Problems of COMMUNISM

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Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance

By Donald S. Zagoria

EDITOR'S NOTE: There are many approaches to the study of Sino-Soviet relations—e.g., the historical (which might consist in an examination of the actual political collaboration between the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia), the ideological (revolving, say, on the issue of Mao's "originality"), or the geopolitical (in which current events would be subordinated to an analysis of basic demographic and economic trends, projected into the future).

Mr. Zagoria's survey of the most recent developments in this field does not fall into any of the above categories. Nor, for that matter, is it the purpose of the author to examine the cohesive (and, as he makes it clear, by far dominant) elements in the alliance, as compared to the divisive factors. His aim, in other words, is not so much to present both *sides of the picture, as to examine one in detail. Yet as the disagreements, the tensions and frictions between the two major Communist powers emerge in bolder relief, it becomes imperative to study even their most minute and indirect manifestations, for it is only through this method that a fuller understanding of the entire picture may be gained.*

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV FLEW to Peking last October to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Chinese People's Republic, the marked coolness of the reception he received, as well as the fact that his talks with Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders failed to produce even the customary piously-worded joint communique, strongly fortified the impression abroad that all was not going smoothly between the "Big Two" of the Communist world. Since then, there have been further significant indications of a deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

On the Soviet side, Khrushchev has not concealed his annoyance at the intransigence of his Chinese ally. In two major speeches shortly after his return from Peking, he voiced criticisms which, though not explicitly naming Communist China, seemed clearly aimed at the policies of the CPC leadership. The first of these criticisms was voiced in his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959. Upholding efforts towards a "mutual accommodation" between East and West, Khrushchev made a highly unusual reference to Trotsky's "adventuristic policy" expressed in the "notorious slogan of 'neither peace nor war'," which he said had created serious difficulties for the newborn Soviet state.[1] This was an implicit, yet fairly obvious, rebuke to Peking for its unwillingness to improve relations with the West, and Khrushchev's pointed reference to Trotsky, the arch-heretic of the Communist world, sharply emphasized the gravity of his charge.

The second criticism came in Khrushchev's address to the Hungarian party congress at Budapest a month later (December 1). Under the guise of reviewing the lessons taught by the "mistakes" of the Rakosi leadership—lessons which, he declared, "other Communist and Workers' Parties cannot but heed"—Khrushchev declared that Communist leaders cannot "disregard objective conditions" (an admonition that may well have referred to the frenetic pace of Communist China's economic program), and that, while no Communist Party is immune from

Mr. Zagoria is an American analyst and writer in the field of Communist affairs. His "The Spectre of Revisionism" appeared in the July-August 1958 issue of this journal.

[1] *Pravda,* November 1, 1959.

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making mistakes in socialist construction, "one must have the courage openly to admit one's mistakes and to correct them in time."[2] He sternly added that "if we become conceited, if we commit mistakes in our leadership, if we distort the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on the building of socialism and communism, those mistakes can be exploited by the enemies of communism, as happened in 1956"—a not very subtle warning that Peking's extremist policies might lead to insurrection.

Notwithstanding such Soviet pressure, the Chinese Communist leadership has stubbornly persisted in its course. At home it continues to pursue an overambitious economic "leap forward" and to press ahead with a vigorous commune program, just recently extended to urban areas. (Its unwillingness to heed Soviet criticisms of the communes was probably behind Chinese Communist nonparticipation in the top-level intra-bloc conference on agricultural policy held in Moscow in February, at which the communes almost certainly would have been brought up if China had attended.)[3] Peking's determination to hew to its present domestic programs—with or without Soviet support—already had been made unmistakably clear by CPC General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping in a special article for *Pravda* on the occasion of the Chinese Communist tenth anniversary. While calling for Soviet assistance and support, Teng asserted in unusually independent terms that "under all conditions the Chinese people have always carried on their struggle resolutely on their own."[4]

AT THE SAME TIME, Peking continues to flout Khrushchev's "soft" line vis-à-vis the West. This defiant Chinese posture was evidenced anew at the most recent meeting of Warsaw Pact signatories held in Moscow on the heels of the agricultural parley. Though attending only as an observer (China not being a pact member), the Chinese Communist representative, Kang Sheng, delivered a speech whose bellicosity was completely out of line with the relatively moderate tone of the final conference communique: he not only attacked the United States in uncompromising terms, sternly warning that Communists must not let themselves be misled by American "peace gestures," but also implicitly rebuked the Soviet Union for its neutral stand regarding China's disputes with its non-Communist South Asian neighbors.[5] Significantly, the speech was not reported by bloc news media except those of Communist China.

Such evidences of discord—and they have been numerous in recent months—obviously do not prove that the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance is near, much less that the Russians are seeking an accommodation with the West largely out of fear of Communist China. Nevertheless, they do seem to indicate that the strains are more serious and affect more aspects of Sino-Soviet relations than ever before. The present article proposes to examine five major areas of disagreement: ideology, the Chinese communes, Khrushchev's strategy of East-West détente, Communist policy toward the "colonial liberation" movements, and the question of nuclear weapons for Communist China. While there are still other areas of stress, these five, in the author's judgment, are among the most important.

Before proceeding with the discussion, however, the writer should perhaps note that he does not view at all seriously the possibility that Moscow and Peking may be deliberately feigning their differences for purposes of deception, or that each partner may be playing an assigned role in a pre-arranged scheme of maneuver designed to keep the West off balance. Their present divergences—as reflected in official speeches and party journals in both countries—appear much too real, acute and persistent to admit of such a possibility. Moreover, if they were merely attempting to deceive the West, they would hardly be doing it in such fashion as to deceive at the same time their own party followings, as well as those in the rest of the bloc who look to the Soviet and Chinese party organs for indications of the respective official lines. Nor would they have carried the deception to the point of contributing to the split of the Indian Communist Party over the issue of the party's stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The Locus of Ideological Authority

As Mr. Richard Lowenthal has pointed out in an earlier article on these pages, the ideological and ultimately the political unity of an alliance of totalitarian states "can only be maintained if the right of a single authority to interpret the ideology in the face of changing conditions is recognized by all."[6] It has now become apparent, however, that the Chinese Communists, for all their protestations of loyalty to Soviet leadership

[2] *Pravda*, December 2, 1959.

[3] The official conference communique stated that representatives of North Korea and Outer Mongolia (the only two Asian countries to participate) had attended "at their own request", indicating that there had been no such request from China.

[4] *Pravda*, October 1, 1959.

[5] New China News Agency (NCNA), February 5, 1960.

[6] "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance, *"Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February), 1959, pp. 14-24.

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WAR AND FEAR: TWO VIEWPOINTS

Peking

[According to Mao Tse-tung], "if the imperialists insist on unleashing another war, we should not be afraid of it . . . World War I was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. World War II was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism."

In the face of a wild beast, we must not show cowardice in the least degree.

—Yu Chao-li, "On imperialism as the source of war in modern times, and on the way for all peoples to struggle for peace," *Red Flag* (Peking), No. 7, March 30, 1960.

Moscow

Let us not approach the matter commercially and figure out the losses this or the other side would sustain. War would be a calamity for all the peoples of the world.

Imagine what will happen when bombs begin to explode over cities. These bombs will not distinguish between communists and non-communists . . . No, everything alive can be wiped out in the conflagration of nuclear explosions.

Only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days.

—Respectively from Khrushchev's speeches before the Indian Parliament, Feb. 11, 1960; to members of the French Peace Council, March 23, 1960; and in Vladivostok, Oct. 8, 1959.

of the bloc, are already "moving the papacy to Avignon" and putting forward Peking as the fountainhead of Communist orthodoxy. They regard Mao as the foremost theoretician of the Communist world today; they confidently believe not only that the CPC leadership is the best judge of how to build socialism and communism in China, but also that the Chinese model of socialist construction is in many respects more relevant than the Soviet for underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Asia; and as ideological purists they regard with suspicion the patent opportunism of some of Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies.

The Russians, on the other hand, are plainly annoyed at Mao's willfulness and ideological pretensions. They believe that the CPC is making serious errors in the building of socialism in China; they refuse to accept Peking's claim that some of its practices might be applicable elsewhere in the bloc; and they regard some Chinese policies as manifestations of "left-wing adventurism."

Since 1958, when Chinese communism entered its neo-Stalinist phase, ideological pronouncements emanating from Peking have been characterized by three elements which cumulatively pose a challenge to Soviet ideological primacy in the Communist world: chauvinism, "fundamentalism," and evangelism. The chauvinistic element has expressed itself in a revival of the concept of "Mao's ideology," which had lapsed into temporary desuetude after 1953: it involves the portrayal of Mao as the leading theoretician of the Communist world and—at times—has been carried even to the length of placing Maoism on a higher level than Marxism-Leninism itself, not to mention "Khrushchevism." One of the more extravagant of these portrayals—yet not untypical in its exaggeration of Mao's position, is the following excerpt from a September 1959 article by Party Secretary Liu Lan-tao:

> It is very natural for us to associate the complete victory of our democratic revolution, the great victory of socialist revolution, the spectacular achievement of socialist construction, and the high international prestige of our country with the glorious name of our great leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the most outstanding exponent of the heroic proletariat of our country, the most distinguished representative of our great nation, a beacon of our country's road to communism, and the most outstanding contemporary revolutionist, statesman, and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism. He has creatively enriched the treasures of Marxism-Leninism on a series of important questions. . . . The more than 600 million people of our country have placed in him their hopes for their own happiness and future and consider him the incarnation of communism and truth, and the symbol of invincibility.[7]

Another paean to Mao, recently broadcast over the Chinese home radio, pointedly asserted that "we must study Marxism-Leninism *as well as* the Mao Tse-tung ideology"[8] (author's italics)—implying that the latter comes first.

It was against the background of this ideological chauvinism in Peking that Khrushchev, in his speech to the Hungarian party congress, warned against conceit on the part of "the leaders of this or that [Communist]

[7] *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, September 28, 1959.
[8] Speech by Hu Hsi-kuei, Vice President of Peking University, "Mao Tse-tung's Ideology Glows 100,000 Feet High," Peking Radio (Home Service), January 24, 1960.

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country."[9] Moscow, moreover, has sought to minimize the importance of Mao's contributions to Communist ideology. In his formal message of greeting on the occasion of the Chinese leader's 65th birthday in December 1958, Khrushchev congratulated Mao on his *"faithfulness* to the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism," not on his creativity.

At the same time, the Chinese challenge appears to have stimulated a deliberate although as yet low-keyed Soviet effort to build up Khrushchev as a counterweight to Mao in the realm of ideology. Thus, one of the primary purposes of the 21st CPSU Congress in early 1959 —whose convocation had been decided by the Central Committee Plenum in September 1958, when Chinese ideological claims connected with the communes were at their height—was quite evidently to provide Khrushchev with a forum for correcting Peking's "erroneous" views regarding the transition to communism, and for presenting the most detailed Soviet theoretical statement on this subject in recent years. Much of Khrushchev's congress report was clearly designed to refute the Chinese contention that the communes represented a short cut to communism: he insisted, for example, that the transition to communism is "a natural historic process which cannot be intentionally violated or bypassed"; and—without specifically citing the Chinese communal system of partial free-supply, hailed by the CPC as a beginning of Communist distribution according to need—he criticized "some comrades" for "prematurely" advocating introduction of this communist principle, which "would mean doing damage to the building of communism."[10]

"Fundamentalism" and Evangelism

Divergent Chinese and Soviet attitudes towards ideology itself, both as an animating force and as an explanation of reality, are another divisive element. Perhaps because their own revolution is much younger, the Chinese Communists are imbued with an extraordinarily zealous, if not mystical, faith in the power of the Marxist ideology, and with the determination to keep it pure. There is a strong conviction—epitomized in the slogan "politics takes command"—that ideological and organizational work can overcome all obstacles, however great. There is an uncompromising hostility towards any dilution of the faith, evidenced by the fact that the fiercest attacks on Yugoslav communism have come from Communist China. There is a grim determination "to build communism" at breakneck speed regardless of the absence of the material prerequisites. There is a strong tendency towards egalitarianism. Finally, there is scorn for the strength of the capitalist world, coupled with adamant refusal to believe that "imperialism" can change its character, or that the capitalist nations are not unalterably bent on destroying the Communist bloc.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union's more advanced stage of development as well as Khrushchev's temperament make for a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to economic problems at home, to relations with the Yugoslavs and foreign policy in general. Khrushchev himself has said that theory is gray while "the tree of life is green."[11] Although some steps have been taken to correct the gross inequalities of the Stalin era, there are no signs of a revival of early Bolshevik egalitarianism. In its economic policies, the Soviet leadership seems much more conscious than the Chinese of the limits imposed by "objective conditions"; it takes a more realistic view of human nature and the need for incentive to spur productivity; and there seems to be greater recognition of the strength, as well as the peaceful intentions, of the capitalist West.

The Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological primacy has been further sharpened by the evangelism of the Peking leadership. To be sure, in the wake of the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956, Peking's evangelistic efforts were directed towards restoring the shattered unity of the Soviet European bloc—as evidenced by Chou En-lai's conciliation endeavors in Warsaw and Budapest early in 1957, probably with Moscow's blessing. Since 1958, however, Communist China has shown a disposition to spread its ideological views and some of its practices to other countries of the bloc even when it was well aware that these were not approved by Moscow. Chinese Communist journals have claimed from the very inception (in May 1958) of the CPC's "general line," the progenitor of both the "great leap forward" and the communes, that it is "significant" for other members of the bloc.[12] This is a point which Moscow has never

[9] *Pravda,* December 2, 1959.

[10] Khrushchev's report to the 21st CPSU Congress, *Pravda,* January 28, 1959. In a later speech at the congress, Soviet Ambassador to Peking Pavel Yudin warned against "the slightest manifestation of utopianism in defining the conditions and methods of building communism." (*Pravda,* February 6, 1959.) For an analysis of the congress as a response to Chinese doctrinal claims, see Richard Lowenthal, "Khrushchev's 'Flexible Communism'—The 21st Congress in Moscow," *Commentary,* April 1959, pp. 277-84.

[11] Khrushchev speech at Bulgarian party congress, *Pravda,* June 4, 1958.

[12] *Hsueh Hsi* (Study), May 31, 1958. See also lead editorial in *Chi-hua ching-chi* (Planned Economy), June 1958, and Liu Shao-ch'i, in *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* Prague, Oct. 1959.

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conceded; it speaks of the line, if at all, as a specific Chinese response to specifically Chinese conditions.

The communes, in particular, have been represented by the Chinese Communists as having much more than a limited national significance. When Chen Po-ta, a member of the CPC Politburo, made the first public mention of these new organizations, he cited Lenin—out of context—as authority for the thesis that the existence in Asia of "special conditions unknown to the European nations" necessitates the adoption of "special forms."[13] The clear implication of his statement was that the communes represented the most appropriate organizational model for all Asian countries building socialism.

Peking's evangelism has also manifested itself in efforts to urge China's militant foreign policy views upon other bloc Communist parties. The Chinese observer's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting was one example, and there have been others.[14] Indeed, it will not be at all surprising if Liu Shao-ch'i's forthcoming visit to Eastern Europe, recently announced by Peking, is used as the occasion for a fresh attempt to mobilize satellite support for the Chinese Communist viewpoint.

Impact of the Chinese Challenge

All three of these aspects of Peking's ideological posture have, as a matter of fact, found support within the bloc. In sharp contrast to the attitude taken by Moscow, the ruling party elites in some Communist countries have consistently voiced warm praise for Mao's theoretical contributions; some have agreed that Chinese methods of building socialism are relevant elsewhere; some have expressed strong admiration for the revolutionary élan generated by the Chinese party; and at times some have inclined toward support of Peking's militant foreign policy stance. In East Germany particularly, these tendencies have been so pronounced that it is scarcely an exaggeration to speak of a Peking-Pankow ideological axis.[15]

This strong East German affinity for Peking's ideological positions provides evidence that the party elites of the individual bloc countries are not automatically aligning themselves with Moscow or with Peking, on all issues of Sino-Soviet conflict, simply according to geographic location. Local vested interests obviously exert an important influence, and will probably continue to do so: so long as Moscow and Peking offer variant ideological approaches, the elite of each country will tend to support that approach which most conforms to its own interests. Thus, for instance, the Poles have welcomed those aspects of the Chinese Communist ideological position which support their own contention that each country must build socialism in a manner consistent with its particular conditions. Other satellite parties, particularly those still under Stalinist leadership (such as the East German, Czech and Albanian), have been attracted by Chinese Communist militancy.

But Sino-Soviet ideological differences are not merely conducive to disunity among the individual bloc parties; perhaps even more important is their potential effect as a stimulus to factionalism within both the Soviet and Chinese party leaderships. In Communist China, "right-wing" opposition to Mao's policies can find support for its criticisms in past Soviet experience, as indeed it has with respect to the communes.[16] Moreover, the general "rightist" objections relating to domestic policy—and their nature can easily be inferred from the attacks on them in Chinese Communist propaganda media[17]—are essentially the same as the criticisms obliquely voiced in Soviet official speeches and party journals. To what extent the Soviet leadership has consciously sought to encourage the "rightist" faction in the CPC is open to conjecture, but it seems not unlikely that some of Khrushchev's veiled criticisms of Maoist policies were intended

[13] *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), Peking, July 16, 1958.

[14] *E.g.*, militant speeches by Li Hsien-nien during the visit of an East German delegation to Peking in January 1960 (see *Survey of China Mainland Press*, U. S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, January 22, 1960) also speech by Chinese delegate Tan Chen-lin at Hungarian party congress, December 1, 1959.

[15] In contrast to Khrushchev's birthday message congratulating Mao for his "faithfulness" to Marxism-Leninism, East German leader Walter Ulbricht paid tribute to Mao's "valuable enrichment" of Marxism-Leninism and of the Socialist Unity [East German Communist] Party. Ulbricht again dwelt upon Mao's ideological contributions at the CPR tenth anniversary celebrations in Peking, even going so far as to say that Khrushchev, in visiting the United States, had acted in consonance with a "Marxist finding" of Mao's. The East Berlin *Die Nation* also wrote at this time that the Chinese "leap forward" set an example for all bloc countries, while Politburo member Herman Matern called the Chinese communes significant for all Asian peoples. Several aspects of Ulbricht's domestic program reflect Chinese Communist influence, and it is noteworthy that East Germany supported Peking's claims in the Sino-Indian border dispute for more than a month before reverting to a neutral position like Moscow's.

[16] See articles in *Yunnan jih-pao* (Yunnan Daily), Kunming, September 1, 1959, and *Szechuan jih-pao* (Szechuan Daily), Ch'engtu, September 22, 1959.

[17] *Jen-min jih-pao* declared on October 21, 1959, that the "rightist opposition" criticized the leap-forward program as a violation of "objective economic laws," claimed that the theory of "relying on the masses" obscured the real need for technological efficiency, that the communes had been set up "much too soon", and that the theme of "struggle" had been overdone.

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to influence the course of policy debates within the Chinese Communist leadership.[18]

Conversely, a re-emergent left-wing opposition to Khrushchev inside the CPSU might very well cite Maoist ideological arguments as justification for charging the new Soviet *vozhd* with pursuing "rightist" policies. At present, there are few overt indications that such an opposition exists; nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that some of those who pay lip-service to the Khrushchev line entertain latent suspicions of his heavy reliance upon capitalist incentives, the abolition of the MTS (machine tractor stations), and the current Soviet strategy of detente with the West. It is not at all unlikely that the recent fall from grace of Alexei Kirichenko, formerly a ranking Khrushchev protege, stemmed from some such reservations about the Soviet leader's policies. In short, although ideology has hitherto been generally regarded as a unifying element in the Sino-Soviet alliance, a good case can now be made for the thesis that it has become as much a divisive as a cohesive force.

The Communes

Sino-Soviet disagreement over the Chinese communes has recently been overshadowed by more acute differences on issues of international policy. However, since the conflict appears no nearer resolution than it did a year and a half ago, a recapitulation of its most relevant aspects seems worthwhile.

It is particularly significant that the Soviet leadership apparently knew nothing of the Chinese plans for the communes until these were already well advanced. Ample evidence indicates that preparations for establishing the communes on a nationwide scale were already actively under way during March-May 1958. Yet, as late as June, Khrushchev gratuitously praised the CPC for its "creativity" in having "found original forms to implement Lenin's [farm] cooperative plan."[19] It seems highly unlikely, in the light of the Soviet leader's disapproval of the communes after their unveiling, that he would have complimented the Chinese specifically on "original forms" of agricultural organization, if he had known that the commune program was in preparation. Even later, on August 18, a *Pravda* editorial described the Chinese peasants as speaking with "enthusiasm about the great possibilities of the cooperative system"—this only a few weeks before the CPC Central Committee resolution on the communes (published September 10) affirmed that the cooperatives were no longer adequate to fill China's economic needs. That there was so little, if any, prior consultation on an initiative—even though domestic—of such a radical character and having broad implications for the whole bloc, necessarily calls into question the closeness of Sino-Soviet collaboration in other areas.

Soviet opposition to the communes themselves stems from ideological, historical, and economic reasons. The ideological aspect has already been adequately discussed by other writers in this journal and elsewhere.[20] As for the historical reasons, they derive from the unsuccessful Soviet experiment with agricultural communes shortly after the 1917 revolution. As Stalin said in 1934, the early communes failed because of underdeveloped technology, a shortage of products, and the premature practice of egalitarianism. This failure left a lasting impression on the minds of the Soviet leaders, as evidenced by Khrushchev's reference to it in his remarks concerning the Chinese experiment to United States Senator Hubert Humphrey at the time of the latter's Moscow visit, and again by his statement last July that the founders of the early Soviet communes "had a poor understanding of what communism is and how it is to be built."[21]

SOVIET ECONOMIC objections to the communes are of a basic character. Even before the Chinese experiment was known, several articles published in Soviet journals in the spring of 1958 indicated that the USSR had indefinitely postponed any new move to form agricultural communes at home (or, by implication, elsewhere in the Soviet orbit) because these organizations require a much higher level of economic development. The dean of Soviet economists, Academician S. Strumilin, put it this way:

> **. . . since the communist principle of distribution presupposes inexhaustible sources of abundance, it would be the sheerest absurdity to begin applying this principle to the collective farm countryside, the most backward sector of the socialist economy. Therefore, transformation of the artel into a commune has been precluded in practice for an entirely indefinite period.[22]**

[18] For example, just at the time that the CCP leaders were probably discussing the fate of the Chinese communes in preparation for the Lushan Plenum of August 1959, Khrushchev emphasized the failure of the early Soviet communes in a speech in Poland (*Pravda,* July 21, 1959).

[19] Khrushchev speech at Bulgarian party congress. See fn. 11.

[20] Lowenthal, *loc. cit* (see fn. 6); also Alexander Dallin, "Commune Controversy," *The New Leader,* April 20, 1959.

[21] Khrushchev speech in Poland (see fn. 18).

[22] In *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Moscow, March 25, 1958. See also the same author's article in *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* Moscow, No. 5 (May) 1958; and I. Glotov, in *Kommunist,* April 1958.

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If Soviet economists consider their own countryside still too "backward" to support agricultural communes, what must they think of the capacity of rural China to support such organizations, however modified?

This basic Soviet objection to the communes clearly was not removed by the limited concessions embodied in the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in December 1958, which moderated some of the most radical features of the communes and soft-pedalled the initial claims regarding their ideological significance. Moreover, although the Sixth Plenum's action was generally interpreted in the West as signifying a substantial retreat in the face of both domestic opposition and Soviet pressure, the Soviet reservations were not only unaltered but certainly better known to Peking when the Eighth CC Plenum, meeting at Lushan in August 1959, decided to inject new vigor into the commune program. This decision was reflected in the new "hard" line initiated by the CPC in September, which included a strong defense of the communal mess halls on practical as well as theoretical grounds, and called for the early reactivation of those that had been dissolved "by mistake." After Lushan, there was a renewed emphasis on ideological claims which had met with strong Soviet disfavor from the start, and the CPC leadership even carried its defense of the communes to the pages of the Soviet press, where it vehemently rejected the "right opportunist" view that the program was "in an awful mess."[23]

For their part, the Soviet leaders have studiously avoided direct references to the Chinese communes in their formal policy statements—though they have commented critically on them in "private" or unofficial interviews. The Soviet central press has similarly disregarded the communes, and the rare articles discussing them which have been published in the Soviet Union have appeared almost exclusively in specialized journals.[24]

Peking and Khrushchev's Diplomacy

It is unquestionably in the sphere of Communist international strategy that Sino-Soviet differences have become most apparent and acute. At least two opposing hypotheses have been advanced to explain Khrushchev's evident interest in the relaxing East-West tension. The first, recently stated in extreme form by Isaac Deutscher, holds that Khrushchev is playing a "waiting game" based, according to Deutscher, on the Soviet leader's belief that:

> . . . contrary to the traditional Marxist and Leninist assumptions, capitalism may well refrain from war even if it finds itself to be the loser in peaceful competition, because in the nuclear age, and in view of the growing Soviet military superiority, capitalism cannot even hope to improve its chances through war. This being so, there is no reason why the Communist bloc should not accept a policy of self-containment until the time when the Soviet Union will have overtaken the United States industrially and when its higher standards of living and of social efficiency and organization will make the appeal of communism irresistible to peoples outside the Soviet Union.[25]

The opposing view is that Khrushchev is not at all willing to accept a policy of self-containment, but is merely using his present soft tactics to create a favorable climate for the forthcoming summit parleys. According to this view, the detente will prove short-lived, particularly if the Soviet Union fails to extract substantial Western concessions at the summit.

In the present writer's belief, Peking's very evident and strenuous opposition to Khrushchev's tactics of detente is the best evidence that the Soviet leader is seeking a more or less long-term relaxation—one that will last beyond the summit talks, and probably for at least the duration of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (through 1965). For if Khrushchev's aim were merely to "soften up" the West for the summit negotiations, and if the "waiting game" is then to be abandoned in favor of a return to more aggressive tactics, why should the Chinese Communists manifest such virulent disapproval? The logical answer would appear to be that Khrushchev has given the Chinese leaders to understand that his soft tactics are indeed not just a maneuver but a new phase of Soviet diplomacy.

Chinese objections to these tactics were made quite clear just the day after Khrushchev arrived in the United States last September for his talks with President Eisenhower. In its issue released September 16, the CPC theoretical organ *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag)—ostensibly criticizing erroneous views on imperialism prevalent among the former Chinese democratic bourgeoisie—actually appeared to have Khrushchev in mind when it warned against cherishing "illusions of some kind" about imperialism and harboring the "foolish view" that imperialism, if not provoked, might reverse its course. Quoting Mao to the effect that "it is impossible to change the fundamental nature of imperialism," the journal re-

[23] Teng Hsiao-ping article in *Pravda* (see fn. 4).

[24] E.g., articles in *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* released October 16, 1958; *Sovetskoye Kitayevedeniye* (Soviet Chinese Studies), No. 4, 1958; and *Voprosy Filosofii,* Moscow, No. 9, 1959.

[25] "Khrushchev Plays the Waiting Game," *The Reporter,* January 21, 1960.

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jected attitudes "obscuring the line" between "the enemy and ourselves," appealed for a policy of strength towards the West, and dismissed the idea that such a policy would involve greater risks. "To imperialism and its jackals," declared *Red Flag*, "the question of provocation simply does not arise. Provocation or no provocation, they will remain the same."[26]

Whatever arguments in defense of his policies Khrushchev may have presented to the Chinese leaders during his immediately subsequent visit to Peking, they obviously did little to assuage the Chinese objections. Even during Khrushchev's attendance at the anniversary celebrations, Soviet and Chinese comments on the international scene manifested a sharp divergence which has not only persisted but even intensified since. Khrushchev himself, in his Peking speeches, stressed the preventability of war, credited United States government leaders with a sincere desire to ease international tension, and called for "realistic" acceptance of coexistence because there is "no other way."[27] In striking contrast, Chinese official statements shunned the preventability-of-war theme completely, asserted that Communist China was "not afraid of any war threat," accused the United States of dubious sincerity in negotiations and of not renouncing policies of aggression, and urged a "long-term, unremitting struggle against U. S. imperialism." Not only was no joint communique issued at the end of Khrushchev's visit, but the Soviet leader, in a remarkable parting statement which seemed intended to disassociate himself from the views of his Chinese hosts, declared that "we Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty . . . to liquidate the cold war."[28]

December 1959—the month of Eisenhower's 11-nation tour of Europe and South Asia—found Moscow and Peking trading further oblique criticisms of each other's foreign policy. Khrushchev seemingly had in mind the Chinese inclination toward a policy of greater risks when he bluntly asserted, in his December 1 Budapest speech, that "no Communist party anywhere, if it really is Communist, has ever said that it hopes to achieve its aims through war."[29] In return, the CPC's chief organ, *Jen-min jih-pao*, took the occasion of Stalin's birth anniversary to pay special tribute—absent from Soviet comment—to the late dictator's policy of maintaining "a high degree of vigilance against imperialism."[30] The paper went on to quote a 1951 statement by Stalin warning that "should the warmongers resort to lies to trap and deceive the people in order to drag them into another world war, such a war would become inevitable"—a quotation quite obviously incongruous with Khrushchev's current emphasis on the possibility of excluding war forever. Another editorial in the same organ on January 21 remarked, with rather transparent impertinence, that the United States' "two-faced tactics (preparing war while talking peace) still misled some people." As recently as April 1, 1960, *Red Flag* came out with the most vigorous, if still implicit, attack on Khrushchev's foreign policy thus far made by Peking. In a long leading article (reported by NCNA, March 30), it flatly contradicted the Soviet view that war is no longer inevitable; quoting Lenin, it is argued that the "imperialist policy of plunder is bound to lead to war" and declared that whoever thinks the imperialists want peace "is a very naive person."

Several explanations can be offered for Chinese Communist opposition to Khrushchev's policy of relaxing international tension. First, the Peking leadership seems

[26] NCNA, September 16, 1959.

[27] Khrushchev's speeches upon arrival in Peking and at subsequent banquet, both reported in *Pravda*, October 1, 1959.

[28] *Ibid.*, October 5, 1959.

[29] *Pravda*, December 2, 1959.

[30] Reprinted in English translation in *Peking Review*, December 1959.

TWO VIEWS

Is War Inevitable?

PEKING: *Imperialism is by nature predatory . . . The imperialist policy of plunder is bound to lead to war. . . . It is absolutely impermissible for us to mistake certain tactical changes on the part of imperialism for changes in the nature of imperialism . . . imperialism will never change its nature and basic policy. As long as imperialism exists, it will always exert itself to the full to realize its policy of plunder, resorting principally to war at one time and to "peaceful" means at another.*

—Yu Chao-li in Red Flag, March 30, 1960.

MOSCOW: *It may be said: But capitalism will still exist, hence there will still be adventurers who might start a war. That is true, and it must not be forgotten. As long as capitalism exists there may always be people who "in the face of common sense" will want to plunge into a hopeless venture.*

Our party at its 20th and 21st congresses concluded that in present conditions there is no longer a complete inevitability of war . . .

—Khrushchev's speeches to the 21st Party Congress, Jan. 27, 1959, and the Supreme Soviet, Jan. 14, 1960.

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to believe that conditions of external tension are necessary to enable it to exact from the population the sacrifices required by its frenetic program for building socialism. Secondly, the Chinese leaders probably fear that friendlier Soviet relations with the United States will heighten their own isolation and lead to a freezing of the Far Eastern status quo, depriving them of Taiwan and reducing the chances of spreading Communist China's influence and power in Asia, as well as in Africa and the Middle East.

A third reason seems to be that Soviet strides in weapons technology have given rise to divergent Chinese and Soviet strategic assumptions. Since the first Soviet sputnik launching and ICBM test in the fall of 1957, Chinese Communist propaganda has heavily stressed Soviet military superiority and Western weakness, while Moscow has shown much less inclination to underrate the West militarily. The Peking leadership seems to believe that the Soviet advance in weapons since 1957 has radically altered the balance of military power in favor of the Communist bloc, and that this advantage should be exploited by pursuing a much more assertive foreign policy than is presently being followed by Khrushchev. In short, the Chinese evidently favor a policy of "brinksmanship" on the assumption that the West, aware of its relative weakness, will not be provoked into a counteraction that would precipitate an all-out war.

There is a fourth and final factor which seems to be at the heart of the conflicting Chinese and Soviet approaches to the international situation. Whereas Soviet foreign policy appears to reflect genuine fear of an all-out nuclear war and a desire to minimize the risks of such a catastrophe, Peking seems more insensitive to the dangers involved and willing to take much greater risks. Thus, Moscow has been increasingly frank in admitting that a nuclear war will result in mutual destruction and, since 1956, has been gradually adjusting its doctrine to the realities of a world menaced by nuclear annihilation. On the contrary, Peking refuses to concede that the socialist camp will suffer intolerable losses in all-out war; indeed it has even boasted that World War III would result in "several hundred million more" turning to socialism. (See box on p. 3.)

Colonial Liberation Policy

Sino-Soviet divergences over the broad issue of East-West relaxation carry over into the more specific area of policy towards the nationalist and "colonial liberation" movements in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. There is evidence to suggest that Khrushchev's "waiting game" has already entailed a substantial shift in Soviet tactics in this area. A good case can be made, for example, that Soviet intervention was responsible for the sudden cessation of the Communist offensive in Iraq in the summer of 1959, and that the reason for this action was Khrushchev's desire to demonstrate Soviet "good faith" in the Middle East prior to his visit to the United States.[31] Much more concrete evidence has since been provided by the Soviet about-face in regard to the Algerian rebellion. This was doubtless in the interest of "softening up" de Gaulle in preparation for Khrushchev's visit to France, but it may also be indicative of a broader shift in strategy subordinating support of colonial liberation movements to efforts for wooing the colonial powers away from close collaboration with the United States, and thus weakening the Western alliance. While there is no way of telling whether the Soviet shift represents a short-term tactical maneuver or something more lasting, Peking's clear-cut refusal to go along with it might suggest Chinese Communist concern lest the shift be not just a gesture before the summit, but part of a new phase of Soviet diplomacy.

In any event, the Algerian issue has provided a striking example of Sino-Soviet disagreement. In his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet last October, Khrushchev suddenly reversed the previous Soviet position of hostility to de Gaulle's proposals for a cease-fire in Algeria—a move which quickly prompted the French Communist Party to follow suit and confess that it had erred in its earlier rejection of the cease-fire plan. Since then, Moscow has maintained a cautious but uncritical position on the Algerian question, has accepted at face value de Gaulle's offer of self-determination to the Algerians, and has adopted a hopeful attitude toward the chance of future French-FLN negotiations. During the last crisis in Algeria, Soviet comment approvingly viewed de Gaulle as standing by his self-determination offer, and Khrushchev's Paris visit brought a reaffirmation of Soviet sympathy.

Peking, however, has not withdrawn its hostility to Gaullist policy. In fact, shortly after Khrushchev's speech enunciating the new Soviet line, a Peking propaganda broadcast took an implicit slap at it by denouncing de Gaulle's Algerian proposals as "nothing but a trick from A to Z."[32] Since then, the Chinese Communists have continued to voice, at least by implication, their opposition to the French-Algerian negotiations and their preference for a continuation of hostilities.[33]

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[31] Deutscher, *loc. cit.*

[32] Peking Radio broadcast in Indonesian, November 12, 1959.

[33] See Peking comment on "Imperialists, Quit Africa Day," NCNA, November 30, 1959.

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Why has Peking opposed the new Soviet line on Algeria? In the first place, the Chinese leaders may have felt that Khrushchev's gambit undermined the position of the FLN extremists, who want to continue the war. Secondly, they probably figured that, while Khrushchev might gain from a show of goodwill toward the French, Peking had nothing to gain and a great deal to lose. Neither Khrushchev's talks with de Gaulle, nor the eventual summit parleys from which Communist China will be excluded, could be expected to further Peking's interests; on the other hand, the Chinese Communists consider it very much in their interest to keep alive not only the Algerian rebellion but anti-colonial nationalist disturbances everywhere, which they regard as affording greater opportunities for the spread of Chinese Communist influence and power.

It is significant in this connection that several FLN delegations have gone to Peking in the past year, evidently to seek Chinese Communist arms and support. Chinese propaganda, moreover, has recently been taking the line that the Algerian rebellion "sets an example" for other African colonial peoples. Thus, Peking seems to regard itself, and not the Russians, as the leaders of the anti-colonial movement in Asia, Africa, and perhaps even in the Middle East. It consequently must view with utmost dislike what it regards as opportunistic Soviet overtures to the colonial powers tending to impede nationalist revolution in these areas. Finally, the Chinese leadership may also regard the Soviet policy as disadvantageous to the Communist bloc as a whole, on the theory that bloc objectives can best be served by halting fruitless negotiations with the colonial powers and stepping up Communist support of nationalist movements.

Nuclear Weapons for China?

Perhaps the most sensitive issue between Moscow and Peking—and the one on which there is the least information—is that of Soviet willingness, or unwillingness, to share nuclear weapons with Communist China. While the Russians have probably been aiding China's efforts to develop a nuclear capability of its own, there is reason to believe that Moscow has thus far held back from agreeing to supply the Chinese with Soviet nuclear weapons.

Indirect but nonetheless persuasive evidence of a rebuff to Chinese hopes in this direction cropped up in 1958 with the disclosure of a controversy that had arisen within the Chinese Communist armed forces. The party press, backed by several of the top-ranking Chinese army marshals, began a severe attack on an "exclusively military viewpoint" which "some among the military" were said to be advocating, and which—as could be inferred from the official criticisms—involved two principal contentions: (1) advocacy of a revision of Maoist military doctrine, especially with respect to its disparagement of weapons technology in general, and of the "decisiveness" of nuclear weapons in particular; and (2) advocacy of a rapid "modernization" of China's armed forces. The proponents of this viewpoint were accused of exaggerating the importance both of nuclear weapons and of surprise attack in modern warfare: in short, they were clearly demanding such weapons for China, and a revised military strategy based on them.

In a typical denunciation of these views, Marshal Chu Te declared on the anniversary (August 1, 1958) of the People's Liberation Army that "we are not advocates of the sole importance of arms . . . people's hearts, not technology, in the final analysis decide victory or defeat in war."[34] Chu also rapped the tendency to "pay attention only to national defense, but not to the significance of economic construction for national defense" —a clear admonition that modernization of the armed forces, including a nuclear weapons program, must await the prior achievement of China's industrialization goals. On the same day, the Army's official organ assailed those in the military establishment who were "one-sidedly stressing the role of atomic weapons and modern military techniques."[35]

The regime's vigorous rebuttal of the viewpoint of the dissatisfied army group—its persistence in a doctrinal emphasis on human rather than technological resources in warfare, and its insistence upon industrialization as a prerequisite to modernization of the armed forces—clearly reflected adherence to a defense planning based on the assumption of Western military superiority for some time to come. This, in turn, suggests that Moscow had already balked at supplying China with nuclear weapons. If there were any lingering hopes among Chinese army officers that the USSR might provide China with a nuclear capability, Marshal Ho Lung dispelled them in another August 1, 1958, statement warning against reliance on "outside aid" in trying to solve China's military problems.[36]

There have been much more recent evidences suggesting a continuation both of Chinese pressures on Moscow to grant nuclear weapons to China, and of Soviet reluctance to comply. The first may be inferred from the fact

[34] NCNA, August 1, 1959.
[35] *Chieh-fang-chun pao* (Liberation Army News), Peking, August 1, 1958.
[36] *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 1, 1958.

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that Communist China was the only other bloc country to come out with a public endorsement of East Germany's threat of January 26, 1959, to "request its allies to place rocket weapons at its disposal" if the atomic armament of West Germany continues. Such an East German request, declared a *Jen-min jih-pao* editorial (February 4, 1959), was "not only fully justified, but also necessary." The timing of Ulbricht's threat and Peking's endorsement of it—on the very eve of the Warsaw Pact conference in Moscow—suggests a possibility that joint East German and Chinese pressure may have been brought to bear on Khrushchev at the Moscow meeting in the matter of nuclear weapons sharing.

Continuing Soviet resistance to such pressures was suggested by an undated letter addressed by Khrushchev to the European Federation Against Atomic Armament, made public by the TASS News Agency on March 18. Released about six weeks after President Eisenhower had intimated, at his press conference of February 3, the possibility that the United States might share nuclear weapons with its European allies, the letter was clearly calculated to warn that such a step would force the USSR to follow suit. Khrushchev stressed the "undesirability of expansion of the so-called atomic club" and cautioned that U. S. action to supply nuclear weapons to its allies would set off "a kind of chain reaction in the dissemination of nuclear weapons all over the world."

A Summing Up

That the strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance are numerous and acute is, in the writer's view, no longer open to question; but that they are, or will soon become, severe enough to produce an open break is improbable. Isaac Deutscher, in the article referred to earlier, expressed the view that if Stalin and Trotsky had headed two powerful Communist states, a split might never have occurred between them. Khrushchev has demonstrated much greater flexibility than his all-powerful predecessor, and Mao is certainly no Trotskyite firebrand. Moreover, both are undoubtedly still counting on presiding over the disintegration of the West before turning hostile attention to each other. Finally, Peking cannot for the time being do without Soviet military and economic assistance. The Chinese leadership has itself admitted that the 291 industrial projects which Moscow is helping, or has helped, to build form the very core of China's industrialization program.

To say that an open split is unlikely in the near future is not, however, to minimize either the gravity of Sino-Soviet differences—which are intimately bound up with real divergences of national interest—or Peking's determination to pursue an independent course in the face of Soviet pressure whenever it feels its interests jeopardized by Soviet policies. The Chinese have acted in defiance of Moscow's objections in pushing ahead with the commune program at home, and they have challenged Soviet leadership of the bloc by proselytizing among the other bloc Communist parties for the acceptance of Chinese viewpoints and policies. They have not only refused to alter their tactics towards the West even after "comradely discussions" with Khrushchev, but have intensified their attacks on the latter's tactics and policies. In all this, there are the making of further serious conflict between the two Communist giants.

In the final analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese Communists' capacity to pursue independent policies will become progressively greater as China is transformed into a major industrial and nuclear power. In the next several years, as the Chinese pursue their furious efforts to become a modern industrial and military power, and barring any radical change in Western policy toward the Mao regime, the present neo-Stalinist characteristics of Chinese communism are likely to persist, causing an accentuation of Sino-Soviet divergences. Khrushchev, therefore, can probably find little comfort in the words of General Liu Ya-lou, commander of the Chinese Communist air force, who in May 1958 asserted that when Communist China has advanced industrially and technologically to the point of being able to produce its own nuclear weapons, "another new turning point will probably appear in the international situation."[37]

[37] *Chteh-fang-chun pao*, May 23, 1958.

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Soviet Power and Marxist Determinism

By Robert V. Daniels

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM—Marx's doctrine that the course of history is determined by economic forces and the class struggles which they engender—has long been under attack by non-Marxist critics as an arbitrary and inconsistent distortion of the historical record, and as a vulnerable spot in the ideological armor of communism. But paradoxical as it may seem in the light of the volume of such anti-determinist literature, Soviet ideologists have themselves long since repudiated the extreme determinist understanding of historical materialism as "vulgar economic materialism." Stalin set the tone in 1934 for the view which has basicaly prevailed ever since, when he declared:

There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. . . . The part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organizations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional.[1]

While the reason for Stalin's statement was pragmatic —he wanted to fix blame for economic failures on responsible individuals—its implication was to dismiss completely Marx's fundamental conception that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."[2] The line which Stalin enunciated in 1934 meant a radical break from the previous tradition of Communist historical thought. It was typical of Stalin's approach to theory that the break came in consequence of a pragmatic policy statement in which theory was bent to the practical needs of the situation. In this manner almost the whole corpus of Marxian doctrine has been revised and forcibly reinterpreted by the Soviet authorities to conform to their political needs. Theory does not guide practice, but is manipulated to justify it after the fact.

Determinism Before Stalin

Prior to the Russian Revolution, and in large measure up to 1929, the deterministic understanding of historical materialism held sway without dispute among Marxists. Plekhanov, the grand old man of Russian Marxism, tried to argue that every apparent accident or individual influence ultimately expressed the influence of the material conditions of society. When Lenin introduced his doctrine of the party and its role in bringing consciousness to the workers, Plekhanov was prompted to pose the question:

Does there exist an economic necessity which calls forth in the proletariat a demand for socialism, makes it instinctively socialistic, and impels it—even if left to its own resources —on the road to social revolution . . . ? Lenin denies this, in face of the clearly expressed opinions of all the theorists of scientific socialism.[3]

But Lenin, despite the obvious anti-deterministic implications of his theoretical and practical stress on the party, continued to observe the philosophical framework of historical materialism. In 1915 he asserted:

One cannot "make" a revolution; revolutions grow out of

[1] Stalin, Report to the 17th Congress of the CPSU (B), *Problems of Leninism,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1940, p. 529.

[2] Marx, Preface to "The Critique of Political Economy," *Selected Works,* International Publishers, New York, n.d., Vol. I, p. 356.

[3] G. V. Plekhanov, "The Working Class and the Social Democratic Intelligentsia," *Iskra,* August 1, 1904, as quoted in Max Eastman, *Marxism, Is It Science?,* Norton, New York, 1940, p. 223.

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crises and turning points of history which mature objectively (independent of the will of a party or a mass).[4]

The most consistent statement of unqualified determinism was made by Nikolai Bukharin, when he was riding high in the Communist leadership in the 1920's. Bukharin dismissed free will and historical accident altogether; he held that the sense of individual will was an illusion, that social conditions determined the revolutionaries' will as much as anyone else's. He wrote in his *Historical Materialism:*

Marxism does not *deny the will, but explains it.* When Marxists organize the Communist Party and lead it into battle, this action is also an expression of historical necessity.

In 1928, shortly before the change in the philosophical line heralded his own fall, Bukharin told the Sixth Congress of the Communist International:

Marxist social science . . . emphasized that socialism followed "with iron necessity" from the capitalist system of society and that our ideals and our aims were deeply rooted in the objective development of capitalist society.[5]

The Shift Toward Voluntarism

In the meantime a contrary position was being developed by certain Soviet philosophers, in the course of the so-called "philosophical controversy" of the later 1920's. The school of "dialecticians," led by the ex-Menshevik A. M. Deborin, were endeavoring to establish a more Marxist and Hegelian philosophy of science, and in the course of this put new emphasis on qualitative "jumps" between different levels of phenomena and between different stages of social development. With the iron Marxist framework of history thus loosened at its joints, hints began to be heard about the role which the willful action of the Communist Party and its leadership could play in the whole scheme of social development. Dimitri Manuilsky, addressing the Comintern Congress in 1928, held that the relationship posited by historical materialism worked both ways:

To deny the influence of "social-organizational" forms upon the level of the material-productive basis means to abandon Marxism. . . . Social-organizational forms were not only the product of the material-productive structure but . . . influenced the latter.[6]

[4] Lenin, *Sochineniia* (Works), 1st ed., Vol. XIII, p. 164.

[5] Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology,* International, New York, 1926, p. 51.

[6] D. Z. Manuilsky, Report to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, *International Press Correspondence,* no. 63, Sept. 17, 1928.

Contemporary political and economic developments made these philosophical adjustments more than mere scholastic refinement. Stalin, having destroyed Trotsky's Left Opposition in 1927, was casting about for issues to use against Bukharin and the Communist right wing. Observing the difficulties which the Bukharin-sponsored policy of economic caution was meeting in 1928, Stalin turned to the alternative of rapid industrialization which the Trotskyists and the "teleological" school of economic planners had been advocating. This course presumed that deliberate effort by the political leadership could decisively step up the country's rate of economic development. "Our task is not to study economics but to change it," wrote the economist S. G. Strumilin in 1927, adding: "We are bound by no laws. There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot storm."[7]

In 1929, both to defend his own new industrialization policy and to generate new ideological issues for use against the Right Opposition, Stalin launched a violent attack on Bukharin's thinking, particularly the sociological theory of equilibrium. Any hint by Bukharin or any other social theorist that human affairs had to work themselves out according to impersonal laws was denounced as an intrusion of anti-Marxist ideology that sabotaged the party's effort to industrialize the country and collectivize the peasants. The mechanistic reading of Marxian philosophy was condemned in the spring of 1929 as "a clear departure from the Marxist-Leninist philosophical position."[8] The new line, enunciated by another ex-Menshevik, A. S. Martynov, held that it was the party's function not to maintain the existing equilibrium but to smash it.[9] This would presumably facilitate the "dialetical jump" to the plane of complete socialism with its qualitatively different laws of development. Stalin evidently saw in the new hints of philosophic voluntarism an appropriate theoretical justification for his own determination to force the pace of economic development and to overturn the country in what he himself later termed a "revolution from above."

The repercussions of the politics of the Five-Year Plan were felt severely in Soviet historical thought during the

[7] S. G. Strumilin, "Industrializatsiia i epigony narodnichestva" (Industrialization and the epigones of populism), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (Planned Economy), no. 7, 1927, p. 11.

[8] Resolution of the Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Research Institutions, *Pod znamenem marksizma* (Under the banner of Marxism), no. 5, 1929, p. 7.

[9] A. S. Martynov, "Teoriia podvizhnovo ravnovesiia obshchestva i vzaimnootnosheniia mezhdu obshchestvom i vneshnei sredoi" (The theory of dynamic equilibrium of society and the interrelation between society and the external milieu), *Pod znamenem marksizma,* no. 2-3, 1930, p. 75.

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early 1930's. A textbook of historical materialism published in 1932 stated:

> Historical necessity is not . . . mechanistically understood necessity. Determinism in general does not exclude correctly understood freedom of action. . . . Historical necessity is *internally contradictory,* and *subjective* factors of history simultaneously stand opposed to it and find in it *objective* opportunities for their revolutionary activity. Thus Marxism supplies the foundation for the active, operative, creative role of the subjective factor in history, to transform possibility into actuality.[10]

This was evidently the first serious theoretical suggestion among the Russian Communists that the proletarian revolution might never have occurred without the active intervention of the indeterminate subjective factor represented by Lenin and the Bolshevik party organization under him.

The New Historiography

Stalin's endorsement of an activist philosophy was the signal for a sweeping revision of the standards of teaching and writing history in the USSR. In 1934, shortly after Stalin had repudiated the restraints of "objective conditions," the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars issued a decree denouncing the "abstract sociological schemes" which allegedly dominated Soviet history teaching, and upheld instead "the teaching of civic history in an animated and entertaining form with an exposition of the most important events and facts in their chronological sequence and with sketches of historical personages."[11] This was followed by a unique event—the posthumous purging of M. N. Pokrovsky, whose ultra-Marxist economic determinism had dominated Soviet historiography in the years before his death in 1932. Pokrovsky and his followers were condemned in 1936 for heresies ranging over the entire spectrum of philosophic crime—"vulgar economic materialism," "deviation to mechanism," "denial of objective science," "subjective idealism."[12]

With this dramatic turn against the old reading of historical materialism, a flood of literature was released to establish the new version of Marxism and to rehabilitate the nation, the state, ideas, and individuals as fundamental categories of historical analysis. Idealist critics of Marxian historical materialism were entirely vindicated in all but their labels, by such Soviet pronouncements as the following:

> Lenin and Stalin devoted all their strength and experience, all the power of their theoretical genius, all their knowledge of the laws of the class struggle and revolution, in order to prepare the working class and the toilers for the consummation of the socialist revolution.[13]

Stalin himself asserted in 1938 (in the theoretical section of the official party history, attributed directly to him):

> As regards the *significance* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions . . . , historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the role and importance of these factors in the life of society. . . . Once they have arisen they become a most potent force . . . which facilitates the progress of society.[14]

In line with this attitude Stalin revised the Marxist doctrine of the state by emphasizing its positive role in economic development and postponing its "withering away" indefinitely.

From the late 1930's until Stalin's death in 1953 Soviet historical thought adhered closely to these highly voluntaristic premises. This was the era in which the glorification of Lenin and Stalin as uniquely inspired and utterly decisive historical figures resounded *ad nauseam* in every sort of Soviet political and historical writing. The only source of new interpretation was Stalin's own statements, which revealed a crudely animistic understanding of the abstract categories of Marxism. In 1950 Stalin wrote:

> The superstructure is a product of the base, but this does not mean that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its base, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, no sooner does it arise than it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing everything it can to help the new system finish off and eliminate the old base and the old classes.[15]

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[10] M. B. Mitin and I. Razumovsky, *Dialekticheskii i istoricheskii materializm* (Dialectical and Historical Materialism) Moscow, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 404-405.

[11] Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), "On the Teaching of Civic History in Schools of the USSR," May 16, 1934, translated in *The Slavonic Review,* July 1934, p. 204.

[12] A. Shcheglov, "Metodologicheskie istoki oshibok M. N. Pokrovskovo" (The methodological sources of the errors of M. N. Pokrovsky), *Pod znamenem marksizma,* no. 5, 1936, pp. 60-62.

[13] F. Gorokhov, "Rol lichnosti v istorii" (The role of the individual in history), *Pod znamenem marksizma,* no. 9, 1938, p. 76.

[14] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course,* International, New York, 1939, p. 116.

[15] Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics,* International, New York, 1951, p. 10.

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Stalin envisioned a kind of battle between society and its leaders on the one hand, and the laws of economics on the other. Appealing to the authority of Engels on the "leap to freedom" following the socialist revolution, Stalin rejected the notion "that economic laws are elemental in character, that their action is inavertible. . . ." "That is not true," he contended. "It is making a fetish of laws, and oneself the slave of laws." The Bolshevik Revolution was successful because of "the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces," but this law, he maintained, could not operate until a "force" overcame the "resistance" of "obsolescent forces of society."[16] Marxian social science had thus ended in a quagmire of naive personification.

Post-Stalin Embellishments

While Stalin's death was a major turning point for Soviet politics, its effect in the realm of historical theory was comparatively slight. To be sure, the reaction against the abuses of Stalin's personal rule was reflected in an emphatic rejection of the "cult of personality" and periodic calls for de-emphasizing the role of individual geniuses in history. The alternative adopted, however, was scarcely any closer than Stalinism to the understanding of impersonal developmental processes which Marxism had originally stressed. The role of the inspired leader was given over to the party, which became the primary force guiding and leading the working class and the toiling masses. History is now regarded as the product of a mysterious source of conscious, willful, energetic mass action, of which tne party is the indispensable organizer. Khrushchev declared in 1956, "Our people . . . have . . . taken their destiny into their own hands. . . ."[17]

With subtle injection of the nationalist motif, the new official party history asserts:

The basic cause of the victory of the October socialist revolution is that it was led by the working class of Russia. No other unit of the international army of labor has known such tremendous experience accumulated in the briefest historical period. . . . The working class came forth as the leader of nationwide struggle against the autocracy. . . .[18]

[16] Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, International, New York, 1952, pp. 9-10.

[17] N. S. Khrushchev, *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress*, Foreign Languages Publishing, Moscow, 1956, p. 143.

[18] B. N. Ponomarev et al., *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), State Press for Political Literature, Moscow, 1959, p. 238.

The Gospel According to . . .

MARX:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production. . . . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins the epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less radically transformed. . . . No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed, and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.

—From Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx-Engels: Selected Works, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 328-29).

The Erstwhile "LEADING MARXIST":

Further, the superstructure is a product of the basis, but this by no means implies that it merely reflects the basis, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its basis, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having come into being, it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its basis to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing its utmost to help the new system to finish off and eliminate the old basis and the old classes. . . .

In a period of eight to ten years we effected a transition in the agriculture of our country from the bourgeois, individual-peasant system to the socialist, collective-farm system. . . . But this revolution did not take place by means of an explosion, that is, by the overthrow of the existing government power and the creation of a new power, but by a gradual transition from the old bourgeois system in the countryside to a new system. And it was possible to do that because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power. . . .

—From J. Stalin: *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics* (English), Moscow, 1954, pp. 9 and 38-39.

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The notion that the requisite circumstances for revolution were produced by the development of capitalism comes as a minor afterthought two pages later, in the same breath with comments on the weakness of capitalism in Russia. We are still confronted by the utterly un-Marxist notion of the party struggling *against* material difficulties and succeeding only because of its correct leadership, its effective organization, and its proper theoretical inspiration. Despite their terminology, the Communists are still firmly wedded to a theory of the decisiveness of politics over economics.

At no time during the Soviet revision of Marxism has the real issue been squarely faced. Was the "proletarian" revolution in Russia inevitable sooner or later, or did it depend on the accidental intervention of a particular leader and organization who were determined to alter the course of history? Soviet writers have never clarified this point evidently because the party leadership wanted to perpetuate confusion on this score. The reasons for its attitude must be sought in the original psychology of the whole Communist movement, which subscribed to Marxism and the goal of revolution not out of rational conviction that the dictatorship of the proletariat was inevitable, but because these doctrines offered an attractive political vehicle for frustrated and rebellious segments of the Russian intelligentsia. Communist behavior in the ideological realm is fundamentally irrational, and can only be understood as such. The Communists could easily explain away the determinist obstacles in Marxism, but they do not care to do so, preferring a dogmatically imposed self-justification-by-inevitability to the intellectual consistency which would be demanded in an atmosphere of freedom.

Stalin's demise, collective leadership, and the ascendancy of Khrushchev have not altered the basic ambiguities in Soviet historical doctrine, because the doctrinal psychology of the Communists remains essentially as Lenin established it. From Lenin's time on, the Communist leaders have been active men, not philosophers; they have found in Marxian doctrine a more-or-less comfortable rationalization for what they wanted to do or felt should be done. The ambiguities persist because the doctrine must say two contradictory things: that the party's ideology is pure orthodox Marxism, with all its emphasis on scientific laws of inevitable social development; and that nothing will be accomplished unless the party, properly led, struggles to realize its goals. Marxism as now professed by the Communists is a fanciful rationalization—"false consciousness"—to sustain the totalitarian managerial type of social order for which Russia has created the model. Nothing reveals the weakness of this rationalization as clearly as the inconsistencies in Soviet historical thinking. Nothing but the continuation of despotic thought-control can preserve the pseudo-Marxist rationalizations to which all Communist regimes cling.

External Viewpoints

It has been left to non-Russian Marxists to discuss the voluntaristic implications of the Russian Revolution with less equivocation. As early as 1919 the Hungarian critic and philosopher Georg Lukacs attacked "vulgar Marxists" for denying "the role of power in the struggle to achieve and preserve victory in the proletarian revolution." Violence, Lukacs held, was essential in order to change the naturally inauspicious course of history: "The demand that socialism be realized without 'extra-economic' power, through the immanent laws of economic development, is actually synonymous with the eternal survival of capitalist society."[19] In more recent times the British school of Marxists has contributed some common sense on the role of the individual. Maurice Dobb has written, "When the objective situation is of a certain kind, and action has an appropriate direction, such action can have a large, even an epoch-making effect."[20] Christopher Hill concedes that had the Russian Revolution not been led by Lenin, "its course would have been very different."[21]

Frankness about the role of the individual has cropped up again in the post-Stalin era in connection with East European Communist "revisionism." Among the sins charged against the East German theoretician Jürgen Kuczinski was the "idealist" deprecation of the masses expressed in his contention that "where the spirit of many millions sleeps, then it is just the few, whose spirit is not asleep, who make history." From this it followed that the success of the Bolshevik Revolution "depended solely on Lenin's genius."[22] Leszek Kolakowski, the individualistic Polish philosopher who starred briefly after Gomulka's return to power in 1956, repudiated the whole scheme of determinism as a moral snare—"the nightmare of the philosophy of history . . . , pseudo-

[19] Georg Lukacs, "Der Funktionswechsel des historischen Materialismus" (The change in the function of historical materialism), in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (History and class consciousness), Malik, Berlin, 1923, pp. 246, 252.

[20] Maurice Dobb, "Historical Materialism and the Role of the Economic Factor," *History,* February 1951, p. 5.

[21] Christopher Hill, "Le Marxisme et l'histoire" (Marxism and history), *Esprit,* May-June 1948, p. 901.

[22] Jurgen Kuczinski, "Der Mensch, der Geschichte macht" (The man who makes history), *Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft,* East Berlin, no. 1, 1957, pp. 3, 16.

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dialectics which, by transforming morality into an instrument of history, in fact makes history the pretext for disgraceful behavior."[23]

Doctrinal Loopholes

It is clear from this brief discussion that the latter-day exponents of Marxism have all turned against strict economic determinism. Marxists and anti-Marxists disagree only as to the position Marx himself meant to take. "Marx and I," wrote Engels, "are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it."[24] There is reason, therefore, to inquire into what Marx and Engels actually meant by their philosophy of history, and to explore the non-deterministic implications which may be found in it.

Marxism, though represented as a "monistic" philosophy, is permeated with dualism, of two sorts. One of these, underlying all of the foregoing discussion, has been widely recognized—the contrast between the scientific (or pseudo-scientific) analysis of the laws of social development, and the energetic devotion to revolutionary action to make the inevitable come true. This might be called the "predestination paradox," which Marxism shares with Augustinian and Calvinist theology. It makes perfect sense if the irrational motivation of theoretical belief is borne in mind. Neither Marxism nor theology creates the will to act in an energetic but frustrated individual; philosophy only rationalizes and reinforces such will. Thus irrationality and inconsistency are inherent in the Marxists' application of their doctrine from the very beginning.

The second Marxian dualism involves a deep inconsistency in the analytic aspect of Marxism. Contrary to the usual non-Marxist opinion, Marxism does not clearly and simply proclaim the absolute sway of economic conditions and impersonal forces. History makes man, but man makes history, and under certain conditions the individual can free himself from the bonds of historical necessity and exercise a significant influence upon the course of society as a whole. Marxism contains the materials for a voluntaristic theory of any degree. These possibilities were articulated by Engels in some of his late writings after Marx's death, in which he expressed three decisive limitations on Marxian determinism.

[23] Leszek Kolakowski, "Responsibility and History," translated in *East Europe* (New York), March 1958, p. 26.

[24] Engels to J. Bloch, September 21, 1890, in *The Selected Correspondence of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,* International, New York, 1942, p. 477.

One of Engels' basic qualifications of determinism dealt with the relationship between the economic "base" of society and the political and intellectual "superstructure." While economics remained the major force, the relationship was one of reciprocal interaction:

> The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms . . . , forms of law . . . , political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas . . . —also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles. . . . On the whole, the economic movement gets its way, but it has also to suffer reactions from the political movement which it established and endowed with relative independence.[25]

Thus it appears that Stalin was justified in insisting on the importance of action by the political superstructure. Actually both the positive and negative accomplishments of the Soviet state can be fitted into Engels' scheme. There was a danger, he wrote, of a "transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society," and the state had it in its power to oppose the natural trend of events in order to "cut off the economic development from certain paths, and impose it on certain others," at the cost of "the squandering of great masses of energy and material."[26] In sum, institutions of political power and determined individuals in control of them could exercise a momentarily decisive role, if not an ultimately determining one, on the historical process.

The Meaning of Natural Law

In contrast to Marxists like Plekhanov, who held that the individual could be nothing more than the agent of vast social forces, Engels was thus willing to concede a certain influence to historical accident and individual autonomy. This leads to the second of his basic qualifications of determinism. While he was encumbered by archaic terminology, Engels was groping toward the modern conception of natural law as a statistical generalization about probabilities. In 1890 he wrote:

> History makes itself in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, of which each again has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. . . . What each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed. Thus past history proceeds in the manner of a natural process.[27]

[25] Engels to Conrad Schmidt, October 27, 1890, *ibid.*, p. 480.

[26] Engels, 1891, introduction to Marx's *Civil War in France,* International, New York, 1940, p. 21; Engels to Schmidt, October 27, 1890, *Correspondence,* pp. 480-81.

[27] Engels to Bloch, September 21, 1890, *ibid.*, p. 476.

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The individual can be quite free, but he acts amid social circumstances that set up certain probabilities in his responses; given a large number of individuals, the frequency of certain actions or responses—voting behavior or business decisions, for example—may be highly determinate within reasonable limits. Thus the evolution of society as the determinate result of natural laws does not require that every individual action be determined by social conditions; it requires only that a multitude of individuals be acting freely—as in the liberal capitalist society—and that no individual have decisive personal influence.

However, according to Engels' first qualification, there are situations where individuals may indeed exercise decisive influence through the social superstructure, as a result of their intellectual role or their political power. When the course of events is not the product of many individual wills but is dictated by a few or one, what becomes of determinism? The inescapable conclusion is that the scope of the economic factor depends on what decisive individual influence is permitted by the superstructure—in other words, by the society's political institutions. Marxian premises, properly qualified, lead to a theory of the decisiveness of political forms, applicable to any type of social system.

The scope for individual action which this conclusion affords is fully consistent with the role which Soviet doctrine has at various times ascribed to Lenin, Stalin, and the Communist Party. The nature of Russian society has in fact been such as to make political leadership and organization all-important. The voluntarist revision of Marxism under Stalin thus appears to be in close correspondence with the realities of the Soviet pattern of development—even though the Communists refuse to admit that either their theory or their practice deviate from the original Marxian image.

Free Will *vs.* Economic Necessity

Marx and Engels, of course, had no inkling that the outcome of the proletarian revolution could be the Leviathan state of Stalinism. Nevertheless, there were implications in their doctrine which directly pointed to such a development, and Engels unwittingly revealed them in his third major qualification of historical materialism—the notion of the revolution as a "leap to freedom." Engels envisaged socialized production as allowing "man" to become "the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization." Thanks to the essentially superstructural conditions of the socialist political organization and the correct Marxist understanding of the laws of history, "we"—or someone—would have the power "to subject [social forces] more and more to our own will, and by means of them to reach our own ends."[28]

This reasoning implied that by centralizing economic decisions the revolution would suspend the operation of the laws of deterministic probability, and the indeterminate, accidental factor of the will of the man controlling the government could become all-important. If there is but one all-knowing will, the "freedom" to which society leaps is freedom for the leader alone. Therefore the benevolence of individual leaders and the efficacy of the institutions controlling them become vitally important under the conditions of socialism. These qualities are not automatically assured, contrary to the class reasoning of the Leninists. Indeed, the whole experience of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet regime has testified to the damage which ruthless and uncontrolled individuals can do in the name of an ideal.

In the sense that the Soviet leaders are free to control economic forces or to alter the course of social development, "freedom" has been achieved in the USSR to a degree which Marx and Engels never imagined. Soviet society is much less bound than liberal societies by the forces of economic necessity that act with statistical regularity in the decisions of a large number of independent individuals. Decisions are made by an individual or a small group, and there free will rather than determinacy holds sway. But such freedom for the few means political compulsion for the many. The opposite of economic necessity is political totalitarianism.

The paradoxical converse of the Soviet situation is the liberal society which repudiates determinism and pins its faith on free will, but is in reality guided far more by impersonal historical forces that determine with statistical regularity how the population on balance is going to act and how the society is going to change. Freedom for every individual means that the society will be shaped by forces which no individual can control. Obviously there is a middle ground, though it must be explored with care; a major challenge for democratic societies in the remainder of this century will be to devise ways to control and improve the conditions of life which modern men have created, without succumbing to the totalitarian sacrifice of individual freedom which is the price of the omnicompetent state.

[28] Engels, *Anti-Duehring: Herr Eugen Duehring's Revolution in Science,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, pp. 392, 387.

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The Soviet Attitude on Outer Space

By Andrew Swatkovsky

WITHIN A VERY SHORT period of time, the use of outer space has become an important issue in current East-West relations, and one that will grow ever larger as time passes. At present, the Western nations, while placing heavy emphasis upon the development of their missile programs, are relying for their defense primarily upon the use of high-altitude bombers stationed on the American continent, and at NATO and American bases overseas. The Soviet Union, lacking a similar ring of bases surrounding the Western nations, is concentrating upon the development of long-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads and capable of destroying the Western base system as well as of dealing a crippling blow to the industrial network of the Western countries themselves. While the heavy bombers travel efficiently at altitudes of approximately twelve miles, the missiles reach heights of seventy miles and more. The political and military significance of these space vehicles—whether they carry nuclear bombs or instruments for aerial photography or meteorological research—is generally recognized today, and along with this recognition have come numerous efforts to develop a body of international law that would govern traffic in outer space (*i.e.*, the area beyond the air space which is accepted as part of the sovereign territory of a nation). It is little surprising that legal writers in the Soviet Union, where so much has been staked on the development of rocketry, have recently been giving a good deal of attention to these problems.

Early Soviet Air Law

In October 1919, most of the major powers met in Paris to draw up an international agreement regulating the use of air space. Article I of the Paris Convention provided: "The High Contracting Parties recognize that *every power* has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory" [1] (italics added). The same principle was reiterated in Article I of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, otherwise known as the Chicago Convention of 1944.[2] The Soviet Government neither participated in the discussions nor signed either of the two agreements; yet, according to Article I, it nevertheless received the same rights of national sovereignty in air space as the ratifying nations, and Soviet writers have frequently cited the above two agreements in support of their claims regarding air and outer space.

Although articles in certain Soviet journals mention Russian claims to national sovereignty in air space dating as far back as the 16th century, the first serious modern claim, according to the Soviet writers A. Kislov and S. Krylov, occurred on July 5, 1912, when the Russian Government enacted a law empowering the War and Naval Ministries to establish restricted air zones.[3] Several months later (November 16) the Council of Ministers issued an order prohibiting foreign airships to cross the western borders of Russia. The decree contained the proviso that "measures up to and including fire with live cartridges will be taken against air intruders failing to descend immediately in compliance with signals from the ground." [4]

The intent of this measure was reaffirmed by the Bolshevik Government when, on January 17, 1921, the RSFSR Council of Peoples' Commissars published a decree forbidding foreign aircraft to cross Soviet territory without the permission of the Commissariat of Foreign

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[1] *Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (13 October, 1919)*, Air Ministry, London, 1920, p. 7.

[2] W. Raymond Young, "The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Space Sovereignty, *The George Washington Law Review*, April 1956, p. 581.

[3] A. Kislov and Sergei Krylov, "State Sovereignty in Air Space," *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1956, p. 36.

[4] *Ibid.*

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Affairs and the Main Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Air Fleet.[5] It was not, however, until eleven years later, in 1932, that the Soviet Union promulgated its first air code. In terminology almost identical with that used in the Paris Convention of 1919, it asserted that the USSR "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its air space (*vozdushnoe prostranstvo*)," which was defined as "the air space above the land and fluvial territory and above territorial waters established by USSR laws." [6] No attempt was made at this time to define the vertical extent of Soviet sovereignty in the air.

Postwar Developments

The Soviet approach to the law of air space remained substantially unchanged until 1947, when a slightly different and for the first time more detailed interpretation appeared in print. *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (an official textbook on international law), published that year, supported in principle the theorem of Anglo-Saxon law, *cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum* (he who owns the land owns it right up to the sky),[7] but went on to define the Soviet Union's claim to sovereignty in air space in terms of the lower and upper reaches of the atmosphere (troposphere and stratosphere),[8] or an overall attitude of approximately 60 to 70 miles. Not all Soviet writers, however, adopted this view, for only a year later, E. Chernomordik stated in the *Izvestii Akademii nauk SSSR* that "air space has no natural boundaries;" that "it is of infinite height," [9] and that "every government should have unlimited and complete sovereignty, without any limitation in altitude, of the air space above its territory." [10]

Even the view of the editors of *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* did not remain settled for long. The 1951 edition of the textbook presented a new flexible formulation which set the minimum reach of national sovereignty in air space at 60 to 70 miles (*i.e.*, the generally accepted outer limits of the stratosphere), and made the upper limits coextensive with man's aerial achievements:

> A column of air above the land and fluvial territory of the state composes its air territory or air space. In the composition of space is now included the troposphere, *i.e.* the lower levels, and the stratosphere, *i.e.* the upper level of the atmosphere. . . . No legislation admits any limitation of a state's air space . . . and this space constantly grows with the altitude ceiling of contemporary airplanes.[11]

Whether by "contemporary airplanes" were meant manned aircraft only, or whether experimental rockets (such as the V1 and V2) and meteorological balloons were also to be included, was not made clear. It may be noted, however, that in setting forth their claims to sovereignty in air space, Soviet legal writers kept well in step with the important contemporary developments in aviation and rocketry. This close coordination between Soviet lawyers and scientists was to become even more apparent in subsequent years.

The question of balloon flights came up for thorough discussion in 1956, in connection with the presence of American-launched balloons over the Soviet Union. These balloons were a part of the United States Air Force research project "Moby Dick," and were described as carrying "meteorological instruments, including cameras and radio equipment, to record and telemeter atmospheric information" above 30,000 feet.[12] The USSR sharply protested the flights of the balloons over its territory, and stated in its second note on the subject (February 15, 1956) that the balloons had nothing in common with meteorological research but were concerned instead with gathering target intelligence data for the US Strategic Air Command and NATO bombers.[13]

Several weeks later, the Soviet journal *International Affairs* published an article by A. Kislov and Sergei Krylov, the latter a professor of Public and International Law at the Leningrad Juridical Institute, which not only discussed the issue of the balloons, but also advanced a new claim for unlimited sovereignty over air space.[14] As to the balloons, the two writers repeated the earlier Soviet charges that these were used to conduct military reconnaissance and to drop propaganda leaflets; they asserted also that the balloons were travel-

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[5] *Sobranie zakonov (postavlenii) i rasporiazhenii pravitelstva (Sovieta Ministrov) SSSR—1921* (USSR collection of laws), Moscow, item 40.

[6] *Sobranie zakonov (postavlenii) i rasporiazhenii pravitelstva (Sovieta Ministrov) SSSR—1932*, Section I, Item 194.

[7] V. N. Durdenevsky, *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo*, (International law), Moscow, 1947, p. 269.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[9] E. Chernomordik, "Vozdushnoe prostranstvo v mezhdunarodnom prave" (Air space in international law), *Izvestii Akademii nauk SSSR* (Otdelenie ekonomiki i prava), Moscow, July-August 1948, p. 243.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[11] E. A. Korovin, *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo*, Moscow, 1951, p. 268.

[12] Bin Cheng, "International and High Altitude Flights: Balloons, Rockets and Man-Made Satellites," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, London, July 1957, p. 487.

[13] Soviet note of February 18, 1956, as quoted in Cheng, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

[14] Kislov and Krylov, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-43.

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ing at heights of 13,000-16,000 feet, rather than 30,000 feet as claimed by the United States, and that at such altitudes they definitely created an air hazard and violated Soviet territory.[15] The authors then went on to quote approvingly Eduard Clunet—a distinguished French international lawyer of the pre-World War I era—to the effect that "the right of sovereignty of each country to its territorial atmosphere must theoretically extend *usque ad coelum* (up to the sky)," [16] and they buttressed their contention further by citing the English writers on air law, Shawcross and Beaumont, who, interpreting the expression "complete and exclusive sovereignty of the state over air space," point out that "complete" signifies "without limit," that there is "no limit of height."[17]

Thus, by 1956, the Soviet claim to unlimited national sovereignty over air space again appeared as unequivocal as it had been during the first three decades of Soviet power. The "infinity" theory had, up to that time, generally suited the political and military interests of the USSR, and in spite of occasional, somewhat more restrictive interpretations, it had until then never been completely abandoned by Soviet jurists.

The Space Age

The scientific developments and the advances in propulsion technology that sent the first sputnik into space altered profoundly the strategic concepts of the Soviet military leaders, as well as their weapons system; and with these changes in the material base, the Soviet jurists—as good Marxists should—went to work on the superstructure. Only ten days after the launching of the first sputnik, on October 17, 1957, an article appeared in *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* which refuted the theory of unlimited national sovereignty over air space.[18] With a view to the new Soviet military interests, and perhaps anticipating Western charges of national air sovereignty violations by the Russian sputnik, the author, G. P. Zadorozhnyi, argued as follows:

The Soviet artificial earth satellite does not violate the air sovereignty of any state if only because it does not fly into space over other states. Instead the territories of these states, by dint of the earth's rotation, pass, so to speak, under the satellite's orbit which is fixed in relation to the earth and stars. . . . Disputing the legality of the appearance of the satellite over the territory of one or another state would be just as absurd and ridiculous as disputing the appearance over a given territory of the moon, the sun or any other heavenly body.[19]

Sovereignty over air space, he claimed, is similar to the concept of *mare liberum:*

By analogy to the principle of freedom of the open seas, which beyond the limits of territorial waters and special maritime zones do not belong to anyone and are in general use by all nations, the upper atmosphere [previously defined in the article as air space above an altitude of 12-18 miles] which is beyond the limits of effective air control by states, can likewise be considerd a zone of open air in general use by all nations.[20]

This new definition clearly placed Sputnik I above sovereign air space, for the missile had a perigee of 140 miles and an apogee of 560 miles. At the same time, however, it precluded free flights over foreign territory by the airplanes then available to the United States Strategic Air Command (B-47s and B-52s), for their altitude ceiling at that time was approximately 60,000 feet, or just under twelve miles. Thus, under Zadorozhnyi's definition, any such flights by Western planes would constitute a violation of foreign territorial sovereignty, while missiles of the Sputnik I characteristics were free to travel above the territory of any nation.

However, the upper limits of sovereign air space as defined by Zadorozhnyi were soon found too low for comfort—no doubt in view of the rapid technological developments in the aircraft industry, East and West—and Zadorozhnyi was partially refuted in the 1957 edition of *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo:*

The air territory of the state comprises the air space above the land and waters of the state to unlimited height. Air space includes the entire atmosphere, the lower strata (troposphere) and the upper strata (stratosphere). States as a rule do not establish any limitations on the height of their air space.[21]

One year later, in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* A. Galina similarly supported the theory which fixed the ceiling of sovereign air space at the edge of transatmospheric space.[22] The problem, she argued, had to be considered in terms of national security:

The right of safeguarding [the state's] security is one of

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 42.
[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 42-43.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 43.
[18] G. P. Zadorozhnyi, "Iskustvenyi sputnik i mezhdunarodnoe pravo" (The artificial satellite and international law), *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* October 17, 1957.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Kozhevnikov, *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo,* Moscow, 1957, p. 187.
[22] A. Galina, "K voprosu o mezhplanetnom prave" (On the question of interplanetary law), *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* No. 7, July 1958, p. 52.

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the basic rights inherent in its sovereignty. . . .[23] And thus the conclusion at which we arrive indicates that the outer altitude limit of state sovereignty must be established in such a manner as to protect the state against encroachments on its territorial sovereignty, on its independence.[24]

Should this criterion receive wide application, then once again the "sky is the limit" as far as sovereignty in air and outer space is concerned. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in the same article Galina for the first time drew a clear distinction between air and outer space, claiming the latter to be beyond the reach of municipal law:

But as far as cosmic (transatmospheric) space located beyond the limit defined as the limit of the extension of state sovereignty is concerned, it would be reasonable, in our opinion, for the purpose of encouraging scientific investigations, to recognize that no state has the right to subject parts of cosmic space to its own legislation, administration and jurisdiction.[25]

Galina, as well as other Soviet legal writers who were then advocating the principle of freedom of outer space, received qualified support from E. A. Korovin writing in the January 1959 issue of *International Affairs*. Korovin agreed that the extension of sovereignty into cosmic space was impractical due to the fact that the earth's rotation and velocity prevent any one point in space from ever being over any one country for more than a few seconds. But having set out to discuss the practical problems created for the Soviet Union by the appearance of reconnaissance satellites similar to the American Discoverer I, Korovin then introduced an important exception to the principle of freedom of cosmic space. He borrowed Galina's security criterion and applied it to space navigation. Freedom in space is not "absolute and unlimited":

It does not follow from the non-application of the concept of sovereignty to the cosmos that acts endangering the security, life and property on the earth, or infringing upon the universally required rights of any country are permitted there. . . .[26] It is scarcely to be expected that governments should be indifferent to acts of foreign intelligence directed against them solely because they are conducted not in the air but in cosmic space.[27]

Reconnaissance satellites are thus illegal and violate the space territory of the country over which they pass. And what is more, retaliatory measures against these "seeing eye satellites" are justifiable, according to Korovin:

[Nations] may undertake diplomatic representation as well as reprisals and retaliation of a non-military nature. Retaliatory measures of this kind need not necessarily be carried out in the cosmos since this would restrict their application solely to countries possessing space techniques. They may well be applied on the ground and in the air.[28]

Unfortunately, in his valiant endeavor to buttress Soviet political and military interests with juridical principles, Korovin failed to suggest how anyone might determine whether a missile traveling at supersonic speeds far above the earth is actually engaged in reconnaissance activity, nor did he intimate the nature of the non-military "reprisals and retaliation" that an offended nation may resort to.

Outer Space in the Political Arena

By the autumn of 1958 the problem of outer space control was ripe for political discussion. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had requested during the previous year that the question be put on the agenda of the 13th Session of the UN General Assembly,[29] and on January 12, 1958, President Eisenhower raised the matter again in his letter to the then Prime Minister Bulganin.[30] On November 7 of the same year the Soviet Union responded in the United Nations with a draft resolution proposing:

1. A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes and an undertaking by states to launch rockets into cosmic space only under an agreed international program.
2. The elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other states, primarily in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and North Africa. . . .[31]

The Soviet proposal was found unacceptable to the United States and the other Western powers. The so-called "foreign military bases" mentioned in the draft resolution are actually, as stated by United States Delegate Lodge, "mutual bases which are to be used mutually for the common defense . . . by common consent."[32] Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations specifically provides that nations have

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Korovin, "International Status of Cosmic Space," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1959, p. 55.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[29] *The Department of State Bulletin*, December 15, 1958, p. 975.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] United Nations, General Assembly, "Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space," *United Nations, General Assembly 1958* (Document A/C. 1/L 219), November 7, 1958, p. 2.
[32] *The Department of State Bulletin*, December 19, 1958, p. 972.

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the right of collective self-defense and concluded that it was the Soviet aim "to end the existence of the bases so as to destroy the capacity of the non-Soviet world to defend itself." [33]

To counter the Soviet proposal, the United States and nineteen other nations presented their own draft resolution to the General Assembly on November 13. This resolution, of a more general nature than the Soviet proposal, merely stated that outer space "should be used for peaceful purposes *only*" [34] (italics added), and proposed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the various problems affecting the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet delegate, Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, rejected this Western proposal, emphasizing that space control was a military problem which could not be solved without taking into consideration the existence of Western air bases surrounding the Soviet Union. Mr. Zorin summed up his country's point of view when he said on November 18:

One hard fact has to be borne in mind: ICBMs are not the only [vehicles] capable of carrying atomic and hydrogen weapons. Consequently any decision to ban them which is not accompanied by a solution of the problem of military bases would be detrimental to the Soviet Union.[35]

Later that day, the USSR came forward with a revised draft resolution. It dealt with the study and use of cosmic space for peaceful purposes, but it failed to propose the banning of outer space for military purposes; nor did it include the phrase "for peaceful purposes only," which was present in the previous versions of both the Soviet and the Western resolutions. Instead, it recommended the establishment of an international committee composed on a parity basis (four members of the Communist bloc, four Western countries, and three neutrals) to prepare a program and rules to facilitate "cooperation in the study of cosmic space for peaceful purposes." [36]

After several days of fruitless negotiation, the United States presented its own revised resolution. Stressing again that "outer space . . . should be used for peaceful purposes only," it called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the question of peaceful use of outer space. In place of the parity concept embodied in the Soviet proposal, the Western resolution proposed that the composition of the committee reflect the membership of the General Assembly as a whole.[37] This difference between the USSR and the Western countries was never resolved. The Western resolution came up for decision on November 24, 1958, and was passed by a vote of 54 to 9, with 18 abstentions,[38] but the proposed committee never came to life: the Communist (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland) and the neutralist (India, Sweden, United Arab Republic) members refused to participate in its deliberations.

The Soviet Government has remained equally adamant in its attitude on outer space control at the current Geneva disarmament conference. On April 4 of this year, Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin emphatically rejected a Western proposal to start negotiations for an agreement to prohibit the use of space vehicles carrying nuclear weapons, unless the United States agreed to liquidate its military bases abroad. Once again, Mr. Zorin denounced the proposal as an American scheme to catch up with the Russians in fields where the United States is lagging.[39] The Soviet Union's price for international control of armament in outer space remains the same: the virtual dismantling of the Western alliance system.

Law the Servant of Diplomacy

Since the very beginning of the international discussions on outer space control, the Soviet negotiators in the field have received unwavering rearguard support from the legal writers at home, who have not hesitated to discuss problems of the law of cosmic space within the context of the East-West arms race; so much so, indeed, that their language parallels very closely the formulations of the Soviet political spokesmen.

Thus A. Galina, in an article published in *Izvestia* on September 17, 1958, explained the Soviet insistence on linking the question of outer space control with the issue of Western bases on foreign territory in the following terms:

What would happen if the numerous military bases created by NATO countries on foreign soil and designated for aggressive purposes were safeguarded while the Soviet Union and other socialist states were tied down by an obligation not to use outer space for military purposes? This would result in the NATO countries' securing an advantage over the Soviet Union which possesses an intercontinental rocket but not such bases. This would inflict damage on the in-

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 973.
[34] *UN General Assembly 1958* (Document A/C. 1/L 220), November 13, 1958, p. 2.
[35] *UN General Assembly 1958,* Official Records, Nov. 18, 1958.
[36] *United Nations General Assembly 1958 (Document* A/C. 1/L 219), Rev. 1, November 18, 1958, p. 2.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *UN General Assembly 1958,* Official Records, 13th Session (Document A/C. 1/SR 995), pp. 245-246.
[39] *New York Times,* April 5, 1960.

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terests of the Soviet Union and consequently on the security of all socialist countries.[40]

In his article mentioned earlier, E. A. Korovin offered a similar rationale:

The meaning of the US proposal to "neutralize" the cosmos amounts to forbidding the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and represents an attempt artifically to single out the intercontinental ballistic missile from the general context of disarmament. . . . By proposing to outlaw the intercontinental ballistic missile alone the US rulers seek to head off a retaliatory blow via outer space in the event of an atomic war, while simultaneously retaining numerous military bases on foreign territories designed to attack the Soviet Union and the peace-loving countries friendly to it.[41]

A somewhat different approach—but one that presaged Zorin's latest statement in Geneva (see above)—was taken by G. A. Osnitskaya in October 1959. At a meeting of Soviet jurists (including Korovin and Zadorozhnyi) gathered in Moscow to discuss various problems concerning outer space, she charged that certain groups in the West were trying to place outer space under the supervision of the United Nations in order to retard the technological progress of the USSR. This plan "to supervise and record the launching of sputniks" was, she argued, "a veiled attempt to slow down the development of science and technology in our country, an attempt to place outer space under the control of the West, *i.e.,* for all intents and purposes, the United States." [42]

Perhaps the most succinct statement of the present Soviet position on outer space control was produced two months later by E. A. Korovin:

Disarmament in the cosmos cannot be separated from disarmament on earth. For this reason the banning of the use of military rockets must take place with the simultaneous liquidation of military bases on foreign territories and the outlawing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Only with such disarmament can mankind be guaranteed the hope of peace and security.[43]

In sum, the Soviet argumentation suggests that the USSR, convinced of its superiority in missile development, insists on unlimited freedom for its space vehicles in outer space to deter any possible attack against its territory from the ring of Western bases. This line of reasoning of course ignores the fact that the principal reason for the establishment and maintenance of the Western bases with their long-range bomber force has been the necessity to offer an effective deterrent to the massive Soviet land forces which since the conclusion of World War II have threatened to overrun Western Europe. Because of geopolitical factors, a simultaneous elimination of the NATO countries' bases and Soviet missiles in outer space would even today leave the balance of power in Europe very much in the Soviet Union's favor. The right to self-defence, as the Soviet jurists never fail to stress, is a right inherent in sovereignty, a condition of survival of states; and it is a universal right.

Conclusion

The successive theories expounded by Soviet writers in their approach to the issue of air and outer space might at first appear to be wavering and at times even contradictory. In the early 1950's an official textbook defined sovereignty in terms of the ever-rising altitude ceiling of airplanes. In 1953 Kislov's and Krylov's definition of air space was based on the *usque ad coelum* (infinity) theory. With the launching of Sputnik I, the analogy to the high seas (*mare liberum*) at altitudes above 12-18 miles was invoked, and by January 1959 the vaguely worded theory of freedom of outer space for peaceful purposes *only* was advocated, to be followed later on by restatements of official Soviet pronouncements in the United Nations. Yet, when examined from the point of view of Soviet military development and security, the attitude of Soviet writers has been quite consistent; the permutations in theory have always been closely coordinated with and conditioned by the security interests of the Soviet Union. There is every reason to believe that Soviet writers will continue to maintain this pragmatic approach to the outer space issue, altering their theories as the military and security status of the USSR changes.

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[40] A. Galina, "Za ravnopravnoe sotrudnichestvo v oblasti mirnovo ispolzovania kosmicheskovo prostranstva" (For equal collaboration in the peaceful use of cosmic space), *Izvestia,* September 17, 1958, p. 975.

[41] Korovin, *op cit.,* p. 57.

[42] "Conquest of Outer Space and Some Problems of International Relations" (a symposium), *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1959, p. 94.

[43] E. A. Korovin, "On the Neutralization and Demilitarization of the Cosmos," *International Affairs* (Russian edition), p. 110.

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Nationalities in the USSR

EDITORS' NOTE: It has always been one of the proudest Soviet claims—and one that has been accepted even by some critics of the USSR—that the Soviet Union has successfully resolved the problem of national relations within its borders, and that close to one hundred national minorities live in enviable harmony and friendship. It was Khrushchev's admission—in the course of his celebrated "secret speech" at the 20th Party Congress—that "rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy" had been committed during most of the existence of the Soviet state (i.e., *during Stalin's reign) which made it clear, even to Communist sympathizers, that Soviet claims in this area, too, had been far removed from reality.*

What, then, six years after Stalin's death, is the historical truth of the successes and failures of Soviet nationality policy? In the first article, Mr. Inkeles provides an answer to this question by setting up a number of criteria that any successful policy towards national minorities would have to meet, and then examining the actual Soviet record in regard to each of them. In the second, Mr. Goldhagen discusses the position of the Jews in the USSR—a unique case in the annals of Soviet nationality policy, but one that may indeed be "the exception that proves the rule." (For discussions on other minorities see Nicholas Vakar, "The Case of Belorussia," No. 3, 1954, and Richard E. Pipes, "The Soviet Impact on Central Asia," No. 2, 1957.)

Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective

By Alex Inkeles

IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE of "peaceful competition between systems," increasing emphasis is placed on the economic factor of production and consumption levels in comparisons of Soviet and non-Soviet achievement. In the process some observers have all but lost sight of the fundamental political, social and cultural characteristics that continue to differentiate the two systems. Among relevant issues one of importance is the status of the national and racial minorities in the Soviet Union. At a time when the Western democracies are granting full independent statehood to one after another of the formerly subject peoples of Africa and Asia, it seems particularly appropriate to inquire into the position of the Soviet minorities. Unfortunately, this subject has received less attention than it deserves, perhaps because many have uncritically accepted Moscow's claim that any issues of nationality and race have long since been successfully resolved. If this were true, Soviet policy would still merit close examination. The fact is, however, that despite some substantial attainments, the

Mr. Inkeles, who made his debut in these pages with "The Soviet Social System: Model for Asia?," (November-December 1959), is a prominent American sociologist, and author of Public Opinion in Soviet Russia *(Harvard University Press, 1950). His paper is based on a public lecture given at the University of Rochester, New York, as part of its series on race and minority relations in the modern world.*

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Soviet regime has far from solved the problem of minority status either to the satisfaction of the groups themselves or to the particular credit of the Soviet system.

In order to assess Soviet nationality policy intelligently, it is necessary to know certain distinctive historical and demographic facts about the minorities.

Population Patterns

While the Great Russians are the single largest group in the Soviet Union, they hold only a precariously slim margin of numerical superiority over the combined population of the national minorities. Indeed, as a result of the rapid expansion of the Tsarist Empire, the Russians were formerly in a minority, comprising only 45 percent of the population in the 1897 census. The loss of certain territories during the Revolution and the Civil War somewhat redressed the balance, and by the 1926 census the Great Russians emerged as 52.9 percent of the total. With the apparent aim of widening this slight margin, the basis of classification was changed in the 1939 census: people were no longer asked what they regarded as their "ethnic origin" *(narodnost)*, but rather what they thought of as their "nationality," the Russian term for which *(natsionalnost)* is closer in meaning to culture or citizenship than to race. With the aid of this device the regime was able to report a Russian majority of 58 percent in 1939.

The 1959 census—preliminary results of which have just been published—reveal a new downward ratio, undoubtedly due to the incorporation of the Baltic states, a section of Poland, and part of Bessarabia (Moldavia) since 1939. Today somewhat under 55 percent of the Soviet people think of themselves as Russian by nationality, and even fewer designate Russian as their native language.

The minorities generally live in homogeneous and compact groups on the outer edge of the central land mass which is the territory of the Great Russians. This basic demographic structure persists despite a great increase in the dispersion of peoples—especially of Russians—into other nationality areas during World War II and its aftermath. The 15 national republics strung around the outer borders of the Soviet Union constitute the overwhelming bulk, 80 percent or more, of the country's national minorities. In the northwest, the three Baltic republics include close to five million Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians. On the western frontier there are some eight million Belorussians, and 37 million Ukrainians who, when added to the Russians, give the Soviet Union its overwhelmingly Slavic majority. On the same frontier are two and a quarter million Moldavians, in the republic of the same name, and almost one and a half million Poles, who for obvious reasons have no identifying territorial unit. Further to the south and east, along the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, there are numerous nationalities distributed in a complex pattern of settlement. These include the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanians, each in their own republic and each more than two and a half million strong—as well as several million Tatars. In Central Asia, the four republics of the Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Kirghiz, along with the people of adjoining Kazakhstan, contribute some 13 million Turkic people of Moslem faith. Other Moslems, living in areas further in from the border, include several million Volga Tatars and almost a million of the closely related Bashkirs. A neighboring area contains close to a million and a half Chuvash, a Christian and often Russianized remnant of the old Bolgar Empire on the Volga. Of the remaining larger nationalities, only the million and a quarter Mordvians and the two and a quarter million Jews are widely dispersed.

Some 85 percent of all the Great Russians live in the vast, sprawling Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The rest are spread throughout the surrounding ring of nationality areas, usually living in enclaves in the cities within a countryside that is solidly non-Russian. In this limited sense minority status is at least as typical of the Russian as any other Soviet nationality. Collectively, Russian groups constitute a median proportion of 13.5 percent of the population in the 14 republics other than the RSFSR. In certain areas, however, the influx of Russians has been far greater. In Kazakhstan, for example, the Russians are now the most numerous group (43 percent) of the population; together with other Slavic residents, the Ukrainians and Belorussians, they constitute a majority of the republic. Thus, the Kazakhs have become a minority in the area presumably set aside for them as a national home, and by process over which they have had little say and less control.

Most of the important minorities represent separate and distinct nationalities, with their own language and literature, and in many cases an earlier history of independent existence as a nation-state. Their sense of separate identity is intensified by the fact that ethnicity is generally linked with religious identification, without the cross-cutting of religion and race found in some lands. Thus, to be Russian is to be Orthodox, to be Polish, Catholic; Armenians are in the Armenian National Church and Georgians in the Georgian Church; and the Asiatic peoples, especially the Turkic, are overwhelmingly Moslem. It seems fairly clear that the last thing these people wish is the loss of identity as sepa-

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rate nationalities through absorption into the larger homogeneous culture of the Russian nation. Indeed, although there are often important historical ties which bind them to the center in Moscow, the nationalities seldom share much in common with other peoples of the Soviet Union beyond their minority status. How, then, did these diverse peoples all come together in common Soviet citizenship? The answer is not to be found, as in some other ethnically heterogeneous nations, in voluntary emigration or incorporation into Russia. It must be sought in the history of Russian state policy going back many centuries.

Tsarist Expansionism

Following their subjugation by the Khans, the Russian people lived for centuries under the rule of the Tatar hordes, compressed into a modest area in central Russia and cut off from other major Slavic groups such as the Poles and Ukrainians, who were variously under domination by peoples from the West, Scandinavia and the Baltic. The starting point of Russian colonialism may be taken as 1552, when Ivan the Terrible took Kazan, and thus liquidated the Tatar Khanate. The expansion of the previously small Muscovite state thus began with the incorporation of large numbers of Turkic peoples, especially from along the Volga and its tributaries. About a century later a comparable major movement to the west was completed when the left-bank regions of the Dnieper were established as a protectorate, bringing Cossack and Ukrainian peoples under Russian hegemony. Peter the Great added the peoples along the coast of the Baltic Sea. In her turn Catherine the Great made further acquisitions in the west, including parts of Poland, and drove all the way to the Black Sea in the south. The Caucasus was added later, and most of the rest of Turkestan was acquired by Alexander II to complete the movement by the end of his reign in 1881.

This extraordinary territorial expansion was estimated to have proceeded at the rate of 50 square miles a day over a period of 400 years, from the end of the 15th to the end of the 19th centuries. As pointed out earlier, it brought the Russians to the status of being a minority in the land they ruled. To speak of Russia as having a minority problem in the usual sense is therefore misleading. Russia was a huge colonial empire; but in distinction to the other empires of Europe, her colonial possessions were contiguous to the homeland. Thus she *incorporated* her possessions, her dependencies and satellites, within one continuous border, with the captive nations strung around the outer limits of the solid Great Rusian core. It is impossible to understand the nationality problem in the Soviet Union without always keeping in mind that the Soviet regime inherited this "prison of nations" from the Tsars when it took power, and it had to operate within the framework thus set by history.

The Leninist Formula

In this situation, the Soviet regime has adopted an essentialy dualistic attitude toward Tsarist expansionism: on the one hand, it has generally treated the conquest and incorporation of the minorities as an "historically progressive" policy; on the other hand, it has encouraged the myth that Tsarist treatment of the captive peoples was uniformly harsh, oppressive and reactionary, and that it was designed to destroy the character and individuality of the many groups which had come under the empire's sway. Actually Tsarist policy toward the subject minorities varied considerably at different times, depending on the political philosophy of the different rulers. It also varied with respect to different areas and groups. Most modern impressions of this policy tend to concentrate on the period of intensive suppression starting after the accession of Alexander III in 1881 and lasting until the revolution in 1905, after which a considerable liberalization again ensued. The depradations of Alexander's reign, especially the marked efforts at Russification and the virtual driving underground of local cultural movements, left a lasting mark not only on world opinion but on the national groups, and this fact was soon to be of great importance to the as yet unborn Soviet government.

Considering how obvious a source of grievance against the Tsarist regime here lay ready for exploitation, it is striking that the Bolsheviks were so slow to realize its potentialities as an instrument for shaking the old order. But their whole philosophy inclined them to gloss over the nationality problem. It was a basic belief of Marxists that the path of history would lead toward ever larger, more homogeneous, centralized, industrial, political units which in time would yield to a world-wide "proletarian" society. The slogan "the proletariat has no fatherland" expressed the belief that nationalism, patriotism, regionalism, and similar attachments were part and parcel of the social pattern of bourgeois capitalism, which would somehow be outlived and sloughed off once socialism and then communism came to the world. Lenin himself gave virtually no attention to the nationality problem until 1913, when he was forced to turn to it both because of the growing popularity of the Bauer-Renner program and because of his own growing awareness that the success of his plans must reckon with the fact of national loyalties and aspirations.

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The Bauer-Renner program, conceived to meet the multi-national situation facing the political parties in the Austro-Hungarian empire, proposed an unusual degree of autonomy for minorities in the conduct of their own affairs; had it been put into effect, it would have permitted a great multiplication of small and more-or-less exclusive national, religious and ethnic units. Lenin naturally viewed this program as a challenge to the principle of centralization which he had steadfastly espoused; but he was equally opposed to the alternative idea of federalism, again on grounds that it weakened the chances for the development of a truly international proletarian power. Forced to take a stand, he went to what he thought was the absolute heart of the matter, by basing his policy squarely *and exclusively* on the right of each nationality to so-called "self-determination." He was unwilling to consider any compromises which might weaken the power of a central Communist government. Any people or nation—theoretically, at least—had the right to secede from the larger society, but if it chose to remain it must accept the general system in its entirety, without demanding special status or privilege and without asking for a federal union:

The right to self-determination is an exception to our general thesis, which is centralism. This exception is absolutely necessary in the face of the Black Hundred type of Great Russian nationalism. . . . But a broad interpretation may not be made of an exception. There is *nothing*, absolutely nothing here, and there must be nothing here, but the *right* to secede.

Lenin felt that this acknowledgement of the abstract "right" to secede was necessary as a political maneuver. But at the same time—in a contradiction that no amount of esoteric language could hide—he held that any attempt at *actual* secession would be retrograde, anti-proletarian, bourgeois counterrevolution. He assumed, in short, that no one would want to *exercise* the right of secession should there be a proletarian revolution.

He proved completely wrong, although in this he had the company of most of the other political groups in Russia, all of whom inadequately assessed both the effect of Tsarist policy in hardening national feeling against *any* central Russian government, and the effect of the rapid social and cultural changes which were increasing national consciousness in many of the minority areas. In any event, the Bolshevik regime found, to its great embarrassment, that in most of the national areas of the former empire the local political leaders took their right of secession quite seriously. Even where complete separation was not their prime objective, the local leaders viewed themselves as equals with the leaders in Moscow, entitled on that basis to negotiate the nature of their nationality's participation in the new state.

The Bolsheviks did not hesitate to use the force of arms to meet this upsurge of independence, sending their Red Armies to regain control over most of the provinces of the former empire. Finland was allowed to slip away without any particular struggle, and Poland and the Baltic States were abandoned after unsuccessful military campaigns. But under the command of such well-known Communist figures as Frunze and Kuibyshev in Central Asia, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze in the north Caucasus, Kaganovich in Belorussia, and Mikoyan in Azerbaijan, almost all the other territories were recaptured by Soviet troops and turned over to the control of the local Communist parties, reliable subordinates of the central party apparatus in Moscow. The army which entered Georgia on February 16, 1921, and by February 25th once again placed the Comunist flag over the capital Tiflis, fought the last major round in the effort to reintegrate the rebellious national areas.

The need for force to win back control of these areas brought home to the Soviet leaders the crucial nature of the nationality problem, and it is largely to this realization that we owe the particular forms which the so-called nationality policy of the Soviet Union has assumed. Rather than attempting to relate the explicit history of the policy, the writer will turn directly to a consideration of its overall features, giving the historical context as seems necessary. Perhaps the best approach is to pose four questions which would be important in evaluating the policy of any large-scale colonial power.

Self-Determination: A Paper Right

1). The first question in such an assessment would be: to what extent does the country's nationality policy provide for gradual transition to separate statehood for the major national minorities whose culture, history, and socio-political and economic maturity make them reasonable candidates for such status?

The attainment of a condition of self-government and national independence has come to be accepted as a fundamental goal and an inalienable right of people all over the world. Since World War II we have witnessed a tremendous socio-political movement as virtually all the major colonial dependencies of the former British Empire, and to a lesser but striking degree of the French Empire, have achieved national independence. Any nation which tries to maintain control over a colonial area —or even to slow down the pace toward independence— invites serious criticism and often serious trouble; the crisis in Algeria is only the most striking and recent evidence of the explosive nature of this issue. It seems not at all inappropriate, therefore, to address the above

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question to the Soviet Union, particularly since it takes so much pride in pointing to the provision in its constitution which grants each of the constituent republics the ultimate right "freely" to secede from the Union. What, if anything, is done to implement this right in practice?

It may seem superfluous to observe, in the first place, that the Soviet regime in no way acts to encourage the secession of the minorities. In fact, one might well argue that no central government could be expected to take an active part in urging its constituent parts to achieve independence. The point is made here because there are those who apply a double standard on this score, criticizing other colonial powers for their lack of encouragement to independence movements, while turning a blind eye to Soviet practice.

It is of course one thing for a central government to encourage some part of a larger union to detach itself, and quite another to ask simply that minority peoples have the right to advocate and work peacefully for their eventual independence. Since the right of secession is constitutionally guaranteed in the Soviet Union, the right to pursue that goal would logically seem to follow. Yet even to advocate, let alone to work toward, the political independence of any area in the Soviet Union is unthinkable for the Soviet citizen. Such action is identified, both by law outside the constitution and by long practice of the secret police, as a counterrevolutionary crime against the state, warranting severe punishment. Almost every major purge trial has involved charges that the accused conspired to separate some national area from the Union. At various stages of Soviet history hundreds and thousands of officials, teachers, writers and other members of the intellectual classes of different national republics have been purged from the party and state apparatus, and/or sent into forced labor on charges of harboring "bourgeois nationalist leanings," the official term for identifying with the interests of one's national group and resisting abject subordination to the interests of the Moscow center.

In short, what the constitution says about the national question bears virtually no relationship to Soviet practice. Any lingering doubts on this score should have been destroyed by the action of the Soviet regime during World War II, when it simply erased from the map and from the face of the earth four autonomous socialist republics—the Volga German, the Crimean Tatar, the Kalmyk, and the Chechen-Ingush. Although there was an announcement in the case of the Volga Germans that this action was taken in the interest of national security, and a belated statement that the Chechen and Crimean Tatars had collaborated with the Germans, not even this much explanation was given with regard to the Kalmyks.

Not only were the republics liquidated as political entities, but their millions of people were dispersed to distant regions of the Soviet Union. There were wide repercussions and revulsion against this act; among others, Tito of Yugoslavia went so far as to accuse the Soviet Union of genocide. Certainly the indiscriminate mass dispersion of a whole population because of acts of individuals, no matter how numerous, violated basic standards of humanity and made a mockery of Stalin's assertion that "the national question and the problem of collaboration among nations have been settled better [in

Works on Soviet Nationality Policy

For those who desire fuller information and documentation pertaining to the subject of the articles by Messrs. Inkeles and Goldhagen, the following works are recommended:

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN—*Soviet Russian Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1956.

RICHARD PIPES—*The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917 to 1923*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford University Press, London, 1954.

WALTER KOLARZ—*Russia and Her Colonies; The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, Philip, London, and Praeger, New York, 1952 and 1954 respectively.

JOHN S. RESHETAR—*The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., and Oxford University Press, London, 1952.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG—*Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, Columbia University Press, New York, and Oxford University Press, London, 1955.

NICHOLAS P. VAKAR—*Belorussia: The Making of a Nation*, Harvard University Press, 1956.

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH—*The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921*, Philosophical Library, New York, and Ronald, Oxford, 1951.

SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ—*The Jews in the Soviet Union*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N. Y., 1951.

ALSO SEE: Articles by Richard Pipes, Solomon Schwarz, Uriel Weinreich, and J. Kucera under the general title "Soviet Nationality Policy—Past and Present," *Problems of Communism*, Nos. 5 and 6, 1953, and No. 2, 1954.

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the USSR] than in any other multinational state." It was not until after Stalin's death that some members of these nationalities were rehabilitated and partially restored to their former status.

Cultural Survivals

2). The second broad question may be phrased: To what degree are the minorities permitted and facilitated in the free expression of their cultural heritage? First and foremost, this involves the right to use one's native tongue in all types of public and private communication and in the education of youth. Cultural expression also includes the preservation and further development of folk and tribal ways, including art forms, ceremonial and religious customs, the national costume, *etc.* In addition, some hold that free cultural expression should include the right to have economic and political forms of organization which are distinctive to a particular culture.

That the Soviet approach toward the cultural self-expression of the minorities has been unique is beyond doubt; whether it has been as liberal as is claimed is quite another question. The doctrinal explanation of Soviet policy rests in the distinction which is made between the content and the form of culture, expressed in the well-worn formula "national in form, socialist in content." In theory, this phrase means that the values and ideas of the socialist society should be uniform in every culture, though the means by which they are expressed may be—indeed, should be—of a traditional and indigenous nature. The vagueness of this formula, however, has left wide leeway in its application, and like most Soviet slogans it has become quite meaningless in practice.

Obviously it is important to know *which* institutions and distinctive cultural forms are allowed to persist, and how crucial to the integrity of the original culture are those which have been suppressed because they fall in the realm where "socialist" uniformity is required. In the Soviet totalitarian system, the model for society as developed in Moscow is so rigid and all-pervasive that very little has in fact been left that could qualify as being "national" without conflicting with what must be "socialist."

The outstanding survival has been the native languages. With one exception (Yiddish), the Soviet regime has made no attempt to eradicate local tongues; they are used in the educational system, in communications media, and in indigenous literature. Generally distinctive literary forms associated with the languages in such spheres as poetry; epic writing and drama have also been permitted. Another class of survivals which has suffered comparatively little interference is folk arts, including folk handicrafts and native art forms. Nor has there been much effort made to alter distinctive modes of native dress (except in the case of the Moslem veil for women, against which a rather successful campaign has been waged). These policies, it might be pointed out, parallel the practice adopted by most colonial powers.

If the Soviet attitude with respect to these several fundamentals of cultural expression has been generally permissive—and certainly represents a vast reform over the depredatory Russification efforts of Alexander III—there is nevertheless much on the record to indicate that tolerance extends only as far as it suits the interests of the central authorities. Even in the matter of language, Moscow's actions have in some cases profoundly affected an indigenous culture. Much is made of the fact that the Soviets provided alphabets for several dozen languages which previously could not be written down, paving the way for newspapers and other literature in these tongues. Less is known of the fact that the Soviet regime used its power, against the overwhelming opposition of the local population, to force the abandonment of the religiously-sanctioned Arabic script used by the millions of Soviet Moslems. Not once but twice they did this, first introducing the Latin alphabet, and then in 1939 substituting the Cyrillic. Even the Tsars never dreamed of attempting such a victory for Russian culture among their subject Moslems.

Folk literature and art, too, have been subjected to interference and suppression whenever Moscow chose to see in their various forms any manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism." Frequently the regime has seized on old or new folk writings, dramas, operas, *etc.*, condemning them for deviation from the official line, forbidding their production, and taking reprisals against their authors. The writing or presentation of native history in particular has suffered from intervention by the authorities, who insist that the Tsarist subjugation of the nationality areas be treated as "historically progressive." Among many such act of repression, one of the more glaring examples was the dissolution of the entire cultural apparatus of the Soviet Jews—including their native theater, newspapers, publishing houses and writers' association—during the postwar wave of officially-inspired anti-Semitism; despite regime claims that no discrimination is practiced, nothing has ever been done to rectify this situation.

All of the minority religions have, of course, been the object of repressive measures. The fact that these moves

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have, from a doctrinal point of view, been part of the Communist campaign against religious belief *per se* (including the Russian Orthodox faith) has made little difference to peoples whose religion and nationality are closely identified. For them, the attack on religion has been simply another example of the effort of an alien regime to encroach on indigenous cultural patterns and to shackle national development.

In short, the Soviet attitude toward "national forms" in the cultural sphere has been one of tolerance when—but only when—tolerance has not interfered with the ideological or practical needs of the regime.

System and Sacrifice

Outside of the specific areas of cultural expression mentioned above, few of the traditional ways of the minorities have been allowed to survive. In the political, economic, and generally the social spheres, the uniform institutions of Soviet society prevail in the form of the supreme ruling party, the bureaucratic administrative apparatus, the planned and centrally-controlled industrial economy, the collectivized peasant agriculture, and the ubiquitous instruments of ideological indoctrination and control. Thus Soviet nationality policy has allowed no recognition of the fact that economic, political and social forms of organization may be distinctive and indeed crucial elements in a particular national culture.

The imposition of the Soviet system involved a social and cultural revolution throughout Soviet-held territory. Among the more settled European or Europeanized populations, whose culture was already somewhat geared to the patterns of industrial society, the process of Sovietization was highly disruptive, but no more so than for the majority of the Great Russians—and perhaps even less so in the case, say, of Armenian traders than of the Russian peasants. But among the peoples of the more isolated, underdeveloped areas—mainly in Asia—the depredations caused by Sovietization and the enforced departure from traditional ways were of enormous magnitude.

An outstanding example is the case of the Kazakh people. Before collectivization the Kazakhs were either nomads, who relied extensively on the use of horses on the great Central Asian steppe, or recently-settled cattle and sheep herders. Their whole way of life was regulated by and within the tribal structure, especially the clan system. The attempt blindly to impose the pattern of collectivization on these people in the early 1930's met with intensive resistance, leading to an open struggle with the regime. The loss of life was staggering. While some of the Kazakhs escaped with their herds over the border into Chinese Sinkiang, the huge decimation of the population during this period was mainly due to deaths in the fighting or through starvation. Census figures for 1926 and 1939 show that in the interim the Kazakh population dropped from 3.967 to 3.098 million, an absolute decline of 869 thousand, or 22 percent. Calculating in what would have been an expectable rate of population growth under normal circumstances (on the basis of 15 percent for the Soviet population as a whole), the survivors in Kazhakstan were one and a half million fewer by 1939 than they should have been, a staggering deficit considering the overall size of the population. Moreover, in the course of the bitter struggle the greater part of the livestock on which the local economy had rested was lost, through retaliative slaughter on the part of the desperate natives, neglect of the herds while the men were off fighting, or in minor part migration. Taking the stocks in 1928 as a base, by 1934 only 25 to 50 percent of the cattle, 13 percent of the sheep, and 12 percent of the horses remained.

Although the stark statistics above are from official sources, the Soviet regime has never put forward any explanation of this chapter of its history. Unfortunately the statistics are little known to the world, and are seldom weighed in the balance when glib estimates are made in praise of "enlightened" Soviet nationality policy. Yet this case represents a relentless fulfillment of Stalin's instruction to the Communist Party in 1923, when he urged that Turkestan—which included Kazakhstan—be transformed into a model republic because of its revolutionary significance for Soviet Russia's eastern policy. He declared: "We have to fulfill this task whatever the price, without sparing efforts and without shrinking from sacrifices. . . ." Stalin, certainly, could never be accused of having shrunk from sacrifices in Kazakhstan.

Equal Opportunity

3). Turning to the third question under consideration, to what extent is Soviet nationality policy non-discriminatory—that is, to what extent does it offer members of the minority nationalties equal access to such benefits as the society provides for average citizens? Are opportunities for education, work, pay, social mobility, freedom of movement, and choice of residence the same for all or does the dominant group enjoy a favored status?

On the whole the record of the Soviet Union in these respects is good. The data which support this evalua-

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tion are based on republics as a whole, not on pure ethnic or national groups, so that the presence of large Russian and Ukrainian minorities in some of the national republics—and conversely of non-Russian minorities in the RSFSR—may distort the picture of Soviet accomplishment to some degree. Still, on the basis of a large number of indices, it seems clear that members of all nationalities (including the Great Russian) have received broadly equal treatment with respect to personal economic and social—if not political—opportunities. Allowance must be made, of course, for the fact that many of the minorities live in predominantly rural or backward regions whose development has expectably lagged behind that of more urban or industrial areas; however, the *relative* position of these groups has improved greatly since the prerevolutionary era.

Important among the indices considered here is the striking spread of literacy among all groups of the Soviet population. In the intercensus period from 1926 to 1939 the overall literacy rate in the Soviet Union rose from 51 to 81 percent. In certain national republics the low base at start made the rise much more dramatic. For example, in the Central Asian Tadzhik republic the rate of literacy increased from 4 to 72 percent, and in the Azerbaijan republic from 25 to 73 percent. The preliminary release on the 1959 census does not provide data on literacy by nationality, but since the All-Union rate is now reported to be 98.5 percent, it must be assumed that the nationality areas have continued to advance in this respect. While the Soviet definition of literacy is based on a very rudimentary level of learning, and while some area improvement can be attributed to the influx of Russian and other literates, the record of accomplishment is nevertheless substantial.

Data on improvements in education are closely related. In the area of the five Central Asian Republics (including Kazakhstan) there were in 1914-15 only 136,000 pupils in elementary and secondary schools, representing less than half of one percent of the 9.6 million pupils in all Russia. By 1955-56 the parallel enrollment was 3.59 million, an increase by more than 25-fold; this figure constituted about 13 percent of the total student enrollment in the same grades, which is about the weight of the population of the Central Asiatic republics in the Soviet population as a whole. Similar progress has been made in higher education: whereas before the Revolution there were virtually no higher school establishments in these areas, by 1955 local institutions had an enrollment of 155 thousand students, or about 9 percent of the total higher school population in the USSR.

There are many other ways in which the Soviet regime has accorded equal treatment to the minorities. Available data show that facilities such as libraries, medical clinics, movie and dramatic theaters, sports stadia, clubs, newspapers and journals, radio and television stations, *etc.*, have been provided in the nationality areas at close to the same per capita rate as in the Great Russian area.

The sum indication of such statistical evidence is that minority members (again, with the striking exception of Soviet Jews) do not suffer from any discrimination insofar as educational training, economic opportunity, and social benefits are concerned. This impression is supported by the testimony of Soviet refugees. In the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, in which this writer participated, questionnaires were submitted to several hundred Ukrainians and to smaller groups of other nationalities—along with Russians—all of whom had escaped from the Soviet Union. The replies showed that people whose occupations had been on a comparable level had, regardless of their nationality, been in very similar circumstances with respect to income, opportunities for education, job satisfaction, and the general rate of social mobility. Such similarity in living conditions produced similarity in values, attitudes and opinions, again cutting across national lines. In other words, class status rather than national identification determined what people found praiseworthy in the Soviet system and what they condemned. The Russian peasant described and criticized his life very much as did the Ukrainian, Georgian, Tatar or Kazakh peasant; similarly, professional people of different nationality evaluated their life situations in like terms and shared the same criticisms of the system. Such differences as did emerge between nationalities were largely a reflection of the varying class composition—in particular, the proportion of peasants—from group to group.

Unequal Inopportunity

There was, however, one distinctive complaint voiced by those in the minority nationalities, and this on an issue of profound importance. The reader may have noted that all of the above examples of nondiscrimination have been confined to the economic and social spheres. In the political realm—in the structure of rule—a very different picture emerges. The crucial protest voiced in common by refugees from the minorities was that their people did not share equally in the direction of society and were not free to shape their culture along lines in keeping with native or indigenous traditions. Many saw themselves as still essentially vassals of a

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foreign power, as ruled by the alien Russian. The basis of these feelings is not just a matter of the sharp restrictions which, as we have seen, the regime places on the development of local nationalism. Just as important is the fact that the institutions of governance, both at the center and within the republics, have not included a proportionate representation of the minorities. The Communist Party has been predominantly a Russian party, with only a weak representation of the nationalities, while in the republics themselves the influence and indeed control of Russians and other outsiders sent in from Moscow has been painfully evident.

The composition of the supreme council of the party has reflected this imbalance during most of its history. Up to the time of its reorganization in 1952, the Politburo had altogether 28 members, of whom 16 were Russians and 8 more Russified Jews or Georgians. The people of 13 national republics, containing some 80 million of the population, never had representation on that body, including the third largest nationality, the Belorussians, and some 16 to 20 million Moslems. The 30 to 40 million Ukrainians were not represented after 1938, when the purges claimed the leading figures of Ukrainian nationality. The membership of the Presidium, which replaced the Politburo in 1952, has been somewhat more in proportion, but not markedly so. Of the 33 people who have served on the Presidium only 8—including Stalin before his death—have been non-Russians. The others are Beria (also Georgian), Kaganovich (Jewish), Mikoyan (Armenian), Korotchenko and Kirichenko (Ukrainians), Kuusinen (Finnish), and Mukhitdinov (Uzbek). A number of minority members, however, have been appointed as candidate (alternative) members of the Presidium.

The fact that Stalin himself was a Georgian by birth counts for little, since like many of these leaders he thoroughly identified himself with the Russians, a trait reflected in his extraordinary toast at the end of World War II:

> I should like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and above all of our Russian people. I drink in particular to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding of all the nations of the Soviet Union. . . .

The weakness of national representation has been evident not only at the top of the power hierarchy, but in the rank-and-file of the party. In proportion to population, the Communist Party is strongest in the predominantly Great Russian areas, weakest in the nationality regions. In Moscow and Leningrad, for example, the ratio of local to total party membership is more than twice that of local to total population; in republics like Tadjikistan the reverse applies. In fact, however, the disproportion is much greater, since within the nationality areas, the party is not only small but includes a substantial number of non-natives, preponderantly Russians. The exact ratios are hard to estimate, since the party generally stopped publishing data according to nationality by 1938. It is known, however, that as late as 1935 Tadzhiks and Turkmen—for example—constituted 75 percent of the population in the republics bearing their names, but only about 50 percent of the party organizations.

Within the lower and middle ranks of the national parties, both the rank-and-file and their officials are predominantly of native stock and speak the native language (the same is even truer of the governmental apparatus). But in the large urban centers, at the seats of power, the Russian image looms large. Access to positions of power is comparatively limited to the native, except insofar as he has become Russified—and in this case he is considered a non-national who may be transferred to work anywhere within the Soviet Union.

The fact that the party chief in the national areas has often been someone sent in from the outside has been perhaps the most important affront to national pride and symbol of the alien nature of the party. The best example in this respect is the Ukraine, where the First Secretary of the Communist Party has almost always been a non-Ukrainian, even though sometimes vaguely connected with the Ukrainian area or nationality. Kaganovich, who held the post in 1925-28, was a Russified Jew born in Belorussia. Kossior, who followed, was a Pole. The rest were Russians, and many never even learned to speak Ukrainian with fluency, despite the fact that it was the national tongue of some 40 million subjects. The only exception in the line of rule was Khrushchev's chosen successor in the post—his Ukrainian assistant Kirichenko (who later rose to the Presidium but is now in disgrace).

Economic Development Policy

To pose the fourth and last question: has there been any economic exploitation of minority regions, by depletion of the land or other natural resources, by the carrying off of wealth produced in the area without sufficient compensation, or by the development of the region's economy is so special or limited a way as to subordinate it unduly to the productive needs and interests of the dominant majority?

In the Soviet case the answer to these questions is clear-cut: the regime's economic policy as a whole does

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not discriminate against the minority areas and their economic development in favor of the Great Russians. Soviet industrialization was, of course, based on forced savings, which the government extracted for investment at the cost of popular consumption. But the minorities were not asked to bear a disproportionate share of the resulting hardships of a depressed living standard. The burden fell on all; in fact, it might be argued that the Great Russian majority initially made the greater sacrifice in order to permit the development of the capital-hungry, economically backward areas.

One economist has estimated, for example, that while the all-Union living standard fell markedly during the 1930's, in the four republics of Central Asia (not counting Kazakhstan), it may actually have improved to a slight degree. At the time the local economy was undergoing rapid change, as indicated by the fact that industrial output, which had been negligible, multiplied between six and nine times over between 1928 and 1937. Such an increase could only have been accomplished by the substantial investment of capital drawn from other parts of the country and by the application of new technology. Such help was even more important to the agriculture of the region.

In the initial stage of European colonial development, substantial capital was invested in the colonies, but often only in order to create a one-crop economy that in the long run was economically disadvantageous to the local people. There was an element of this approach in the Soviet regime's insistence on the expansion of cotton acreage in Central Asia, usually at the expense of existing wheat crops. But the area was not treated simply as a vast cotton plantation for the rest of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, existing resources of other kinds were widely developed. A hydro-electric power industry was developed, the output of which increased 8.5 times over in the period 1928-37. Earlier virtually all cotton had been shipped to Russia to be made into textiles, which in turn had to be shipped back, but in the 1930's a substantial textile industry was established in Tashkent. Leather shoe-making was established to utilize the hides from the region's extensive herds. These efforts make it evident that capital was retained in the area and not syphoned off for accumulation at the center. The data already cited on the growth of education and other cultural and social facilities similarly indicate that a goodly share of the returns accrued from exploitation of the region's natural wealth was reinvested in raising standards in the region.

Although the central Asian case may be one of the more outstanding examples, it reflects the general pattern of Soviet policy in the economic development of backward areas. The allocation of investment during the process of economic expansion has not in any significant degree been guided by considerations of nationality, but rather by those of economic efficiency or the defense needs of the country. And the benefits—as well as the burdens—which have resulted from economic development have been more or less equally shared by all peoples of the Soviet Union.

A Summary View

The main features of Soviet nationality policy sketched above have been consistently manifested since at least the early 1930's. Although the program as a whole is often identified as "Stalinist" nationality policy, only minor modifications have taken place in the post-Stalin era. In line with the general relaxation of terror in the USSR, the most repressive policies *vis-à-vis* certain nationalities have been abandoned and some of the iniquities of Stalin's reign (*e.g.*, the dispersion of the Chechen-Ingush, Kalmyks, and so on) have been rectified. In addition, Khrushchev has shown more awareness of the requirements of good "public relations" by such gestures as personal visits to the nationality areas, the appointment of a Ukrainian to the top post in the Ukraine, and the nomination of representatives of the Central Asian peoples to the higher councils of the ruling Communist Party.

In all other respects, however, the present leadership has followed the pattern of the past. On the credit side of the record, this has generally meant equality of social and economic opportunity for the individual of minority status. On the whole it has also meant equal treatment of national groups with regard to the exploitation of resources and economic development on the one hand, and to the elaboration of certain cultural institutions on the other.

Against these features, other factors must be weighed. First, if equality of treatment has been the general rule in the above respects, the exceptions and departures have been numerous enough and in some cases so glaring as to demonstrate that the application of nationality policy remains a matter of arbitrary and expedient decision on the part of the regime. More important, however, are the moral and political issues which underly the question of minority rights. The basic fact—and no amount of achievement can obscure it—is that Soviet nationality policy has constituted a forceful imposition of social, political and economic forms by a powerful center upon a host of colonial subjects. If these people had little part in choosing their path of national development, they have as little freedom today to alter it.

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Communism and Anti-Semitism

By Erich Goldhagen

"Judaism kills the love for the Soviet Motherland."

—***Sovetskaia Moldavia,*** **July 23, 1959.**

"They do not like collective work, group discipline . . . They are individualists. . . . Jews are interested in everything, they want to probe into everything, they discuss everything, and end up by having profoundly different opinions."

—Khrushchev in an interview with Serge Goussard, correspondent of *Le Figaro* (Paris), April 9, 1958.

THE EXISTENCE OF ANTI-SEMITISM in the USSR, its employment as a tool by the Communist leadership, and its absorption into the *Weltanschauung* of the "New Class" should no longer come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the realities of Soviet life. Yet few are aware of the genealogy of this unique phenomenon—of its historical roots and ideological evolution. For it is a fact that anti-Semitism is not alien to the radical tradition—in Western Europe, and more particularly in Russia. Indeed, the ancestry of Communist anti-Semitism may be traced to the percursors of Leninism and Stalinism—the revolutionary terrorists, the so-called "Populists," who dominated the revolutionary scene in Russia in the second half of the 19th century.

"Lubricant on the Wheel of Revolution"

When socialism as a current of political thought made its appearance in Western Europe, it tended to look upon the Jews with unfriendly eyes, regarding them as the embodiment of those qualities of social life which socialists denounced as evil and which they were sworn to undo. Barred from the ownership of land and excluded from the Guilds, the Jews had long ago been driven to devote themselves primarily to the pursuit of commerce; and throughout Western Europe the name Jew came to be almost synonymous with that of trader. The belief was thus born that the pursuit of money was a national vocation of the Jews, enjoined by their religion and practiced with unrivaled skill and zeal. It seemed that the spirit of commerce had found its purest embodiment and its consummate practitioners in the Jews.[1]

The Jews thus incurred the contempt and hatred that socialists harbored against the world of finance. The comprehensive condemnation of commerce and finance as useless and parasitic occupations, as unproductive activities whereby those who shun honest labor could derive undeserved riches from the toil of others was bound to embrace the Jews. This attitude was reinforced by the sinister tales which popular lore came to weave around the name of Rothschild, whose enormous wealth was believed to be a source of evil power—swaying monarchs, making and unmaking governments, and determining the destinies of nations. The vagaries of history, its irrationalities, the injustices and sufferings

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[1] It is interesting to note, in this connection, that all utopian reformers viewed money as a pernicious force serving no purpose save that of breeding injustice and perverting authentic human values, and foresaw its disappearance in the desired society of the future. The citizens of Thomas More's *Utopia,* for instance, "hold gold and silver up to scorn in every way . . . . They hang gold rings from the ears of criminals, place gold rings on their fingers, gold collars around their necks, and gold crowns on their heads." (T. More, *Utopia,* New York, 1949, p. 44.) And Karl Marx, in his *Nationale Ekonomie und Philosophie,* had the following to say about the evil influence of money: "It turns loyalty into disloyalty, love into hate, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, slave into master, master into slave, stupidity into intelligence, intelligence into stupidity." (Quoted in Kenneth Muir's "Marx's Conversion to Communism," *The New Reasoner,* London, No. 3, Winter 1957-58, p. 63).

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which it inflicted were traced not to the impersonal forces of economic and social processes but to villains of flesh and blood to whom one could assign guilt and upon whom one could discharge that hatred in which suffering and discontent often seek relief.

It was this outlook which Marx in part echoed in his famous essay *Zur Judenfrage:*

> What is the object of the Jew's worship in this world? Usury. What is his worldly god? Money. . . .
> Money is the zealous one God of Israel, beside which no other God may stand. Money degrades all the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal and self-constituted value set upon all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world, of both nature and man, of its original value. Money is the essence of man's life and work, which have become alienated from him. This alien monster rules him and he worships it.[2]

In Russia, too, disdain towards the Jews was the prevalent attitude of the early revolutionaries. The abysmal conditions of the Jews—constrained in their movement, compelled to live only in assigned regions known as the Pale of Settlement, and reduced (save for a tiny minority) to a state of poverty verging on starvation—evoked little sympathy in the breasts of the radical intellectuals of the 1870's and 1880's, however virulent their hatred of the Tsarist autocracy. To be sure, the Jews were wretched and poor, but their wretchedness and poverty was not graced by those lofty virtues which the fertile imagination of the revolutionaries ascribed to the Russian peasantry. Unlike the peasants, who earned their meager subsistence by toil and who were regarded by the intellectuals as noble beings endowed with the qualities of selflessness and instinctive communalism, the Jews were a work-shirking lot, engaging in the "parasitic" and "exploitative" occupations. Even poverty, their only reward, could not redeem them.

But some revolutionaries did not content themselves with passive disdain; they acclaimed and encouraged active violence against the Jews.

IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER of 1881 a wave of violence swept through the southern part of the Pale of Settlement. Over one hundred Jewish communities were visited by orgies of destruction, claiming, apart from enormous material damage, scores of dead and hundreds of wounded. This outbreak of unprovoked brute force visited upon a defenseless community moved the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will)—the largest revolutionary-terroristic organization at that time—to issue a proclamation in Ukrainian on August 30, 1881, blessing the riots and exhorting the peasants to further violence against "the parasitic Jews" and the "Tsar of the Jews". "The people of the Ukraine", the proclamation stated, "suffer more than anyone else from the Jews . . . you have already begun to rise against the Jews . . . you have done well." [3]

This proclamation cannot be simply explained, of course, by the anti-Semitic spirit of the radical intelligentsia. No doubt its authors were imbued with anti-Semitic prejudices; yet it would be naive to assume, for instance, that they were in earnest in affixing the label "Tsar of the Jews" on Alexander III: his disdain for the Jews, and his oppressive and discriminatory policies against them were certainly known to the leaders of the Narodnaya Volya. Thus there is little doubt that the proclamation was first and foremost a *calculated device.* Underlying it, apart from the Bakuninist conviction that the "passion for destruction is a constructive passion," lay Machiavellian calculation, the wish and the hope that the violence against the Jews would be extended to the autocracy. By linking the Jews with the Tsar, the leaders of the Narodnaya Volya sought to telescope the pogroms into the social revolution, to fan its fire into a conflagration engulfing the authorities. They were consciously lying, but to their minds this was a "noble lie," graced by the lofty purpose it served. The blood of the Jews might have been wholly innocent, but it was nonetheless the "lubricant on the wheels of revolution."

In the society of radical émigrés in Geneva, one by the name of Zhukovsky defended the pogroms in the following terms:

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[2] Karl Marx, *A World Without Jews,* New York 1959, p. 41. This is not to say that Marx was anti-Semitic in the accepted sense of the term. Indeed, the main theme and purport of his essay was to expose the hollowness of the civic equality granted by the bourgeois order. As for Marx's linking of Jews and capitalism, the most original and freshest explanation of it, in this author's opinion, was offered by the East German scholar L. Kofler, in his *Zur Geschichte Der Buergerlichen Gesellschaft* (On the history of the Bourgeois Society) *n.d.,* Halle/Saale, pp. 478-496—a unique exception to the otherwise dreary gibberish that passes off as "social science" in the Communist bloc. According to Kofler, capitalism found its purest manifestation in the Jewish ethos because unlike Gentile capitalists who, being linked to the native proletariat by ties of common nationhood, have endeavored to disguise and temper their avarice and exploitative ambitions, the Jews knew no such restraint. Strangers to the society in which they have lived, they pursued their vocation with uninhibited ruthlessness and without an embellishing guise. They thus have mirrored capitalism in its stark nakedness.

[3] Quoted in E. Tcherikover, *geshikhte fun der yidisher arbeter bavegung in di fareynikte shtatn* (History of the Jewish Labor Movement in the USA—in Yiddish) New York, 1945, Vol. II, p. 174.

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Sixty percent of the Jewish population are engaged in commerce. This is the background against which the peasant hunts down the Jew. . . . To be sure, from a humanitarian standpoint, it is a piece of barbarism when peasants fall like savages upon a frightened Jew and beat him until he bleeds. However, take this event in the context of social dynamics. Why does he beat? Because [beating] is his political ballot. He has no other way of venting his wrath against his exploitation by the government. It is indeed a pity that the peasant beats the Jew—the most innocent of his exploiters. But he beats, and this is the beginning of his struggle for liberation. When . . . his fists will have grown strong and hard he will strike those who are above the Jews.[4]

But even those radicals who did not view the pogroms with approval could not bring themselves to call for an end to the bloodshed. Anti-Semitism was endemic to the Russian peasantry. It was its daily psychic bread designed to still the grievances and frustrations born of hunger—hunger for land and hunger for food. The Russian intelligentsia which had for two decades tried with only limited success to strike roots in the Russian peasantry, to secure its confidence and to persuade it to follow the intellectuals as the champions of its aspirations, feared that by showing concern for the Jews they would unwittingly alienate the peasants. To come out in defense of the Jews would have branded them as "Jewish stooges." Was it worth endangering, for the sake of a small national minority, the cause of socialism? These were the arguments with which radicals who had dissociated themselves from violence justified their refusal to come out publicly against the pogroms. The radical philosopher P. L. Lavrov, who was to describe anti-Semitism as the "most tragic epidemic of our era," declined to print a pamphlet against the pogroms submitted to him by the Social Democratic leader Akselrod:

I must confess that I regard this question as a very complicated one, indeed an exceedingly difficult one for a party which seeks to come closer to the people. Theoretically, on paper, the question can be easily answered. But in view of the prevailing popular passions and the need of the Russian socialists to have the people on their side whenever possible the question is quite different.[5]

The New Spirit

The succeeding generation of Russian revolutionaries did not share the Populist view that anti-Semitic outrages have a redemptive quality. Manifestations of anti-Semitism were not tolerated in the Marxist-Socialist movement which dominated the Russian revolutionary scene during the next two decades. In his pamphlet *Our Differences* (1884), which set forth the program of the Social Democrats and the reasons for their opposition to the Narodnaya Volya, Plekhanov, the "father of Russian Marxism," condemned the proclamation of 1881 as "a base flattery of the national prejudices of the Russian people."[6] Similarly Lenin, after the notorious Kishinev pogrom in 1903, recalled with shame the "infamous proclamation" and called on all socialists to defend the Jews against the mob as a matter of honor.

Indeed, by the turn of the century both Russian and West European socialists tended to view anti-Semitism in a new light. Hitherto, socialists had regarded it as a misguided protest against existing social conditions by petty bourgeois and proletarians—"the socialism of fools," in the words of August Bebel. They had hoped that sooner or later those ensnared by it would recognize that not only capitalist Jews were the cause of their misery but Gentile and Jewish capitalists alike; and that this recognition would bring them into the fold of socialism. But when it seemed that instead of being a vestibule of socialism, anti-Semitism had become a useful tool in the hands of the ruling class, the socialist attitude changed. Anti-Semitism came to be treated unequivocally as a hostile ideology. During the two decades before 1917, there were few recorded overt expressions of anti-Jewish bias in the Russian socialist movement. In fact, there is no doubt that by and large the leaders of the Russian socialist parties did not harbor anti-Semitic sentiments. Such sentiments were certainly absent from Lenin, who was a genuine "internationalist," singularly free from national intolerance, and determinedly hostile to any manifestations of xenophobia or "Great Russian chauvinism" on the part of his comrades-in-arms.

Nevertheless, the Russian Social Democrats still shunned prominent association with specifically Jewish causes. To be sure, the central organs of their press denounced anti-Semitism in forceful terms; but they did not carry these denunciations in popular leaflets and pamphlets. For a socialist agitator, working among the grass-roots of the working-class, it was still unwise to appear in the role of an advocate of the Jews.

After the October Revolution the Bolsheviks adopted an uncompromising attitude against anti-Semitism. As the White armies converged to extinguish the infant regime with the battlecry "Beat the Jews and Save Rus-

[4] F. Kurski, "di zhenever grupe sotsialistn yidn un ir oyfruf" (The Geneva Group of Jewish Socialists and its proclamation—Yiddish), *Historishe Shriftn*, Vilna/Paris 1939, Vol. III, p. 561.
[5] *Iz Arkhiva P. G. Akselroda* (From the P. G. Akselrod archive—in Russian) Berlin 1924, Vol. II, p. 30.
[6] G. V. Plekhanov, *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia* (Collected Philosophical Works), Moscow 1956, Vol. I, p. 217.

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SOVIET CLAIMS

In my country, all peoples enjoy freedom for the development of their culture. They can have their theaters and their literature, and that includes the Jews. However, the Jewish population has merged with the Russian in Russian culture so fully that Jews participate in general culture and literature . . .

—*A. I. Mikoyan, New York, Jan. 15, 1959, (transcript of the United Nations Correspondence Association).*

As far as the Jews are concerned, even if Jewish schools were established, very few would attend them voluntarily. . . . A university in the Yiddish language could never be established. There would not be a sufficient number of students. With regard to the Yiddish or Hebrew languages, there is no demand for their use. . . .

—*N. S. Khrushchev, Réalités (Paris), May 1957*

COMMUNIST QUESTIONS

Why has nothing appeared in Yiddish [in the USSR]? Not a newspaper, not a book, not a magazine! All the arguments we heard from certain Soviet leaders that the Jews themselves do not want Yiddish publications do not correspond to reality. . . .

That the Soviet Jews are interested in having a Yiddish newspaper can be seen from the fact that close to 2000 copies of the Warsaw *Folkshtimme* come into the Soviet Union and are avidly read. Even the *Morgn Frayhayt* [US Communist Yiddish daily] comes all the way to the Soviet Union and is read eagerly.

—*Ch. Suller, Daily Worker (New York), Sept. 22, 1957.*

What about the 3,000,000 who flocked to the Yiddish concerts given sporadically in the USSR in 1957 (a figure given by N. N. Kanilov, Vice-Minister for Culture. . .)? Why should these millions, or even thousands, be denied full facilities to publish, speak, see plays, in what is still their mother tongue, namely Yiddish? . . . .

If all facilities and help were extended to [Jewish] culture and language between 1917 and 1948, what change has taken place in their status after 1948 to warrant the cessation and elimination of this culture? . . . . I have not come across a coherent Marxist argument . . . why Soviet Yiddish writers should have their novels, stories and poems published (in Yiddish) by left-wing publications in capitalist countries . . . and not in their country of origin, the USSR.

—*A. Waterman, "On the Jewish Question," Marxism Today (London), April 1959.*

sia," the denunciation of anti-Semitism as counter-revolutionary became not only a duty enjoined by faith but a course dictated by the imperatives of the struggle in which the Bolsheviks were engaged. The weapon had to be wrested from the hands of those seeking to restore the *ancien regime*. Anti-Semitism was outlawed and suppressed; and the Red Army was hailed by the Jews as a protector and liberator from the White troops which were bringing upon them nothing but death and destruction. There was exaggeration but no falsification in the picture of Eastern Europe drawn by the American-Yiddish poet, A. Liesin, who was not a Communist: "While in all the countries surrounding Bolshevik Russia *anti-Semitism is fanned with increasingly infernal* power . . . Bolshevik Russia presents an example of humaneness and justice, the like of which the history of the Jewish Diaspora has never seen before." [7] Anti-Semitism could not figure in any indictment drawn up against the Soviet dictatorship during the 1920's. But with the advent of the 1930's a new picture began to unfold itself.

Stalinist Nationalism

The revival of Great Russian nationalism under Stalin's dispensation in the early 1930's created a climate less congenial to the Jews than that which had prevailed throughout the preceding decade. With the building of "socialism in one country" proceeding apace, Bolshevik Russia began to shed many of the features which revolutionary enthusiasm and devotion had bestowed upon her. A new spirit pervaded the party, disillusioned by the dearth of revolutionary outbreaks in West Europe to which it had looked forward in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, and deeply immersed in its own "revolution from above." Under these circumstances, the Russian nationalist tradition, renounced and abused by the sweeping wave of revolutionary triumph, gradually reasserted its claims, casting the revolutionary *élan* into more traditional mold. Within these confining walls the cosmopolitan radiance of the revolution grew dimmer and dimmer. The old revolutionary leadership reared in the tradition of Marxist internationalism was replaced by a new generation of bureaucrats imbued with that peculiar mixture of Marxist militancy and Russian chauvinism which henceforth was to mark the ethos of Soviet society.

A chilly wind began to envelop the Jews, especially the Jewish intelligentsia which had been everywhere in

[7] A. Liesin, in *di tsukunft* (Yiddish), January 1920, p. 1.

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the modern world the bearer of cosmopolitanism. In this new climate the dictatorship was less disposed to resist the envious and subdued demands that the high proportion of the Jews in administrative positions and universities be reduced and that the vacancies thus created be filled by native sons. Indeed, the dictatorship viewed such restrictive measures as salutary: they would earn the regime fresh popularity at home, and at the same time blunt the edge of anti-Communist propaganda throughout the world (emanating from the extreme right) that Mother Russia had fallen under the domination of the Judeo-Communist conspiracy. Accordingly, the Soviet government proceeded to reduce sharply the number of Jews in the leading bodies of the party and government, to introduce a *numerus clausus* into some institutions of higher learning, and virtually to exclude Jews from the diplomatic service.[8] To be a Jew again became a source of discomfort and a handicap.

These measures did not spring from anti-Semitic sentiment in the strict traditional sense of the term, but were motivated by coldly calculated *raison d'état.* They were sometimes accompanied by regrets (privately voiced) about the necessity of sacrificing principles to this greater consideration. *Lex revolutiae suprema est,* Plekhanov had proclaimed in faulty Latin at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party (1903), scarcely aware of the horrifying deeds with which that tenet was pregnant. Would a movement which could massacre proletarians in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, practice terror in order to achieve social harmony, glory in autocracy in order to establish universal self-government—would such a movement shrink from the appeasement of anti-Semitism if it thought such appeasement would further the "lofty" cause of communism? The head of the Central Committee's department on national minorities met the complaints of a Yiddish writer, Katcherginski, concerning the discrimination against Jews practiced by Soviet authorities in Lithuania, with the explanation that "the Jews of Lithuania may have to be sacrificed to the general cause".[9] The rich and indiscriminate armory of means wherewith bolshevism professed to pursue Utopia acquired a fresh instrument, time-honored and of proven efficacy; and the anti-Semitic spirits, which had been outlawed by bolshevism and driven to lead a repressed existence in the subterranean dwellings of Soviet society, were now emboldened to emerge and engage in their practice in the guise of a Communist *raison d' état.*[10]

(See box on p. 41.)

From Intolerance to Repression

In 1948 Soviet policy towards the Jews acquired a fresh and disturbing dimension. If hitherto anti-Semitism had been a tool wielded with dispassion and calculated moderation without deeply engaging the spirit of the Communist leaders, and affecting only those Jews aspiring to careers in certain fields, now it was fed by passion and conviction, and was directed against the entire Jewish community. It was not only anti-Semitism *de logique,* to paraphrase Camus' famous phrase; it was at once logical and passionate.

The affection and enthusiasm displayed by the Jews of Russia for the newly created state of Israel, to whose birth the Soviet Union itself had made a modest contribution, provoked Stalin's suspicion that the Jews were an untrustworthy element whose ties with their numerous brethren abroad made them potential traitors. He proceeded to treat them accordingly. He decided not only to render them harmless by encouraging their removal from jobs as security risks, but also to extinguish their ethnic consciousness. With characteristic totalitarian swiftness all Jewish cultural institutions were abolished and several hundred Yiddish writers were arrested: the more prominent among them were executed after a secret trial (in 1952), while others expired in the penal camps of the arctic wasteland. The

[8] Hitler revealed in the course of one of his celebrated table talks that "Stalin made no secret before Ribbentrop that he was waiting only for the moment of maturation of a sufficiently large indigenous intelligentsia to make short shrift (Schluss zu machen) of Jews as a leadership stratum which he still needs today." *Hitlers Tischgespraeche,* Bonn, 1951, p. 119.

[9] Sh. Katcherginsky, *tsvishn hamer un serp* (Between hammer and sickle—Yiddish), Buenos Aires 1950, p. 96.

[10] Trotsky diagnosed the first stealthy manifestations of official anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia as symptoms of the bureaucratic degeneration afflicting Soviet society. According to him, having usurped the dictatorship of the proletariat and betrayed the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist legacy, the Stalinist bureaucracy was seeking to use the Jews as a scapegoat for its misrule and betrayal. L. Trotsky, "Thermidor and Anti-Semitism," *The New International* (New York), May 1941, pp. 91-94. The article bears the date February 22, 1937. This diagnosis, however, was less applicable for the 1930's than to the period after World War II. Thus in 1956 during the ferment in the Polish Communist Party which brought Gomulka to power, the Stalinist elements, known as the Natolin faction, proposed that the popular hatred besieging the Communist rulers be placated by offering the Jewish party members as a sacrificial lamb. They advocated, in the words of a contemporary revisionist account, that the governmental and party apparatus be reconstructed by applying "the criterion of pure Aryan blood." Ryszard Turski, in *Po Prostu* (Warsaw), October 28, 1956. See also Czeslaw Milosz, "Anti-Semitism in Poland," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1957.

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entry "Jews" in the Soviet Encyclopedia appearing during that period described the Jews as if they were an extinct tribe.[11] Before World War II an elaborate network of cultural institutions had served the Jews of Russia: schools attended by over 100,000 children, a Yiddish press, a large and prolific Yiddish literary community, and a theatre rated among the best in the Soviet Union. By the autumn of 1948 almost nothing was left in existence. By a stroke of the dictator's pen all organized Jewish endeavor came to an abrupt end. Only a score or so of defunct synagogues survived. These and the withered label of Birobidzhan still incongruously attached to that region on the Amur, which had never acquired a Jewish character and in which the Jews formed a hopeless minority, were the only visible signs of a community of two and a half million.[12]

From 1948 until the death of Stalin Soviet Jews lived under a reign of terror amid rumors of their imminent mass deportation.[13]

Rehabilitation with a Difference

The death of Stalin and the acquittal of the doctors involved in the "Doctors' Plot," as well as *Pravda's* (April 6, 1953) admission that the affair of the doctors was a "fabrication" intended to "inflame nationalist hostilities among the Soviet peoples," removed the nightmare which had hovered over the Jewish community. The terror relented. But the fundamentals of Stalin's policies towards the Jews were retained. As in many other spheres of Communist endeavor the Stalinist aims were preserved, only the methods were changed. The carrot gained ascendancy over the stick, the peaceful incentive over terror, the indirect approach over the direct brutal assault.

Stalin's heirs, in the process of their cautious detachment from the most severe features of Stalin's legacy, set out to right the wrongs inflicted on some nationalities. It will be recalled that seven other ethnic groups had fallen victim to Stalin's suspicion and vindictiveness: the Ingush, the Chechens, the Volga Germans, the Crimea Tatars, the Kalmyks, the Karachai and the Balkars. All of them were uprooted at various times during World War II and banished in their entirety, including members of the party and the Komsomol, to remote places. While the expulsion of the Volga Germans was justified by the authorities as a security measure—and it was perhaps a more rational measure than the removal of the Japanese-American from the Pacific coast during World War II—the deportation of the other national groups was undertaken on the principle of collective guilt. The sins of the few were visited upon the entire community. The preamble to the official decree published in *Izvestia,* June 26, 1946, announcing, two years after the expulsion, the dissolution of the Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean Tatar autonomous republics, stated that collective punishment had been meted out for the failure of the peoples to combat those in their midst who were collaborating with the German enemy. It was this tribal notion of justice which Khrushchev included in his indictment of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress:

> **Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.[14]**

The repressed nationalities have since been restored to their public identity and some have even been permitted to return to their native lands. They ceased to be Orwellian "un-peoples." Their names reappeared on maps and in reference works. Even the Volga Germans have been provided with schools and newspapers.[15]

This wholesale rehabilitation has not embraced the Jews. To be sure the Jews had not been deported—although Soviet Jews are convinced that only Stalin's death saved them from that fate.[16] But condemned to the status of an "un-people," they had been marked out for cultural extinction and their institutions had been destroyed. However, it would seem that in Khrushchev's view this particular action of Stalin did not fall into the category of "monstrous acts" and "rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state" [17]; it was a deed of prudent

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[11] *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia,* 2nd ed., Vol. 15, Moscow 1952, pp. 377-79.

[12] Birobidzhan, an area in eastern Siberia, was set up in the late 1920's as a "Jewish autonomous region," but due to its geographic location and severe climatic conditions it never attracted many Jews, whose roots were in the Ukraine and Belorussia primarily.

[13] See Communist weekly *World News* (London), Jan. 12, 1957.

[14] See Khrushchev's "secret speech" in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1956, pp. 57-58.

[15] For an account of the rehabilitation, see Walter Kolarz, "Die Rehabilitierung der liquidierten Sowjetvolker," (The rehabilitation of Soviet nationalities), *Ost Europa* (Stuttgart) June 1957, pp. 414-20.

[16] See *World News, op. cit.*

[17] Khrushchev, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

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statesmanship. In the course of an interview with a Canadian Communist delegation, Khrushchev, in one of the unguarded moments of candor to which he is so often given, showed himself to share Stalin's view of the Jews as inherent security risks. "Khrushchev," relates the Canadian Communist, Salsberg, "agreed with Stalin that the Crimea, which had been depopulated at the war's end, should not be turned into a Jewish colonization center, because in case of war it would be turned into a base for attacking the USSR. . . ." [18]

Surely, a people harboring such a ready propensity to treason could not be allowed to possess cultural institutions fostering and perpetuating that tendency.

Assimilation through Attrition

Stalin's heirs are determined not to revoke the edict against the cultural life of the Jews. The pleadings of a British Communist group asking that Yiddish schools and the theatre be restored were met by Suslov with a categorical refusal befitting that grim guardian of orthodoxy: "No, these things will not be reinstituted." [19]

This obduracy has been maintained by the Soviet leaders in spite of its unfavorable impression on Western opinion, which has displayed anxiety over the lot of the Jews, and in spite of the injuries inflicted on Communist parties with a substantial proportion of Jewish members. Three Communist delegations have taken up the Jewish question with the highest Soviet leaders: a Canadian delegation in August 1956; a British delegation in October of the same year; and a deputation of French Jewish Communists which journeyed to Moscow with the blessing of Thorez early in 1958 for the express purpose of dissuading the Soviet leaders from their present policy towards the Jewish minority. All returned empty-handed.

Disillusioned and embittered, Jewish Communists in Canada, the United States and Britain have deserted their parties in large numbers. For many years they had nourished a vision of Soviet Russia which bore little resemblance to reality. Their imagination had seen a land in which a multi-national brotherhood informed by love was laboring towards the realization of Utopia under the guidance of dedicated leaders, all of them paragons of Leninist virtue, stern, determined, ruthless against enemies but full of solicitude for the oppressed everywhere. In the aftermath of Stalin's death the veil of illusion dissolved. J. B. Salsberg, leader of the Canadian CP and a member of the delegation to the USSR, after an interview of two hours, found the First Secretary of the Communist Party and presumed custodian of Marxism-Leninism to be a man possessed of "a backward prejudice against the Jewish group as a people . . . a prejudice which sharply contradicts the Marxist mode of thought." His "statements smack of

[18] Quoted in *The New Leader* (New York), Sept. 14, 1959, p. 9.
[19] *World News, op. cit.*

Constitutional Guarantees . . .

Equality of rights of Soviet citizens, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of governmental, economic, cultural, political and other public activity, has been inscribed in the Stalin Constitution.

No matter what nation or race a Soviet citizen may belong to, he enjoys the same political rights as all other citizens. He may be elected or appointed to any state office or post. He may work at any job he can cope with and receives equal pay for equal work. He may enter any educational institution and engage in scientific or cultural work . . . with all other citizens.

The Stalin Constitution most strictly prohibits any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of citizens on account of their race or nationality.

—From The Social and State Structure of the USSR, by V. Karpinsky, (Moscow), 1952, pp. 179-89.

. . . and Official Rationalization

Khrushchev: At the outset of the Revolution, we had many Jews in the leadership of the party and the state . . . In due course, we have created new cadres . . .
Pervukhin: . . . our own intelligentsia.
Khrushchev: Should the Jews want to occupy the foremost positions in our republic now, it would naturally be taken amiss by the indigenous inhabitants.

[Madame Furtseva] said that some years back, talk of anti-Semitism here [in Russia] was stirred as a result of misinterpretations of certain government actions. The government had found in some of its departments a heavy concentration of Jewish people . . . Steps were taken to transfer them to other enterprises, giving them equally good positions and without jeopardizing their rights.

—From interview in Réalités (Paris), May 1957. Furtseva quoted in National Guardian (New York), June 25, 1956.

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Great Russian chauvinism. . . . His approach to the problem of Jewish nationality is an unforgivable violation of socialist democracy."[20] Soon afterwards, Salsberg resigned from the party and was followed in this action by a large number of Jews and non-Jews. The Canadian party lost some of its ablest leaders and dedicated members. In Montreal, where the Communists had once been strong enough to elect a member of Parliament, the party organization virtually ceased to exist.

In explanation of the absence of Jewish cultural institutions, Soviet spokesmen usually advance the theory of "integration." According to this theory, the Jews have become so integrated into the body of the Russian people that they have lost all will or capacity for ethnic self-expression. Eager to submerge in the Russian majority, they have abandoned Yiddish for Russian. The breath of life has departed from Jewish culture; it has died from inanition. This consummation, marking an advance on the road of history, deserves the applause of all progressive persons, including Jews. Only reactionaries could lament it. To revive Jewish institutions would, therefore, be tantamount to reviving a corpse in defiance of the will of History. According to Salsberg:

> Khrushchev repeated the view . . . that the majority of Soviet Jews have become integrated into the country's general life. He emphasized that such integration is historically progressive, whereas the maintenance of a separate group existence is reactionary.[21]

It is true, of course, that the majority of Jews have come to use Russian in their daily lives—to a large extent as a result of the assimilationist policies that have been enforced on them. Still, according to the last census, 20.8 percent of Soviet Jews have declared Yiddish to be their most intimate medium of communication. To be sure, the percentage is lower than of any other ethnic group claiming its national language as the "mother tongue." Yet two factors must be borne in mind: (1) That it must have taken a certain amount of courage for Jews to claim Yiddish as their tongue in the face of official hostility, and that the actual figure may therefore be considerably larger; and (2) that 20.8 percent still embraces 472,000 people—in absolute figures, a far larger number than that of two dozen or so other Soviet nationalities (such as the Buriats, Avars, Ossetians, and so on) whose languages are not only tolerated, but actively encouraged by the Soviet authorities. Such, indeed, are the canons of the Soviet nationality policy that 472,000 Jews are served by a meager sheet whose circulation of 1,000 is largely confined to Birobidzhan, while, say, the 12,000 Chukchi inhabiting the northern region of the RSFSR are served by a comparable organ of 800 copies.[22]

The picture becomes fuller when we add that about 80 Yiddish writers, survivors of the decimation of the Yiddish literary intelligentsia, are denied a public forum in their own tongue for their creative talents. A chosen few may have their works translated into Russian, if their theme is not of a specific Jewish content. The others must find contentment in manuscripts languishing in the obscurity of desk drawers. According to a highly literate French Jewish Communist, Chaim Sloves:

> The Soviet Jewish writers are more creative today than perhaps ever before. "Not a day passes that I don't write," everyone tells you. And everyone has his own work ready for the press—volumes of poetry, novels, stories, dramas. It is not merely literary impetus or prolific creativity: It is, in the highest sense, sacred dedication.[23]

Immediately after the Revolution Hebrew was declared a counterrevolutionary language. Since 1948 Yiddish literature has been treated as a force inimical to the purposes of the Soviet government. A unique application, indeed, of the official formula "socialist in content—national in form"!

PURSUING THE GOAL of total assimilation of the Jews, the regime has for the past three years embarked on a campaign against the last fragments of communal life in Russia—the synagogues and the religious life associated with them. The purpose of this campaign, conducted through the familiar medium of the

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[20] *New Leader, op. cit.* That Khrushchev harbors anti-Semitic feelings of a rather vulgar nature has been evidenced by many of his utterances made in private. One such adverse pronouncement on the Jews, made in the course of an interview with a French correspondent of *Le Figaro* (Paris), April 9, 1958, described the Jews as averse to collective work and group discipline, and stung even the most hardened Jewish Communists in the West, whose loyalty survived the *crise de conscience* produced by revelations after Stalin's death. "It is incomprehensible how such a statement could come from the leader of the Soviet state"—quoted from *morgn frayhayt,* New York, April 13, 1958.) It would be a mistake, however, to infer that the personal feelings of the dictator govern Soviet policy towards the Jews. The operative logic of the Soviet system is sufficient to account for it, although the dictator's sentiments lend a particular acerbity to some of its features.

[21] *New Leader, op. cit.*

[22] See census report in *Pravda,* Feb. 4, 1960. Also in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), March 2, 1960.

[23] *Yiddishe kultur* (Yiddish culture), New York, Feb. 1959.

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feuilleton in the press and the occasional radio broadcast, and practically reinforced by the closing of synagogues in outlying regions, is to deter the Jews from congregating in compact groups. The process of atomization is to be brought to its ultimate conclusion. By insulating the Jews from their co-religionists and co-nationals in the rest of the world, and by isolating them from each other, the regime hopes to extirpate the consciousness of kind and thus remove what it thinks is a source of disaffection from within the Soviet Union. For Judaism, Soviet propagandists insist, is not only "opium for the people," but also a creed implanting in its adherents allegiance to foreign powers and infidelity to the Soviet Union. In a recent broadcast (December 9, 1959) emanating from Kirovograd in the Ukraine (a town, incidentally, with a notorious record of pogroms in pre-revolutionary Russia, including the one which the Narodnaya Volya welcomed with such glee), the speaker inveighed in language of unusual virulence against the local synagogue and its officials:

> . . . the Jewish faith has been strongly intermixed with Jewish bourgeois nationalism and Zionism, already possessing a strong reactionary essence. . . . Sermons by Rabbi Ayzik Pektor hardly differ from the woeful theory of the uniqueness of the Aryan race and its destiny to rule over the peoples of the entire world. . . .

The broadcast was saturated wth sheer medievalism:

> Among the numerous Jewish feasts, a special place belongs to Saturday, which should be inspiringly observed by every Orthodox Jew, for according to the teaching of the Talmud this is the day of absolute inactivity. And so, on a Saturday, when the divine service ends, the faithful disperse, and . . . the table is laid, vodka, wine and snacks appear, and toasts to the health of "God's servants" are raised. The drinking feast (*sic*) is led by the rabbi's wife, Roza Spektor.
>
> Jewish ministers and circumcisers execute the rite of circumcision, which has a strikingly nationalistic character. Its specific significance lies in the fact that it gives proof of belonging to the "chosen" people—the Jews. At the same time it imbues Jews with repugnance and hatred of those who do not possess this special sign. . . .
>
> Judaic sermons are sermons of bourgeois Zionists. Such sermons are tools of the nationalistic, Israeli, cosmopolitan American bourgeoisie. With their tentacles, the Jewish bourgeois nationalists, with the help of Judaism, try to reach into our Soviet garden. But they will never succeed.[24]

THE TREATMENT OF the Jews by the Soviet dictatorship is without a full parallel among its policies toward the other national minorities. A unique people, the Jews have drawn themselves singular treatment. As Stalinism departed from the ideals of internationalism and cosmopolitanism which had inspired the Bolshevik Revolution, it cynically resorted to anti-Semitism as a tool of its designs, harkening back to the tradition of the Narodnaya Volya, in many ways its spiritual ancestor. The xenophobia born of its totalitarian isolation—a xenophobia incongruously linked to its international aspirations and professions—exposed the Jews to grave suspicion. They were members of a world-wide fraternity, the greater part of which lived in the camp of "imperialism," and the creation of the state of Israel intensified that suspicion. Alone among all the national minorities the Jews have been condemned to total assimilation. The Jews are indeed a "chosen people" in Russia—chosen for cultural extinction.

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[24] Throughout 1959, a high percentage of the feuilletons appearing in the Soviet press were devoted to the pillorying and denunciation of individuals bearing unmistakable Jewish names, and of synagogues: *e.g.*, 20-25 percent of the pieces in *Vechernaia Moskva;* 20 percent in *Sovetskaia Kultura;* 10 percent in *Komsomolskaia Pravda;* 33 percent in *Sovetskaia Latvia.* For representative samples see *Prikarpatska Pravda,* September 24, 1958; *Vechernaia Moskva,* March 13, 1959; and *Sovetskaia Moldavia,* November 12, 1959. See also *The New Leader, op. cit.*

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Towards a "Communist Welfare State"?

The reader is referred to the symposium under the above title in the January-February 1960 issue, containing the article "Social Welfare in the USSR," by Alec Nove, and comments by Solomon Schwarz, Bertram D. Wolfe, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Peter Wiles, Richard Lowenthal, and Asoka Mehta—Editors.

A Matter of Definition

YOU HAVE DONE useful service in opening your columns to this discussion, because it seems to me one of the fundamental questions with which we shall be occupied for some time to come. But I sense a certain confusion in the discussion, which arises, perhaps, from the fact that Mr. Nove's article is not really addressed to the question which you raise in your editorial introduction—the possibility of a "Communist welfare state." All that Mr. Nove says, supported by the evidence which he has assembled with his usual scholarly care, is that Khrushchev's regime is paying a good deal more attention to the welfare of the population than did Stalin's. This is really a very long way off from the "welfare state" (to which Mr. Nove makes no reference), at any rate in the sense in which we use the term in England. For, in our sense it means at least two things. First, a state in which the welfare of the governed takes precedence over some of the other aims which have preoccupied our governments in the past—national glory, for example, or far-flung empire. Secondly, a state in which this welfare is achieved with no, or at all events a minimum of, damage to our traditional free institutions by which our liberty is ensured. In other words, it is recognized by all—or so many of us hope—that increased preoccupation by the state with widespread welfare can constitute a danger to liberty, though opinions vary as to the extent to which this risk must be accepted in the interests of social justice.

Now, if one applies to the Soviet Union the synthesis of questions raised both by Mr. Nove and by you we arrive at three main questions:

Question One: Is the present Soviet regime more preoccupied with welfare than its predecessor? Answer: obviously yes. Whether the motive is fear of public disorder, or the inexorable logic of industrial growth, or some inherent benevolence in Khrushchev's disposition seems to me of very little practical importance, and probably undiscoverable, since the motives of politicians are seldom unmixed.

Question Two: Is welfare the primary preoccupation of the Soviet regime to the exclusion of such other great power preoccupations as glory, or empire? Answer: obviously not—though it is conceivable that it could become so, if ideology loses all its dynamic, if the appetite for the good and quiet life continues to grow, and if the party loses its grip.

Question Three: Is the present Soviet regime anxious lest increased attention to welfare should threaten its "traditional free institutions"? An absurd question, but one which helps to remind us how little the welfare state has to do with Communist regimes, and also that despotism and welfare are far from incompatible. For the masses, who are usually ready to trade freedom for greater material advantages, are satisfied under a "welfare despotism", while the few, with memories of greater tyranny in the past, are lulled by the benevolence into tolerating the despotism. On all sides in the Soviet Union today we see signs of party control digging itself in, extending its range of influence and interference, devising new "public organizations" through which it can channel public activity into useful directions which are at the same time harmless to its own authority—in short, laying the foundations for that effortless waking and sleeping subordination of the individual to the collectivity which is the totalitarian ideal. All this can be much better achieved by increased attention to welfare than by Stalin's wasteful terror. (May it not even be one of the motives for the new trend?) That increased attention to welfare should of itself lead to more freedom (and freedom is, I repeat, implicit in the phrase "welfare state") seems to me incomprehensible.

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Basic Flaws

THE SPIRITED and earnest discussion around the subject of "The Communist Welfare State" . . . has left this regular reader of your publication slightly breathless and, on balance, rather dissatisfied . . . .

Given the quality of the minds that took part in the symposium, the several contributions were individually all that we had a right to expect: well-informed, interesting, elegant. Taken together, however, they seemed to me to add up to little more more than a flow of interesting "copy". I am proceeding on the assumption, of course, that the symposium had a more substantive purpose behind it.

In the first place, your authors were visibly laboring under the handicap of an ambitious title that overshot the mark. It was all too apparent that not one of the participants in the discussion could really persuade himself that the character of the state in the USSR has changed, or is changing, as the result of a measured increase in the ruble expenditures from the bloated government budget on the needs of the population. As a result, the focus of the discussion tended to drift for the most part toward the periphery of the subject, seeking to establish, *inter alia*, whether the character of the labor force, or the general educational level, or the political style of the post-Stalin dictatorship, or some other element of the social complex, may not be in the throes of some significant transformation in the Soviet Union.

The second handicap came, I submit, from the preoccupation with statistics. Far too much authority was vested in the somewhat brighter statistical details that have recently been made available in the sphere of social services. This is indeed an improvement over the grim recent past, over what one may call the "late Stalin" period. In the absence of a sense of perspective on this point, however, the discussion lost sight of the fact that the statistics reflect, more than anything else, a return to the "middle Stalin" period. The simple fact is that in the mid-1930's education was free on all levels, and that both the monthy pension and the minimum wage came within shooting distance of the cost of sustaining life in the USSR. In regard to one very important ingredient of "welfare", moreover—namely, capital investment in consumer goods industries—the allocation scheme followed by Khrushchev still has some distance to go before it returns to the "middle Stalin" period, when 17% of all industrial investments went to the sector producing goods for consumption.

There is not much to be gained, therefore, from looking among the economic statistics for a clue to any change in the quality of Soviet society, political or any other kind. As Mr. Nove has so acutely reminded us in his study *Soviet Growth and Capabilities* (National Planning Association, N. Y., 1959), "farmers have been known to feed their animals well, too, without wishing to give them votes" (p. 46). In the Soviet setting, the recent improvements in living conditions have been quite impressive, to be sure. It is no longer treason to seek a more comfortable life.

In a very broad sense, however, these changes amount to a long overdue removal of wartime austerity. In more specific terms, the population has been given access, simultaneously, to more goods and more purchasing power. This prosaic, nonqualitative fact, I think, is nonetheless rich in interest for the student of Soviet society. What is especially interesting, in this connection, is the recent introduction into Soviet domestic trade of a number of consumer durables. While they represent a promise, they may also serve as a potential source of complication.

Some of these articles are now produced on a scale sufficient to provide every year only one family out of 100 with a new appliance, say a washing machine. This is not enough to meet effective demand, yet more than needed to supply the "big risk takers", the political magnates, who are in a class by themselves. How will these symbols of status be distributed in a society in which, in spite of Stalin, the notion of egalitarianism dies hard? Will the government continue to rely on the elemental, capitalist system of distribution of "first come, first served"? In view of the role of the unofficial middleman, will the scarce items always go to the "deserving" elements of the population? One of the questions that could have been profitably posed in the symposium is whether this contribution of Khrushchev towards "catching up with the West" will have its main impact by way of increasing consumer satisfaction or rather by widening the gulf in material well-being between the "have's" and "have-not's" in Soviet society.

Leon M. Herman
Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

What are the Facts?

IN HIS ARTICLE, "Social Welfare in the USSR," Mr. Alec Nove has undertaken to prove the incorrectness of the opinion held in some Western quarters that the main objective of the Soviet rulers in the economic field is "keeping the mass of Soviet citizens on the lowest possible living standard."

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This opinion is wrong and harmful and ought to be corrected. As Mr. Richard Lowenthal, another contributor to the symposium, rightly points out, the "principal moving force of the Soviet economy has been and remains power." Mr. Solomon M. Schwarz supplements this with another basic truth that "a modern industrial state can function properly only if it possesses a working class that enjoys a relatively high standard of living. . . ."

Mr. Nove appears not to concur with either of these maxims. At least he states that "it surely was the intention of all Soviet leaders, including even Stalin, to raise the living standard at some future date" and that "the USSR is now powerful enough economically to permit the diversion of an increasing amount of resources to the satisfaction of its citizens."

PERHAPS due to this line of thought Mr. Nove has not presented with full objectivity the welfare situation in the Soviet Union. His otherwise excellent review gives full credit to the Soviet government in every possible, and sometimes also questionable, instance. But at the same time he almost entirely fails to indicate those acts of the regime which belong to the debit side of the overall welfare picture in the USSR.

A case in point is Mr. Nove's handling of the question of the working time and of education in the Soviet Union. He points to the reduction of working hours in some branches of the Soviet industry . . . even if he agrees that such reductions are accompanied by a 15 percent increase of working norms. On the other hand Mr. Nove bypasses entirely the fact that the new school law promulgated on December 24, 1958, practically compels millions of high school students (in grades 9-11) and students in institutions of higher education (during the first two and a half years) to do double work: to study and at the same time to work. One can understand, if not condone, the reasons which have induced the Soviet regime to introduce this hard measure. But in presenting an overall and partly very detailed welfare review, facts of this kind should also be mentioned.

Another example concerns the Soviet pension law, implemented on October 1st, 1956. Mr. Nove quotes the Soviet finance minister A. G. Zverev as having stated in 1957 that the intention of the Soviet government had been to increase the "average rate of all pensions by 81 per cent." However, according to the speech by N. A. Bulganin—at that time the chairman of the Council of Ministers—in the Supreme Soviet on July 13, 1956, this was not the intention of the Soviet government. The intention was to increase the total expenditure on pensions from the previous estimate of 25.1 billion rubles or only 52 per cent. The total expenditure on pensions divided by the new number of pensioners, which could only have been expected to increase considerably after the implementation of the new pension law, would have reduced the increase of the average rate of pensions even considerably below the 52 per cent increase in the total expenditure.

What had gone wrong with the initial plan appears in the budget speech of A. G. Zverev on December 19, 1957: a miscalculation. Therefore, only part of the increase of 23.4 billion rubles in expenditure for pensions (59.9 minus 36.5) from 1956 to 1957 as shown by Mr. Nove can be credited to the intentions of the Soviet government. At least 9 billion rubles, according to Zverev, has to be credited to a mistake.

In connection with this mistake it is of interest to note that from January 1st, 1960, a new regulation has been implemented in regard to pensions of teachers. With the simultaneous removal of the required age minimum, the regulation sets the full pensions (for a minimum of 25 year service) to 40 per cent of wages instead of the previous probable average of about 65 per cent. The same reduced rate is said to be applied also to all medical personnel. For wage earners in agriculture the new full pension rate is said to be 50 per cent of wages instead of the previous probable average of about 75 per cent. The new regulation concerns up to 20 per cent of all Soviet wage earners. Whether this innovation is intended to help to correct the mistake of 1956 remains to be seen.

BUT MOST SERIOUS is Mr. Nove's misjudgment of the primary reasons for improving living standards in the Soviet Union. He rejects the "irresistible force of circumstances" as motivating power and attributes the improvements, as far as internal reasons are concerned, almost exclusively to the good will of the regime. This seems to be the reason why the Editors of the *Problems of Communism* ask, in their introductory note to Mr. Nove's article, that "If the proportion of consumer goods vs. producers' goods is indeed changing in favor of the former . . . does this not imply a fundamental transformation of the economic structure of the Soviet Union, as well as of its political system and political goals?"

The truth is that, while there is a slow increase in the absolute level of the living standard, the proportion of consumer goods in the total of Soviet industrial production, including food industry, has not been increasing but decreasing, and that this decrease has continued year after year also in the post-Stalin period (see the accompanying table).

As to the future, the present Seven-Year Plan stipulates an increase of 85-88 per cent in industrial production of producer goods and an increase of only 62-65 per cent in consumer goods. This means that, by 1965, the share of consumer goods in overall industrial production is intended to be reduced to about 25 per cent. And since the past Soviet practice generally has been to

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overfulfill production targets in producer goods and to lag behind in consumer goods, the share of consumer goods in 1965 might well be under 25 per cent.

In the light of these figures it can hardly be said that something has changed, or will soon change, in the "political system and fundamental goals" of the Soviet Union . . . . Although there have been other changes in the Soviet Union since 1953, these figures reveal that in this respect nothing has changed.

Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely excluded that different goals and new plans would be conceived and announced by the Soviet Union at some future time. The first sign of the sincerity of these proclaimed new intentions would then be the reversal of the present trend for a diminishing share of consumer goods until this share again reaches the level which is considered fair for the consumer in free countries.

Aleksander Kutt
New York City, New York

Author's Table

The following table, based on Soviet official data, presents the development of the relative importance of producer goods and consumer goods in the total gross production of Soviet industry. The year 1928 is the starting point of a series of Five-Year Plans:

	Producer Goods	*Consumer Goods*
	(% of total production)	
1928	39.5	60.5
1940	61.2	38.8
1946	65.9	34.1
1950	68.8	31.2
1953	69.2	30.8
1954	69.5	30.5
1955	70.5	29.5
1956	70.8	29.2
1957	71.2	28.8
1958	71.9	28.1
1959	72.2	27.8
1960 plan	72.7	27.3

SOURCES: for the years 1928-1955—*Promyshlennost SSSR*, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie (Central Statistical Administration), Moscow, 1957; for the years 1956-1957—*SSSR v Tsifrakh*, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Moscow, 1958; for the years 1958-1959—calculations based on information about the year 1957, and information of the Central Statistical Administration about the relative increase in the volume of producer and consumer goods' industrial production in the years 1958 and 1959 as published by *Pravda* of January 16, 1959 and January 22, 1960; for the year 1960—*Pravda*, October 20, 1959. Because of the rounding off of respective official figures in *Pravda*, the figures in the table for the years 1958-1960 might slightly deviate from exact figures.

Some Additional Data

AS A MEMBER of a group of five persons that went to the Soviet Union in August and September of 1958 to study their social security system (under the East-West Cultural Exchange program), I read with great interest Professor Nove's article and also the several commentaries. On many of the points and arguments developed I cannot speak with expert competence . . . . However, as to the factual aspects of the social security system, I can perhaps speak with certain authority.

Most of the factual statements made are—according to our information and analysis—accurate but there are the following points that might be added:

(1) Page 2, table.—In general, the figures shown for social security, social insurance and maternity assistance agree with those that we were given. As an aside, it may be noted that the Soviets use a purely artificial distinction between the terms "social security" and "social insurance." The principal items included as "social insurance" are cash sickness, maternity, and industrial injury and disease benefits. On the other hand, "social security" consists primarily of old-age, survivor, and disability pensions. According to usual nomenclature and considering the types of program involved, these should all be included in the same category and should probably be called "social insurance." The category "social security" would then include these social insurance programs, plus the family allowance benefits payable to mothers with many children and to mothers with illegitimate children, and the medical care benefits —and possibly also such social welfare items as sanitarium care, etc.

(2) Page 4, first column, last paragraph.—Here it is stated that before the 1956 amendments, the old-age pension was on the basis of two-thirds of final wage up to a maximum wage of 300 rubles a month so that the effective maximum pension was 200 rubles a month. This is not entirely correct because for the general workers (other than those engaged in dangerous and difficult work), the basic pension was 50% of final pay up to a maximum of 300 rubles and for nonworking pensioners an additional 60 rubles was paid as a cost of living adjustment (introduced in 1948) making a total pension of 210 rubles . . .

(3) Page 4, second column, last paragraph.—The second sentence states that some collective farmers are reported to have adopted formal pension and sickness benefit plans. We visited two collective farms and each of them had formal plans (although, under one, the

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benefit amounts were very low) but we heard nothing about formal sickness benefit plans.

(4) Page 4, footnote 5.—This is not nearly as precise as it should be. As indicated previously, working pensioners formerly generally received only 150 rubles a month whereas now this amount is always payable as long as the working pensioner does not earn over 1000 rubles a month. There has thus been no change for most working pensioners although there was a deliberalization for higher paid ones.

As a general point, it is to be noted that the article does not mention the family allowance payments (or as the Soviets say "payments to mothers with many children") which are available both as lump sums at birth of third order and higher children from age 1 until age 5. Also, there are payments for illegitimate children (up to age 12). It is these payments that account for the current expenditures of about 5.5 billion rubles as shown in the table on page 2, under the item "Total Maternity Assistance," which I believe does not include certain payments made to mothers with low earned incomes (or none at all) to provide a layette and to meet the cost of the infant's food during the first 9 months—a total payment of 300 rubles. One item of significance regarding these family payments is that they apply to the entire population including the collective farms . . .

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Subjective Factors and Objective Facts

MR. NOVE HAS DONE a signal service in realistically summarizing Soviet achievements regarding public health, education, social insurance, pensions, holidays, the working week, housing, and the greater attention now being paid to consumers' needs. Only on one point, I feel, does he slightly misrepresent the position when he says the collective farmers have had no social insurance rights. In fact, they have always enjoyed the free medical service, and since the 1930's collective farms have been obliged by law to care for their own disabled and aged. The very great variation in collective farm incomes, however, has led to great unevenness in practice.

But when Mr. Nove passes over to "motivation," I feel he only makes tentative guesses where he could have recognized established facts. For whether we take the works of Marx and Engels, or Lenin and Stalin, we find that the idea of a Communist welfare state is the declared aim of all of them. The conception of Communist society, in which "each contributes according to his ability and receives according to his need" is the prototype of all welfare states. In its very first years the USSR led the world with a free national health service, paid holidays for all, and the 8-hour day. And Stalin, in his last written work when already he was guilty of much wrong-doing, clearly stated the "basic economic law of socialism" as "the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society, through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of the highest technique." Whatever subsequent criticisms have been made of Stalin, this definition is still the basis of Soviet economic policy. Incidentally, in his contribution to the discussion Mr. Peter Wiles notes that, from a long term point of view, the Soviet policy of planned priority development of heavy industry will lead to a higher level of consumption in the USSR than the USA.

If the idea of a Communist welfare state has always been present, the question of "motivation" does not arise. Rather, we should be trying to understand why, just at this period, there is the acceleration noted by Mr. Nove. Or, to put the question in what is, in my view, more realistic terms: what are the factors that have, up to now, obstructed the development of the Soviet welfare state? These factors can be summed up as follows:

First, the extreme backwardness of Russia. The agriculture of that country never rose above mere subsistence prior to 1917. The *golodovka*, or local famine, was an annual occurrence; the *golod*—or nationwide famine—occurred at roughly ten-year intervals. Industrial production was around one-twelfth or one-thirteenth of that of the USA.

Secondly, the size of the USSR has been a mixed blessing. While it is an undoubted advantage as a base for almost infinite variety of raw materials, and has had inestimable value in defensive wars, the USSR suffers from the biggest national transport problem of any country in the world. The resources which have to be poured into the transport system to provide an equivalent service per head of population are higher than for any other country.

Thirdly, the USSR's development has been drastically set back as a result of two wars: the intervention from 1918 to 1921, and the Nazi invasion from 1941 to 1945. So great were the setbacks resulting from the first of these wars that it took the USSR to 1928 to restore production to the level of 1913. And following the ravages caused by Hitler, it took to 1950 to restore the level of 1940. It should be noted that those very "steps backward" noted by Mr. Nove in the 1930's were

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all undertaken when the country had to devote far more to defense than had been anticipated, owing to the Nazi threat from 1933 onwards.

It should be mentioned that—of the factors operating on the USSR from abroad—there was the world economic crisis in 1939 which had serious indirect effects in the USSR. The export of goods to pay for essential capital imports turned out to be far greater than allowed for in the plan.

Several internal factors have also contributed to delays in achieving the present level. During the First Five Year Plan, apart from the world economic crisis, there were two unplanned snags. First, the Plan never envisaged the amount of opposition the kulaks would put up to the policy of collectivization. And secondly, the Plan seriously overestimated the rate at which labor productivity in those first five years would be increased.

It is now generally recognized that in the post-war period, despite the rapid rate of post-war industrial recovery, a brake was put on scientific and agricultural development owing to the Stalin cult. Especially was this seen in agriculture where no adequate system of incentives existed for collective farmers. The result of this, as still manifest in the 1959 economic statistics, is the high proportion of food-stuffs which the collective farmers are still producing on their personal plots.

To answer the question concerning the undisputed speed-up in welfare developments in the USSR in the past few years, then, I would say: Such developments are wholly within the forecasts of all the Communist classical writers, are in fulfillment of these forecasts, and the recent acceleration is entirely due to the fact that the main obstacles which have hitherto obstructed such developments have at long last been overcome.

Pat Sloan
General Secretary,
British-Soviet Friendship Society,

A Reply to My Critics

I AM VERY GRATEFUL to those who criticized my article "Social Welfare in the USSR."

First, a word of explanation. The subject was suggested to me by the Editors, and so its choice does not imply that I personally (or the Editors!) believe "welfare" to be *the* key element in Soviet social or political development. The title, too, was the Editors', not mine. I would not have used the words "welfare state" myself, because, especially for one living in England, it has connotations which are quite irrelevant to the USSR. Mr. Leonard Schapiro makes this same point, perfectly rightly. Obviously, the USSR is not a state in which "the welfare of the governed takes precedence," and I never intended to imply that it was.

I did not examine "the historical framework of industrialization," or specifically "the special role of totalitarianism in shaping industrialization," to the apparent dissatisfaction of Mr. Wolfe (from whom I quote these phrases), because I was not asked to write about them, though I do indeed take these things very seriously in their proper context.

His more relevant criticisms puzzle me, because I very largely agree with him. He accuses me of failing to see that totalitarian "power" considerations could be consistent with increased attention to welfare. Yet the basic implication of my entire article, as was correctly observed by Mr. Lowenthal, was that a shift to more welfare can be explained "without assuming a basic change in the political and ideological motivations of the ruling Communist Party and its leaders." Certainly, given the general situation confronting them and the various technical, social and political factors involved, the party leadership is wise, from its own point of view, in sharply increasing welfare appropriations. To say so is the clear purpose of the final sentence of my article. Then what is Mr. Wolfe attacking? The dichotomy between "power" and "welfare" is not of my making; it is surprisingly common among the less thoughtful critics of Soviet policies. It is certainly not "bordering on the fatuous" (his words) to point out that many in the West still believe the propaganda stereotype to the effect that Soviet leaders pursue power to the constant and deliberate detriment of welfare. It is important to note that this interpretation leads logically to seeing the provision of more pensions or houses, or relaxation of labor restrictions, as *signs of political weakness*, because they are taken to represent reluctant yielding to pressure from below. This view is thought by many to be held to this day by Dr. Adenauer, and to have been held by Mr. Dulles. I believe these arguments to be wrong, and note with pleasure that Mr. Wolfe agrees with me.

I am also delighted to find Mr. Wolfe saying that the Soviet state "must be primarily an organ of the administration of the economy itself." If I had made so sweep-

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ing a generalization, I would have been accused of *déformation professionnelle*, perhaps not altogether unjustly. Mr. Wolfe also criticizes me for failing to see that increased welfare goes with developing industrialization. Yes, to some extent it does, and references to this (*e.g.*, in connection with education) did appear in my article. Firstly, however, the fact remains that in relation to national income the Soviet Union spends far more on health, education and so on, than highly industrialized Western countries do, and it is therefore wrong to assume that her present rate of spending is in some sense economically predetermined, regardless of political decision or system of government; secondly, *pace* Rostow, it is possible to argue that the USSR, as distinct from Western countries, can hold down living standards despite achieving a high level of industrialization—therefore we cannot assume what must be proved: and, thirdly, long-term tendencies inherent in establishing a relationship between industrial society and welfare cannot help to explain an important shift in policy of which the most significant developments were concentrated into the years 1956-59. Less "basic," more prosaic, reasons must be considered.

M. DE JOUVENEL makes the relevant point that, given the nature of the system, it would tend to provide more *social* welfare in relation to private incomes than would be the case in another kind of regime, and I also agree with nearly all he says in other connections. He wonders how far "the death of Stalin, rather than economic development" caused the recent improvements. Of course, this depends partly on the time-scale one uses, but few can doubt that personal factors do play a role in shaping (or delaying) various decisions.

Similarly, I have very little disagreement with Mr. Solomon Schwarz. He stresses the tension caused by the contrast between backward living standards and modern industrial technology, and indeed I made the same point on page 9 of my paper. The resultant social attitudes and expectations are part of the situation to which the Soviet leadership seeks to adapt its policy. In that sense, there is indeed a species of unorganized pressure from below, since failure to respond would lead to tensions and perhaps trouble. Yet the process is rightly described by Mr. Schwarz as due more to what he calls "economic imperatives": the leaders find that it is necessary and right, from their point of view, to act in the way they do. In *this* sense, they do not make "concessions," which suggests a forced compromise, any more than a sensible general who feeds his men properly makes a "compromise" with the troops.

Mr. Peter Wiles says many sensible things, and in particular emphasizes (as do also Messrs. Lowenthal and Schapiro) the undoubted fact that various kinds of economic liberalization do not of themselves lead to the end of totalitarianism. Yet he is seriously off beam about Yugoslavia, where the extension of a free market really has made a significant difference. Let him examine for two minutes any bookshop in Zagreb or Belgrade, and he will see the effect of having commercial (though nationalized) publishing houses (and competing importers) on the choice of titles—especially of foreign and translated books—available to the public. Although of course there are many limitations on freedom in Yugoslavia, the contrast with Moscow is still quite impressive.

Whether improved living standards would contribute to lessening of tension and of totalitarian ideology is a matter which Mr. Wiles reasonably leaves as a question-mark, but Mr. Lowenthal tends to rule the whole question out of court. Indeed, the experience of Nazi Germany shows that an educated and technically advanced country can be totalitarian. This disposes of anyone's delusion about some *inevitable* development towards freedom, but surely there is more to be said. If Soviet totalitarianism is historically connected with social tensions, if the size and power of the police had some relation with the scale on which people were compelled to do things they disliked, then the increased attention to welfare and the decrease in the powers of the police are also connected. It needs fewer police to supervise an increase than a decrease in wages. While none of this leads necessarily to the solution of any international or internal problem, evolution in this direction can surely be taken seriously as a ground for hope.

Mr. Lowenthal bases the assertion that the Soviet government is not "committed" to carrying out its promises—*i.e.*, that it is free to reverse its policies—on the lack of institutional safeguards. In a superficial "power" sense, he is right. There is no *institutional* check to prevent Khrushchev from decreeing a 20 percent wage cut, or ordering that no pensions be paid to those entitled to them, or indeed doing many other things which manifestly he will not do without some very strong publicly-defensible reason. I would ask Mr. Lowenthal to ponder over Mr. Schwarz's "economic imperatives." Undeniably, Khrushchev has a greater possibility of neglecting public opinion, or of molding it, than has any Western statesman. Undoubtedly, in some last-resort situation, he would sacrifice non-priority objectives to the survival of party power. But, looking at the present situation realistically, is it really useful to say that he could at any time reverse his welfare policies? Apart from anything else, why on earth should he?

NOW FOR THE other comments. I am unable to understand why Mr. Kutt attributes to me the belief that the welfare policies were due "almost exclusively to the goodwill of the regime." He would surely not argue the view that it is the deliberate aim of the Soviet regime to maximize the sum of human unhappiness, that an increase in the sum of material satisfactions is contrary to the ideology of communism? If the leader-

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ship finds that the provision of more such satisfactions is consistent both with the social situation and with the availability of resources, why should it not draw the necessary conclusions, *in its own interest?*

Some of Mr. Kutt's points are reasonable enough. Thus I would regard some of the provisions of the educational reforms as a definite step backwards, so far as educational policy is concerned. I would gladly discuss educational policy on some other occasion, but in the present context I confined myself to indicating the likely effect of the reform on the state's expenditure on education. It is also perfectly true that the magnitude of the increase in pensions expenditure considerably exceeded the original estimates of the government. This is also true of expenditure under the National Health Service in Great Britain, but a fact remains a fact, expenditure did rise. As for the pension regulations cited by him, I would prefer to wait and see before pronouncing that they will lead to a decline in the actual pensions paid. The budget for 1960 does not seem to me to substantiate this theory. The planned expenditure of almost 70 billion rubles under this head compares with 67.5 billion rubles which was to be spent in 1959. This, when allowance is made for increased numbers, looks like the continuation of average rates at the same, or possibly even slightly higher levels. It is possible that the amendments bear some relation to the revision of wage scales on the basis of which the pensions are calculated.

The proportion of producers' goods to consumers' goods was not a subject about which I was asked to write, but two brief comments are called for. The first is that *if* (repeat *if*) the Seven-Year Plan leads to the achievement of "an increase of only 62 to 65 percent in consumers' goods" (I do like the word "only"!), this would be a remarkable achievement indeed. The second point is more complex, and relates to the definitions of producers' goods and consumers' goods used in the Soviet Union. All "intermediate products" (fuel, materials, machinery, cloth, including goods used for producing consumers' goods) are producers' goods; only in the final stage of production are consumers' goods identified as such. In any developing economy, the proportion of intermediate products tends to rise. This is true of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. This is not to "justify" the poor performance of the USSR in the field of consumers' goods, which is another question altogether.

With Mr. Herman I am partly in agreement. Certainly some of the recent reforms were a return to the middle 1930's, and I said so myself. But in view of the undoubted trend towards diminishing differentials, I cannot understand his point about "widening the gulf in material well-being between the haves and the have-nots." Such a widening may take place, of course, but it does not appear to be Khrushchev's policy to promote it. It cannot be proved by reference to increased production of consumer durables. The queue for television sets outside GUM does not consist of privileged members of Soviet society; the really privileged have got their sets by the back door already.

Mr. Myers is absolutely right that the maximum pension before 1956 for ordinary workers was not 200 but 210 rubles. I was also wrong not to mention the 1000-ruble earnings limit applicable to payment of pensions to working pensioners. The reason why I did not mention the family allowance payments under the social insurance system is that, as far as I know, they have not been changed for many years. There are also other things I did not mention, such as funeral benefits, for the same reason. As for sickness benefits in collective farms, I can provide some quotations to substantiate their provision here and there, but it happens rarely.

AS FOR MR. SLOAN, he is right in saying collective farmers enjoy a free medical service, but this in no way contradicts my assertion that they have no social insurance benefits, since these medical services form no part of the budget for either social insurance or social security. He seems to think that the backwardness of Russia in providing for consumer welfare was at all times explicable by objective circumstances and that nobody need be blamed, except perhaps the "Stalin cult." I do not believe this. There is in the Soviet system a lack of political and economic responsibility to the ordinary citizen, which still remains. It is an important social and political fact that the top leadership in the USSR is to a great extent free from any organized pressure from below, and that it has been able to neglect with impunity the urgent needs of the peop'e if it considered it in its own interest to do so. So thoroughly was the system designed to prevent the emergence of social pressure-groups, that the regime itself suffers from the unresponsiveness and irresponsibility of local officials. It is hard to see how these defects can be cured without genuine accountability to the electorate (or to trade union membership), which would be inconsistent with party control. The local official charged with looking after the citizens remains primarily responsible to the all-powerful local party secretary and not to his constituents. The result is to distort even such desirable phenomena as housing drives. Unfinished houses are reported as completed, even though the unfortunate tenants cannot live in them, because local officialdom is responsible not to them but to those auhorities above them who desire to report the fulfillment of the housing plan. Nor does the economic system "transmit" consumer demand effectively to the planners or the producers. This is why further travel along the road of welfare improvements might lead to conflict with the organizational basis of the Soviet regime. Personally I hope it will.

Alec Nove

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China—Old and New

Communism *vs.* Confucianism

Confucian China and its Modern Fate,
by Joseph R. Levenson.
University of California Press,
Berkeley, California, 1958.

The Soul of China,
by Amaury de Riencourt.
Coward-McCann Inc., New York, 1958.

Reviewed by Michael Lindsay

IS CHINESE COMMUNISM an alien system imposed on a country whose native culture and traditions are completely opposed to it? Or has communism been successful in China largely because it fits in with important elements in the native culture and traditions? Serious arguments have been advanced for both views.

The two authors whose books are reviewed here reach almost opposite conclusions on this central issue. Professor Levenson maintains:

> The categories of Chinese communist thought are not traditional. This is the salient fact. And it is belied neither by some Communist taste for traditional achievement (Tunhuang frescoes or the odd phrase from a Confucian classic), nor by some Communist casting in traditional roles. (p. 162)

According to Mr. de Riencourt, on the other hand:

> Mao's new up-to-date version of Marxism-Leninism was in fact a reaction toward the past. It conformed drastically and often gruesomely to the basic urges of Chinese psychology which the West had chosen to ignore. . . .
> Red China is a more up-to-date, more ruthless, more efficient version of what the Celestial Empire had been for thousands of years. The forms have changed . . . but the contents are the same. (pp. 260, 264)

These opposing conclusions are reached by the respective authors through completely different types of reasoning. And the difference in their approaches incidentally serves to illustrate the thesis that the West does not have a homogeneous culture but at least two different cultures.

Confucian China and its Modern Fate is an application of scientific scholarship to the history of ideas in China—more specifically, to the breakdown of the Confucian tradition, which had been accepted almost without question up to the mid-19th century, and the failure of successive attempts to reach a compromise between that tradition and Western learning. The ideas the author discusses are empirically demonstrable, expressed in the writings of definite people. His conclusions are inevitably speculative, but they are only presented as hypotheses to explain what can be empirically demonstrated.

The first two chapters outline some features of the traditional system of thought and dispose of the argument that the "Han learning" of the early Ch'ing dynasty was similar to Western empiricism. Levenson writes:

> The Han learning could attack *mind* (where truth exists for subjective idealism)—in the name of *nature* (where truth exists, though perhaps unattainably, for science)—in the interests, really, of *books* (where truth exists for the Confucian literati). (p. 10)

The ego-ideal of the traditional official class is very convincingly depicted as the cultivated amateur—the man with a classical humanist education, who prided himself on not being too proficient in the purely technical and utilitarian skills. The author draws an interesting parallel with the attitude of Jonathan Swift in early 18th century England: like the Chinese literati, Swift valued the classics and disliked both business and

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science. The early Jesuits, Levenson notes, were accepted in China but had little influence. They did not really challenge the traditional system, and the new knowledge they offered was regarded by the Chinese literati as interesting and curious, but not really important.

The Opium War of 1842 was the first real shock to the traditional complacency. Chinese officials in contact with the West could not ignore the superiority of Western technology. They tried to meet the challenge by adopting the theory that Chinese learning should be preserved for the "essence" of Chinese society, and Western learning studied for its "utility". This compromise, however, failed on both counts:

> The more Western learning came to be accepted as the practical instrument of life and power, the more Confucianism ceased to be *t'i*, essence, the naturally believed-in value of a civilization without a rival, and became instead an historical inheritance, preserved, if at all, as a romantic token of no-surrender to a foreign rival which had changed the essence of Chinese life. (p. 61)

The conservatives realized that the attempted compromise would end by destroying Confucianism, while at the same time it failed to introduce enough Western "utility" to secure the reorganization that was needed to make Chinese society competitive in the modern world

The next attempt to bring about what is very aptly termed "Westernization with honor" (p. 77) was especially associated with K'ang Yu-wei, the moving spirit behind the attempted reforms of 1898. K'ang's idea was that the values of Western society could be secured by going back to authentic Confucianism, which had become distorted and needed the equivalent of the Reformation in Europe. But this, too, failed to work because, as Levenson puts it, "the new ideas were so many, and so clearly subversive of the stable Confucian society, that it soon was merely fanciful for the moderns to claim the Confucian imprimatur." (p. 84)

WITH THE ADVENT of the twentieth century, the problem was complicated by the rise of nationalism. The traditional culture had made universal claims: a contrast had been made between *t'ien-hsia* (civilized society), which could only be based on Confucian virtues, and *kuo-chia* (national state), which need not be civilized. Insofar as the Chinese now started to think of themselves as a nation in a world with other nations, they could believe that the traditional culture was important as the Chinese national heritage. But this abandoned the universal claims of the Confucian tradition for a new cultural relativism. And the traditionalism associated with nationalism was attacked by the radicals as an ideology serving the vested interests of the old society.

Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, under whom Peking University became the center of Chinese intellectual life in the years around 1920, advocated selecting the best from both East and West. "His fundamental conviction," to quote Levenson, "was that truth has no national boundaries." (p. 110) But Ts'ai's formula likewise failed to provide "Westernization with honor." For, says the author:

> The fact is, simply, that a European who admired traditional Chinese achievements remained just a European with cosmopolitan tastes, not the synthetic Sino-European whom Ts'ai envisaged; while the Chinese who admired Western achievements might pass through cosmopolitanism and synthesis together and become a Western convert. (p. 113)

Christianity, the book suggests, failed to succeed Confucianism because it failed to satisfy the Chinese feeling for cultural equivalence with the West. "Only if its old rival, Western Christianity, were dispatched with it, could Chinese Confucianism be thrown to the modern Western lions." On the other hand, "valid conclusions of science . . . are empirically demonstrable, hence ultimately irresistible;" so China had to accept modern Western scientific practice, which is the key to industrial civilization. Writes the author:

> In a field where general judgments cannot be empirically proved, where choice is still possible, the special Chinese commitment shows itself; since Christianity (the West as *Christian* civilization) is rejectable, Christianity is rejected." (p. 121-2)

Levenson sees this same factor as the main reason for Chinese acceptance of communism. For while communism came from the West, it was also a rejection of the traditional West which had competed with Confucianism. Thus:

> A Chinese who wished to be confident . . . of the equivalence of China and the West need not fall back on a desperate traditionalism, since anti-traditionalism, under communist aegis, would serve his purpose. Instead of being the laggard, following in western footsteps, a communist China, with Russia, could seem at the head of the queue. (p. 134)

And the Communists still keep some parts of the Chinese tradition by identifying them with "the people" as against the "gentry-culture" which they reject.

In conclusion, the author argues that one can trace a continuity in Chinese history. Communism is not something suddenly thrust on China from the outside, but equally it is not "Confucianism with another name and another skin but the same perennial spirit."

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> The Confucian tradition, transformed and abandoned, has led directly to the communist version of Chinese change of mind, not by preserving itself immanent in communist doctrine, but by failing in self-preservation, leaving its heirs bereft and potentially strange in their own land, and thus commending that latest doctrine as an answer to a need. (pp. 162-3)

The argument for these conclusions seems a cogent one within Professor Levenson's terms of reference—that is, the study of explicitly expressed ideas. One can, however, ask a question partly outside these terms of reference, namely: How far has Chinese communism been influenced by implicit presuppositions deriving from the Confucian tradition? In this form the Confucian tradition may still influence even those Chinese who explicitly and consciously repudiate it; and such influences can be traced by equally scientific scholarship. A good illustration is David S. Nivinson's analysis of Confucian influence on the thought of Liu Shao-ch'i, presented in his article, "Chinese Communist Ethics and the Chinese Tradition" (*Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. XVI, pp. 50-74). As Liu's case shows, such influences may be an important, even if subconscious, factor in the decision of many Chinese to accept the Communist variant of Western culture. People who reject Confucianism may still assume, for instance, that the proper substitute for it is some other all-embracing system, and so may prefer Marxism-Leninism to the empiricism of the Western scientific tradition.

THAT MARXISM-LENINISM supplies a new "all-embracing philosophy" is precisely one of the arguments with which Mr. de Riencourt supports his opposing thesis that communism in China is a reaction toward the past. He offers several other similar arguments: Communism supplies a new version of *t'ien-hsia,* the universal society for civilized mankind, to which barbarians may be converted. It satisfies the need for a philosophy of history—"The Absolute cosmic Reality is a dynamic process unfolding dialectically in *time,* the process of history; it is not the Christian Almighty but a modernized version of the old, impersonal Tao." (p. 261) It satisfies the "rebirth of old yearnings . . .; the implacable reduction of the individual to his social function . . ." (p. 261) And, like Confucianism, Chinese communism has a strong ethical emphasis. In sum, Mr. de Riencourt's basic argument is that communism has been successful in China because "from the depths of the Chinese soul, there welled up an irresistible urge to revert to familiar patterns . . ." (p. 264)

One cannot make a direct confrontation between these conclusions and those of Professor Levenson because the two authors operate in different systems of thought. Professor Levenson belongs to the scientific variant of Western culture. He explains that he "interprets intellectual history as a history not of 'thought' but of men thinking . . ." (p. 163) On this postulate of methodological individualism, the "soul" of a nation can only be a statistical concept derived from the ideas of the individuals in a particular group at a particular time. One can trace how dominant systems of ideas have been influenced by the past, and can deduce how they are likely to influence the future; but the result need not be an "irresistible urge." A nation may have several rival "souls"—that is, competing systems of ideas—and individuals obviously do accept new ideas or work out new systems for themselves. On the other hand, Mr. de Riencourt at several points avows his sympathies for Hegel, and it is clear that, for him, "the soul of China" is something more than a statistical concept.

By the standards of scientific culture, the Hegelian theory is false because its implications in empirically verifiable instances can be empirically disproved. De Riencourt argues, for instance, that "the same dislike—indeed, deliberate incomprehension—of the Chinese for the infinite made them conceive of the universe, the cosmic totality of heaven and earth, as closed, finite" (p. 83); but Joseph Needham and Wang Ling, in their account of Chinese astronomy, cite evidence showing that some Chinese, long before any contacts with modern Western astronomy, had suggested a cosmology in which the earth and stars floated in empty and unbounded space. Again, it is abundantly clear that a great many Chinese do not feel the "irresitible urge to revert to familiar patterns" claimed by Mr. de Riencourt. Neo-Confucianism is strongly criticized in Taiwan, and Mao Tse-tung's short-lived 1957 experiment in allowing a measure of free criticism showed that many Chinese on the mainland had accepted communism not because of any such inner urge, but only because of external pressure to conform.

The difference between the scientific and Hegelian variants of Western culture is reflected even more clearly in the contrast between Professor Levenson's view that empirically demonstrable conclusions are ultimately irresistible and Mr. de Riencourt's view that men believe in theories when these are emotionally satisfying, even though sometimes demonstrably false. For example, the latter writes: "The intrinsic truth or falsehood of a doctrine such as Marxism is purely a matter of academic

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dissertation. What matters to the historian and to the man of action is its effectiveness . . ." (p. 170) (It is interesting that Professor C. P. Fitzgerald states the same view in his *Flood Tide in China,* London, Cresset Press, 1958.) Mr. de Riencourt develops this thesis at greater length near the end of his book:

> At this stage of history, the Chinese simply do not ***understand*** economics, productivity or social relations in the Western sense. . . . The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is filled with social and economic theories, every one of which has been proved blatantly false. But no matter; what is objectively false can be subjectively true; Marxism affords its devotees a psychological satisfaction of a religious nature. . . . What the West has hitherto refused to see is that the falsity of Marxism's economic theory is quite immaterial. . . . 'Scientific' Marxism is in fact based on primitive but powerful ***magic,*** on the desire to overpower a mysterious foe (the technological power of the West) by ***duplicating*** it artifically and destroying it by ritual reproduction. (pp. 268-9)

NOW, IT IS TRUE that the rationalist, scientific tradition in Western culture has tended to overestimate the cogency of logical and empirical demonstration and to underestimate the influences which produce irrational beliefs. But this is a corrigible error. The influences producing irrational beliefs can themselves be rationally analyzed. It is not possible, of course, to defend the crude rationalist view that rationally demonstrated conclusions must inevitably be accepted; but it *is* possible to defend the view that reason plays some part in determining human beliefs and actions, and that it can play a progressively larger part insofar as men come to understand the influences producing irrationalism.

Certainly, the actual future of China depends a great deal on the truth or falsity of the theories in terms of which the country's rulers decide their actions. If, for example, they decide their economic plans on the basis of theories which are demonstrably false—such as the theory that overpopulation is impossible under socialism—then it can be predicted that the outcome of their policies will surely differ from their expectations. They can influence the future according to their intentions only if they act in terms of theories which are *objectively* correct.

This leads us to the basic assumption of *The Soul of China*—that rational understanding is only possible through a philosophy of history. But does not the kind of philosophy of history which predicts the long-term future, such as Mr. de Riencourt advocates, depend on the assumption that men are not capable of acting with sufficient rationality to influence the short-term future? There is a story by Lord Dunsany which provides an illustrative parable. A man is given a crystal ball which, he is assured, will permit him to foresee the outcome of horse races. It works well as long as the man places only small bets, but goes wrong as soon as he makes large ones. When he complains, he is told that the future shown by the crystal ball is the future that would happen if no one made determined efforts to change it, and that, by placing large bets, he has produced just such determined efforts. Similarly, the future as predicted by a Hegelian, Marxian or Toynbeean philosophy of history is what is likely to happen if people do not make efforts to change it, or if a lack of rational understanding makes such efforts ineffective. A scientifically defensible theory of history cannot be unilinear. At any particular time it may be possible to predict a limited range of possibilities for the comparatively short-term future, but which of these possibilities actually materializes will depend on human choice, or perhaps on unpredictable chance; and from the new situation another range of possibilities can be predicted. The divergence between possible lines of development is likely to increase steadily with time.

A theory of history in this sense—seeking to estimate the range of possibilities open at any particular time—may be a valuable help to rational action. The same can be said for theories (such as those of Professor Karl A. Wittfogel) which point out the interaction of influences between different aspects of society—for instance, between economic organization and social and political structure. However, Mr. de Riencourt is almost certainly wrong when he ends with an impassioned plea for his own kind of philosophy of history as a necessity if the West is to compete with the Communist world. How, for instance, could a philosophy of history have helped the West in China if, as the author argues, Communist power was the result of an irresistible urge welling from the depths of the Chinese soul?

More generally speaking, the scientific variant of Western culture is almost certainly more capable of competing with communism than is the Hegelian variant. The issue of democracy provides a good illustration. The assumption behind democratic institutions is that a process of discussion and study of the evidence will tend to produce a consensus of opinion about what is the right thing to do. And there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that a society co-ordinated by such a consensus is more efficient than an authoritarian system, that freedom and discussion can make a properly working democracy more effective than any society

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which enforces an orthodox ideology. If, on the other hand, reasoning and evidence cannot change beliefs that are held because they are emotionally satisfying, there is no reason to suppose that democratic processes will ever produce a consensus of opinion, and it follows logically that the co-ordination needed for the functioning of any society can only be secured by submission to authority.

MR. DE RIENCOURT'S assumptions preclude him from arguing this case for democracy, and lead him instead to an implicit definition of democracy which is very near the Communist position. We are told that the establishment of the unified empire by Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (3rd century B.C.) "brought to the Far Eastern world the basic ingredients of Civilization: democratic equality . . ." (p. 57) and that, while there had been rulers by divine right and a powerful hereditary aristocracy, ". . . the new Caesarian autocrats had limitless powers in an equalitarian, democratic society, but they were at all times insecure on their thrones . . ." (p. 62) That is, democracy is identified entirely with the abolition of hereditary privilege, with the change from a situation in which only a minority enjoyed freedom and security to one in which no one, except temporarily the Emperor, had any freedom or security. If China under Ch'in Shih Huang Ti is classified as democratic, it is hard to see why one should not equally apply the term to Russia under Stalin or China under Mao Tse-tung.

But while Ch'in Shih Huang Ti did not, in any meaningful sense, bring democracy to China, he did perhaps bring the element of the Chinese tradition which has survived in communism—the Oriental Despotism of Wittfogel's analysis,[1] which, through the Mongols, also influenced Russian tradition.

The foundations of the unified empire were laid by the "Legalists," the bitter enemies of Confucianism, who stood for political absolutism, exaltation of the state, and restriction of individual rights and liberties. The re-emergent Confucianism of the Han dynasty absorbed many Legalist elements and became the official ideology on which oriental despotism was based. But, even though a strict Marxist might dismiss Confucianism as "superstructure," it did have an influence on Chinese society. A despotism in which the officials were humanist amateurs, and which paid at least lip service to such principles as winning obedience by virtue rather than by force, was inevitably somewhat different from a purely Legalist despotism.

It is probably correct to say that Confucianism has disappeared in China except in the form of unconscious, implicit assumptions. What has survived, or *re*vived, has been the social structure associated with Legalism. And this has been recognized by those living under the system. Ch'u An-p'ing's theory of the "Party Empire" (*Tang Tien-Hsia*) explicitly pointed out the similarities between the position of the Communist Party in the new system and that of the bureaucratic ruling group in the old.[2] The fact that Ch'u's theory was attacked with special bitterness in the 1957 "anti-Rightist" campaign is perhaps the best indication that it came uncomfortably near the truth.

[1] See Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale University Press, 1956.

[2] Ch'u An-p'ing, then chief editor of *Kwang-ming jih-pao* (nominal organ of the "democratic parties"), gained notoriety during the anti-Rightist campaign when he was accused of having criticized the Communists for setting up a "Party Empire" whose oppressive controls were alienating the masses from the party. As a consequence he was purged from his editorial post.

Social Patterns in Transformation

A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, and *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, By C. K. Yang. Technology Press (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Cambridge, Mass., 1959. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

Reviewed by E. Stuart Kirby

THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION in China, probably the most extreme and ambitious social transformation ever attempted, has unquestionably generated frictions, tensions, and insecurities on a scale almost unprecedented in history, and it is of vital importance that all these be analyzed not only from the political and

Professor Kirby, who is teaching during the current academic year at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver), is on the faculty of the University of Hong Kong, and writes widely on Chinese affairs. His "Peiping's Growing Dilemma: Population," appeared in the March-April 1958 issue of this journal.

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economic, but also from the sociological point of view. Yet, while our stock of information and analytical studies on the political and economic aspects of the Chinese Communist program continues to grow, the comparative scarcity of scholarly analyses from the sociological viewpoint is striking.

Particularly welcome, therefore, are the two companion studies recently published under the authorship of Dr. C. K. Yang, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh. One deals with contemporary changes in Chinese village society, and the other with the transformation of the family system, under the impact of the Communist revolution. Both books are comprehensive and documented in detail from the author's personal observations and from Chinese Communist publications. Together, they give a vivid picture of the deep social stresses arising out of the all-pervading and unremitting processes of "struggle," "drive" and "remolding" to which the 650 million inhabitants of mainland China are subjected.

What was Chinese life really like before the Communist "overturn"? Dr. Yang makes this his starting point, and rightly so—particularly in view of Peking's incessant propaganda efforts to distort and obscure the picture of the former China, which have vitiated popular understanding and even scholarly work in the field of Chinese affairs. What was the old actually like, and what has the new really brought? As with all human things, the scientific certainty is that both have their good and their evil aspects; and the task of the social scientist is to measure both credits and debits.

Dr. Yang is remarkably well qualified for this task. In addition to extensive earlier field work in China,[1] he headed a team of sociologists which embarked in 1948 on an exhaustive study of a South China village, and which was permitted to continue its investigation on the spot through the first year of Communist rule. This survey provided much of the basic material for the studies under review, but the bulk of the information for the period from 1951 on had to be gleaned from a careful sifting of Chinese Communist press reports, published documents, and other sources. The author's comprehensive reference notes list a wide range of sources in both Chinese and English.

THE PRE-COMMUNIST Chinese village as it emerges in the first of Dr. Yang's twin studies is typified, first of all, by isolation, especially in a political sense. Distance and the looseness of pre-Communist political controls insulated it to a considerable extent from the oppression, ineptitude, and malfeasances of the regimes which successively held power in distant metropolises; and the tendency toward isolation was accentuated by the fact that the village was largely self-sufficient in some essential respects, though indeed at a very low level of subsistence. Isolation, of course, meant a free hand for local rascals and oppressors, as Chinese Communist propaganda tirelessly keeps reminding us. But, even at the worst, the main oppressor—the central government—was usually at a safe distance, creating among the villagers a feeling much like that which, in India of old, was popularly expressed in the saying, *"Delhi dur ast"* (Delhi is far away).

Pre-Communist village society was highly complex, representing an elaborate balance of interests and influences. By no means was it dominated by one oppressive and exploitative class. Nor was it static and unevolving; on the contrary, modernization was progressing, and at least to some extent the system was adapting itself viably, sometimes even imaginatively, to new conditions. There were, to be sure, elements of resistance to change —the influence of clan relationships, the strongly "familistic" and "traditionalist" traits of village society, and deep attachment to local culture and *mores*. Yet, the people of the village under study had participated in every significant political movement in pre-Communist China, at least since the Tai'-p'ing Rebellion of the mid-19th century. And their mental make-up displayed a strong element of individualism. The survey also established that there was a considerable degree of social mobility in pre-Communist days, although the system as a whole tended toward stability—in spite of the disruptions caused by civil war and Japanese invasion. While poverty was extreme owing especially to population pressure, the peasant society strove to alleviate it by various expedients—emigration, subsidiary occupations, part-time work in the townships, and systems of rural credit.

HAVING THUS SKETCHED out the essential background, Dr. Yang proceeds to describe the Communist regime's relentless attempt to stamp out many of the basic features of the old village society, and to evolve—in record haste—an entirely new social system to supplant it. With the Communist victory in 1949, he notes, roughly one million Chinese villages were "marked for drastic revolutionary changes"—a figure which alone attests to the prodigiousness of the effort involved.

The attempt at transformation did not begin immediately, however. The author reports that, in the South

[1] The results of an earlier field study were incorporated in C. K. Yang, *A North China Market Economy* (New York, 1944).

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China village under observation, "the first ten months under Communist rule were rather uneventful" except for occasional incidents when Communist soldiers forced the villagers to sell them vegetables, pigs and chickens "at only about half the market price"—which, even then, was better treatment than the villagers had been accustomed to from other soldiers in the past. (pp. 131-32) The new regime lost no time, however, in proclaiming its intention to implement land reform by dispossessing the "landlords and rich peasants," who—according to the Communist organ *Jen-min jih-pao* (June 30, 1950)—"account for less than ten percent of the rural population [but] own 70 to 80 percent of the land." The exaggerated nature of these figures was evident from the actual statistics for Dr. Yang's typical village, which showed that 12 percent of the families (amounting to a larger percentage of the population) held just under 50 percent of the land (Chap. IV).

The first step taken by the party cadres upon arriving from the cities was to divide the peasants into six categories: landlords, rich, middle, and poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and vagrants. "A great anxiety and tenseness pervaded the village," the author relates, "for now every family was assigned a status fraught with social, economic and political consequences." (p. 143) The next step was the confiscation of "surplus grain" belonging to those in the wealthier categories. "Few rational criteria were used in determining the amount . . . to be surrendered," the cadres arbitrarily fixing it on the basis of information obtained from compliant members of the local peasants' organization. For example, one "landlord" owning 60 *mow* (ten acres!) was subjected to a levy of 40,000 catties[2] of unhusked rice (representing the entire output of this much acreage); another, with 20 *mow,* was assessed for 10,000 catties, though he actually possessed only 1,000.

In all this, the Communists characteristically sought to incite class struggle as a means of achieving their aims. Although Dr. Yang states that this particular village probably suffered less violence in the struggle than many others, he adds:

> **Nevertheless, in about one and a half years, the Communist campaign to arouse mass hatred among the poor against the rich broke down the stability of an ancient social order which had kept the conflict of class interests under control. Although formerly there had been suppressed hatred between the two extremities . . . there had been generally peaceful coexistence among the large middle section and between the middle groups and the two extremes; but now . . . the entire village was methodically partitioned into class compartments, each set against the other. (pp. 141-5)**

[2] The Chinese catty is equivalent to 1 1/3 lbs.

The land expropriation phase of the program was just as arbitrary. The official policy of the regime was "to leave the middle alone, while equalizing the extremities"; however, as Dr. Yang points out, the end result was to put the majority of peasants in the status of "the lower-middle and upper-lower class." (p. 151) Taxation was increased from the pre-Communist level of 13 percent of gross yield (on average land) to 30 percent; and, taking in other factors, the peasant who had formerly realized 80 percent of his gross yield now got only 63 percent. (pp. 155-9) Valuable special crops, such as vegetables, went out of cultivation; peasant earnings from subsidiary occupations, catering largely to city markets for products and services classified by the Communists as "luxuries", ceased; and although the old system of borrowing from the richer peasants had been extremely unsatisfactory, there now were no credit facilities at all. (p. 165)

The Communists' "new power structure" proceeded to break up the clan system, the system of local government, the religious basis, and even the people's recreations through the "politicalization" of spare-time activities. But while tearing down the old social framework of the village, the Communists in the next five years did not erect any comprehensive structure to replace it. Rulership was exercised by the party through its cadres and representatives on the spot, who imposed their will by means of frequent mass meetings and occasional mob action. The collectivization program between 1953 and 1958 resulted in a degree of economic improvement but also intensified the stresses of peasant life:

> **Up till early 1958, large numbers of cooperatives were still in varying degrees of instability and disorganization, and a sizable section of the peasants lived under economic insecurity. (p. 253)**

Since the fall of 1958, the regime has been attempting to superimpose the commune system. Dr. Yang sees a possibility that the communes, if economically successful, might "replace the Chinese peasants' traditional economic dependence on the kinship system," but on the other hand he doubts that they "could substitute for the function of the nuclear family in developing the individual's emotional security and personal stability," or that their reliance upon para-military organization and discipline offers a sound and lasting foundation for the development of a workable social order.

SCHOLARLY OBJECTIVITY also distinguishes Dr. Yang's companion study of the impact of the Communist revolution on the Chinese family system, one of the main pillars of the old social order. The author

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frankly acknowledges that the traditional system was not without its "harsh and tyrannical features," but he reminds us that some of these had already begun to undergo alteration under Nationalist rule, and that the Communist reforms in these areas—though imposed out of quite different motives—only extended what was already in process. Moreover, with all its faults, the old system "possessed many attributes . . . that make people feel nostalgic as they face the modern revolutionary scene of violence, chaos and uncertainty." (p. 21)

The first target of Communist attack was the traditional marriage system. As Dr. Yang points out, the institution of "arranged marriage," formally abolished by the Communist marriage law of May 1950, had already weakened greatly—along with arbitrary parental authority in general—under the pre-Communist National Republic. The Communists thus did not introduce something totally new so much as they legalized and extended to the whole country a change that was already gathering momentum at least among the urban population. Nevertheless, the attempt to impose overnight, upon all segments of the population, and especially the tradition-bound peasantry, a reform which hitherto had gained acceptance for the most part only among the urban intelligentsia had, according to Dr. Yang, "an obviously disintegrating effect." Characteristically also, the Communists enforced the change through the application of political power in a new and ferocious form, with mass "struggle meetings," public denunciations, and so on.

The new marriage law coupled freedom of divorce with freedom of marriage. Here again, the author points out, Nationalist laws had permitted divorce, but social and institutional pressures had been so strongly against it that divorce had been a rarity in pre-Communist days. What the Communists did was to impart practical force to the principle of freedom of divorce through direct political pressures designed to break down social and institutional resistances. The sharp impact of the 1950 law was evidenced by the fact that, in 21 cities, the number of matrimonial suits in the courts was over 90 percent higher in the four months following the law's promulgation than in the four preceding months. This "upsurge" continued, and Dr. Yang notes that within two years "domestic disharmony came to rank with labor-capital struggle as the two numerically largest items of litigation" in the Communist courts. He notes further that the rural areas were no longer behind the urban centers in the volume of such litigation, and that 40 percent of the parties to divorce suits were under 25 years of age. (pp. 67-9) Nevertheless, the author states that "social resistance"

Son, Father, and the State

My father was a bigwig in the feudalistic secret societies. Due to support from the secret societies and due to his shrewdness, he was for nine years the head of Hochiang subdistrict. In March 1950 he participated in a rebellion and fled from home. At first I blamed the government for lack of understanding. . . . After repeated study, I finally came to see many things wrong with father. . . . I was deeply moved by the example of a comrade who correctly dealt with the problem of his reactionary father. With this inspiration, I began to analyze my father's rebellion. . . . After that my attitude towards my father began to change from sympathy to hatred. . . .

I was told that the government demanded that the family look for my father. I firmly decided to take up the duty of locating him. . . . I finally found him in a small teahouse.

He was sitting alone. His shrunken and pale appearance almost made me fail to recognize him. But he recognized me. I was happy. Was not that my father? My heart started to beat fast, but I calmed myself. With tears in his eyes my father told me, "Since I parted from your brothers and sister, I have had to depend entirely on practicing medicine for a living. Before September, business was not bad, but after that there was hardly any business. Hunger, cold, and sickness almost took my life. . . .

When I returned to the hotel I fell into a heart-rending state. I ran a high fever, my body trembled; I turned and tossed in bed but could not sleep. New and old thoughts were struggling within me. I pitied my father. All alone here, he had suddenly met his own child, and how eagerly he was pinning his hopes on me. . . .

After a night of conflict I finally shattered my incorrect thoughts and I consolidated myself on the principle of "no compromise in revolution, and no sentimentalism in struggle." I reaffirmed my stand.

I went to the police bureau and informed the responsible comrade. Then I went to my father and demanded that he recant his past and reform. He said, "How could you do this to me?" and tried to escape by saying that he was going to eat. But that time the armed comrades were already at the door. My father had no choice but to pretend to be willing to reform, and gave himself up. . . . My duty was at last done. I felt lighthearted. I was happy, for I had rid the people of a dangerous character.

—Quoted from an official Chinese source in *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*, pp. 176-78.

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to the new marriage system still persists, partly because of the tenacity of traditional moral values and partly out of general aversion to the excesses of Communist policy in this sphere. (p. 79)

ANOTHER LINE of attack was directed at the "age hierarchy," which had already been weakened under the Republic, but which was now assaulted with particular vigor. The Communists gave both "coercive power" and "social prestige" to the youth, whom they overtly organized, not merely separately from, but often *against* the old. The same tactics were applied with regard to women, who were drafted into special womens movements and youth organizations. The effect was, of course, to create enormous social stress and dislocation.

The dislocation continues to this day and is exacerbated by the fact that new forms now have successfully replaced the old patterns and institutions. The family as a dominant and independent production-unit has been destroyed; its self-sufficiency has been obliterated; the head of the family has been deprived of his position of leadership and authority—in other words, practically all that used to hold the society together has been done away with. And what has come to replace it? The new collectivized and state-controlled organizations—the party, the numerous "movements," the communes, and so on. Yet these organizations have not arisen spontaneously, in response to real societal needs: they are political products pure and simple, enforced *from above,* and the loyalty which they command (in lieu of the traditional institutions) is therefore also of a synthetic and coerced nature. It is only by dint of constant campaigns, "struggles," denunciations, terror and intimidation that the state is able to fill the void which it so methodically and ruthlessly created.

Variations of pace may be expected, Dr. Yang concludes, as well, probably, as changes of direction. "As the gigantic experiment of the Communist revolution gropes along its uncharted path, the course of development of these trends will be marked with cycles of advance, halt and reversal." (p. 220) But the path of the juggernaut is strewn with an appalling accumulation of pain and distress. Naturally, perhaps, the attention of the world tends to focus—two-dimensionally as it were—on production figures and political pronunciamentos. Yet it would be unforgivable to overlook the underlying human costs. Scientific sociological appraisals, such as the two books by Dr. Yang, provide this much-needed third dimension and help to create an accurate appreciation of the ultimate price paid by human beings at the altar of Communist totalitarianism.

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Planning and Efficiency—

A Note on L. V. Kantorovich

SINCE THE EARLY 1930's, economic theory in the Soviet Union has served more as an ideological implement of the propaganda apparatus than as a guide for the solution of concrete planning problems. Such theory as was applied in the selection of investment alternatives or the setting of rational prices was of a rudimentary nature, relevant—if at all—only in certain narrow situations. Only principles distilled from Marx and Engels were "generally applicable," but they were too vague to be of much use. (What sort of operational guidance could a planner get out of knowing that "the law of value influences but does not govern the allocation of producer goods?"[1]) Then, too, whenever specific suggestions were read into these "theories," they more often than not confused the issue and led to decisions contrary to common sense. For example, the dogmatic restrictions placed upon the use of interest rates in planning and in price-setting stemmed from a debatable interpretation of Marx's doctrine that human labor was the originator of all value. Because of the lack of objective criteria for choosing among investment alternatives, enormous sums were squandered on expensive projects such as dams and canals, which took years to build and many years of use to pay for themselves, while desirable, quick-yielding projects had to be abandoned or postponed for lack of funds.

The diffidence of Soviet planners toward theory was bound up with a fear of contamination by bourgeois economic principles. "Interest rates," "marginal costs," "profit maximization"—these concepts could not just be sterilized by infusing them with a new "socialist content"; their subversive nature still showed through. And, in any case, to most poorly-trained Soviet economists their usefulness for planning purposes was not obvious enough to warrant any attempt at ideological compromise.

As fate would have it, the 1930's saw the forging in the West of a new economic tool which had direct practical significance for Soviet planning. This was input-output analysis, a method developed by Wasily Leontief of Harvard University, who before emigrating to the West had studied and worked in Moscow in the mid-1920's and had become familiar with early Soviet attempts at coordinating national plans. Input-output analysis provided an instrument which could be most useful in eliminating inconsistencies in Soviet plans and doing away with the waste of plant capacity and manpower resulting from poorly synchronized production plans and consequent breakdowns in the delivery of materials. It was designed to answer the following type of question: Given certain targets for "end-products," such as clothing, processed foods, tanks, houses, machinery and industrial buildings, what quantities of raw materials and semifabricates would have to be produced to support this program?

THIS IS NOT so simple a question when one considers, for example, that steel is needed to make more steel, or that electric power is needed to make aluminum ingots, which in turn are fashioned into wire and conductors used to carry electricity. Myriads of such complex interrelations among and within industrial sectors can be traced in an input-output table for the economy if the table can be made detailed enough—with as many producing and consuming sectors as can practically be distinguished. The larger the table, however, the more computations are required to make up a consistent plan; with 200 sectors or more, only modern electronic computing machinery can cope with the millions of linkages in an input-output table. It should be noted in this connection that over 800 commodities or groups of commodities are now planned and rationed out to industrial consumers by Gosplan, the supreme Soviet planning organ.

Nevertheless, interest in input-output analysis seems to have awakened only three or four years ago in the Soviet Union. Soviet economists, when questioned about this tardiness, claim that it was the lack of computing machinery, rather than doctrinal rigidity, which held back experimentation with Leontief's methods. Since 1956, however, notable progress has been made. Although Gosplan still balances its plans by trial-and-error, with-

[1] *Cf.* Kantorovich's remarks at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences, reported in the *New York Times*, May 29, 1959.

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out any systematic procedure for achieving consistency, a number of pilot-programs, each encompassing 40 to 50 sectors, have been run through the computers available at a center attached to the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. As more capacious computers are developed and made available to economists—who for the time being command only a low order of priority in their use—it is quite possible that input-output will become an essential aid in formulating Soviet economic plans.

BUT THE PROPER INTERNAL coordination of economic plans is only one aspect of rational planning. Plans can be balanced to a nicety and still be egregiously wasteful: inner consistency signifies nothing when it comes to whether or not the planners are making efficient use of the resources at hand—*i. e.*, whether maximum quantities of desired products, in the proper assortment, are being turned out with the manpower, land, plant capacity, and time at the nation's disposal. The muddling-through procedures of Soviet planning have proven at least as imperfect in this respect as they have with respect to consistency.

Traditional "bourgeois" economic analysis is not too helpful either in solving the efficiency problem in a centrally planned economy, since it postulates for every instant of time a set of rational prices as a guide to efficient allocation. If these prices could only be computed, it would be a fairly easy matter for a planner to combine the inputs of materials, labor and capital going into each product so as to minimize the costs of an industry or enterprise and attain the largest profit for this entity. But it is just as hard to devise a set of rational prices in the absence of markets as it is to lay down the right production targets and the right combination of inputs without any rational prices to go by.

To help resolve this dilemma, chance again came into play. In 1938 and 1939, a Soviet mathematician named Kantorovich was asked to solve certain practical managerial problems of limited scope. One such problem was how to allocate a number of different machines—used to make a mixture of products requiring varying amounts of machine time—in order to produce these products in certain predetermined proportions. Kantorovich solved these problems and published a pamphlet outlining his solution and method.[2] The pamphlet, together with a paper published shortly thereafter on the transportation problem, formulated the basic ideas of linear programming. As it turned out, this method was susceptible of application to much wider problems than those Kantorovich had originally tackled, most notably to the problem of the optimum utilization of the national resources as a whole.

[2] L. V. Kantorovich, *Matematicheskie metody organizatsii i planirovania proizvodstva* (Mathematical methods for the organization and planning of production), Leningrad, 1939.

It was not until 1947-48 that the American mathematician George B. Dantzig, working for the US Department of the Air Force, independently rediscovered linear programming,[3] which immediately attracted a good deal of attention in the United States. As early as June 1949, a conference on "Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation"[4] assembled most of the American pioneers of the new technique including Dantzig, T. C. Koopmans and Marshall Wood. By the mid-1950's, the elements of this new branch of economics were already being taught in a number of American universities.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, it took many years of preaching in the wilderness before Kantorovich was listened to. In his recent book on the efficient utilization of resources,* Kantorovich cites many reports which he made to the Mathematical Institute and the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences between 1940 and 1950, apparently without creating any stir at all. Kantorovich's influence on Soviet theory and practice remained negligible until perhaps two years ago when he and a few collaborators in Leningrad began to collaborate in a consultative capacity with the representatives of various industries in order to solve certain specific production problems. Much more recently, in Moscow, Academician Nemchinov has been placed in charge of a group of about twenty young economists and mathematicians working on input-output and linear-programming. One of the tasks they have been assigned is to study the most efficient exploitation of coal mines in southern Russia and the best use of the existing transportation network to distribute this coal among consumers. But nothing has yet been done to apply these ideas to programming for the economy as a whole, and the Gosplan bureaucrats are still operating according to time-honored routine.

KANTOROVICH'S BOOK is more than just another contribution to the theory of linear programming: it is a reformulation of the traditional principles of efficient allocation of resources as seen through the eyes of a linear-programmer. The mathematics are confined to two long appendices. The text concentrates on a

[3] "Programming of Interdependent Activities: II Mathematical Model." *Econometrica*, Vol. 17, July-October 1949, pp. 200-211. Dantzig's computational procedure (the "simplex method") could be applied to more general problems than those Kantorovich had dealt with, and was an important advance in its own right.

[4] "Activity analysis" is the term used to denote the general theoretical framework within which linear and non-linear programming figure as particular cases.

* *Ekonomicheski raschet nailuchshchevo ispolzovania resursov* (The economic calculation of the optimum utilization of resources), Moscow, 1959.

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systematic exposition of the principles of rational allocation of resources (1) at an instant of time ("static model"), (2) through time ("dynamic models"), and (3) through space ("transportation problems").[5] The most elementary static model is the one which the author devised back in 1939; it solved the problem of how to allocate machines with given productivities per work shift among different jobs or products—while maintaining certain proportions in the desired assortment of production (the "product-mix")—so as to get as large a "bundle" of products as possible. In the case of two products, the problem may be solved by first allotting all machines to product A and then gradually shifting machines to product B in such a manner as to lose as little as possible of product A per unit gained of product B. The greater the increase desired in product B, and the larger the number of machines shifted, the greater will be the loss of product A per unit of increment of product B, since opportunities for shifting at a small loss are soon exhausted. The process stops when the desired proportion in the output of the two products has been attained. At this point, the ratio of product B gained per unit of product A lost represents what Western economists would term an "opportunity cost at the margin." Kantorovich calls it a ratio of "objectively determined valuations" and makes clear that these "valuations" are really the internal ("shadow") prices of the system. For any linear-programming problem, which may involve many more scarce factors (machines, labor of different skills, plant capacity, transportation facilities), products, and alternative production processes than in the example cited, there exists a unique set of "valuations" or "shadow" prices corresponding to the optimal solution of the problem. These prices—which we shall call "efficient"—are such that if the production processes were placed under the control of autonomous managers, and if these managers were instructed to maximize "profits" (maximize the value of outputs minus the value of inputs, all computed at efficient prices), they would produce the same quantities of the desired products with the same combination of factors as in the optimal allocation calculated by the linear programming method.[6] If certain processes were inefficient, then the managers would produce nothing at all, since they could make no positive profit. These processes would also be excluded by the optimal linear-programming solution.

The bulk of Kantorovich's book is devoted to an analysis of the "valuations," and a comparison of these with the price system for producer goods actually in force in the Soviet Union.[7] These Soviet prices he calls "*a priori*" and he frankly condemns them for failing to express "equivalencies" at the margin: one ruble of copper may be worth more or less to the economy (as judged by the planners) than one ruble of tin or nickel. Chances are that the relative scarcities of these metals are not reflected in their present prices—as they would be if their prices were computed from a linear programming model of the economy as a whole, taking into account all the alternative processes for which the metals might be used, as well as the limited supplies of the ores and other inputs necessary to produce them.

Kantorovich does not believe in instituting a free market for producer goods (which would result in efficient prices through the action of supply and demand forces), but would rather use industry-wide and eventually economy-wide linear programs to compute these efficient prices, thus circumventing the need for decentralizing the entire economy. He seems to realize the difficulties involved in collecting the data for such a task and in calculating a solution, even with the most up-to-date electronic machinery; but he is convinced that even approximations and partial solutions (limited to an industry or a single region) would be better than the system as it operates at present. After all, if we are to believe the author, there is so much waste to be eliminated that any improvement would be welcome: the "net output" of the economy, in his estimation, would stand to increase by 30 to 50 percent if the linear-programming methods he advocates were adopted.[8]

NOT ONLY is this extraordinary book written in a language Western economists can understand, but in one guise or another it embraces most basic propositions touching on the efficient allocation of resources. We may find in it the notion of consumers' surplus (pp. 215-217), the idea that the value of the incremental product of a factor should be equal everywhere (p. 82-84), and

[5] It is not possible to tell from the text whether the author arrived at these principles independently or whether he was already familiar with them and recognized the parallels between the traditional and the linear-programming solutions to the problem of rationing scarce means to achieve given ends. Kantorovich's only reference to a traditional formulation of the efficiency problem is to Vilfredo Pareto (note 1, p. 303), an "economist-apologist of capitalism," whom he accuses of making maximizing assumptions which are inappropriate under capitalist conditions (due to the presence of unemployment and underutilization of resources). His position on this point seems very near to that of Oskar Lange, who once quipped that bourgeois economics was the economics of socialism, and Marxist economics the economics of capitalism.

[6] This assumes certain properties of the "dynamic process of adjustment," which need not concern us here.

[7] Kantorovich rarely questions the appropriateness of the economic program laid down by the authorities. He is more concerned with *how* to achieve it with the least expenditure of resources than with indicating what might be a more desirable set of production targets to begin with. He is also exceedingly wary of discussing the prices of consumer goods, presumably because he does not want to touch on the issue of "consumers' sovereignty," that is, on the influence that consumers might be able to exert through their market choice on the allocation of resources.

[8] Kantorovich, *Ekonomicheski raschet* . . . p. 17.

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the principle that it is rational for an enterprise to increase its scale of output up to the point where the (efficient) price of each product just covers the cost of producing its last unit (p. 164). In his long chapter devoted to "perspective planning" (dynamic programming), Kantorovich makes no bones about adopting the rate of interest as a device for parcelling out investment funds and for discounting the value of future output and future costs to the present. He is also careful to stress that this rate of interest must be "objectively determined" (on the basis of the given supply of capital and the production targets laid down for future years) and not just be set arbitrarily at some conventional figure.

Only the book's occasional critiques of the free market and of capitalism may seem superficial and out of place to "bourgeois economists," but such critiques are probably mandatory for any innovator wishing to propitiate the censors, the reviewers, and party critics.

ACTUALLY IT TAKES more than just a few incantations to conciliate the authorities on the lookout for heresies. Academician Nemchinov, in a lengthy introduction to Kantorovich's book, acknowledged the work as a valuable aid in solving specific managerial problems at the plant or even perhaps at the industry level, but he took the author to task for his allegedly misguided criticism of the Soviet price system and for exaggerating the usefulness of his methods for solving economic problems on a nationwide scale. It is all very well to shuffle machines around in a workshop to raise productivity, according to Nemchinov, but a national economic plan is bound up with political decisions and cannot be concocted in mechanical fashion.

The economist Ia. A. Kronrod, in a speech made at a seminar on the application of mathematics to economics, spoke out much more severely against Kantorovich. He accused the latter of failing to rely on Marxist value theory in his approach to the general problems of the economy, and of "slipping onto the path of error" by reverting to "obsolete marginal-utility theories" and other forms of marginalism as well.[9] Kronrod concluded that any such attempt to "defile Soviet methodology" should be convincingly refuted. Finally, a strong criticism of Kantorovich's marginalist approach, signed by A. Boyarski, one of the best known mathematical economists in the Soviet Union, appeared in the January 1960 issue of *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (Planned economy).

For the time being, the party has not thought fit to intervene in the dispute between the proponents of scientific planning (*cum* mathematical methods) and the old-line adherents of Marxist economic sociology. The bureaucrats and *apparatchiki* who make top-level operational decisions regarding the allocation of resources may also have something to say on the suitability of input-output and linear-programming methods for drawing up national plans. Will they brook the interference of this "outgroup" of scientists who have no practical experience in the field and who probably know little or nothing of the browbeating, the cajoling, and the bargaining which mark the formulation and implementation of Soviet plans from Gosplan all the way down to the production shop? The enforced collaboration of bureaucrats and scientists is likely to engender conflicts of views and of personalities which could not easily be resolved.

If, nevertheless, the scientists are invited to share in the responsibility for elaborating Soviet plans, and if they can enlist the cooperation of their more experienced predecessors, they will undoubtedly find ways to improve the functioning of the economy—without radically altering any of the institutions dear to the hearts of the Soviet leaders. In the short run, this is likely to lead to an acceleration of Soviet economic growth and a faster narrowing of the gap between Soviet and American levels of output.

More important, a rational choice of means cannot fail, in the long run, to influence the choice of ends. Some scientists will eventually ask whether, after thirty years of industrialization, the policy of giving continued priority to the all-out expansion of heavy industry can withstand rational appraisal. What useful purpose do production records in metallurgy and heavy engineering serve in the light of the major political objectives of the nation? When does the accumulation of military hardware cease to contribute to national security? These and many other questions may be raised once reason begins to rule in the highest councils. This is about the best thing we can hope for.

J. M. Montias

(Mr. Montias, whose "The Polish 'Economic Model'" appeared in the last issue of this journal, is Assistant Professor of Economics at Yale University.)

[9] *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 9, pp. 61-62. Kronrod's accusation is baseless, as Kantorovich nowhere in his book shows any evidence of favoring marginal-utility theories. In fact, he goes to some pains to dodge the issue altogether by taking the proportions of the product-mix laid down by the authorities as his point of departure for all calculations (see footnote 7).

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